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In 2002, the Russian government began distributing tens of thousands of Russian 
passports in the de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some scholarly attention 
has been devoted to this process, known as passportization, but most of the literature 
treats passportization as a primarily political process, ignoring its geographic aspects. 
This thesis shows that passportization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia amounted to a 
process of “biocolonization,” wherein the populations of the de facto states were 
discursively captured by Russia through individual naturalization. Consequently, 
passportization served to create “Russian spaces” within the internationally recognized 
borders of Georgia and, in the process challenged international legal norms rooted in the 
logic of the modern state system. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
То, что существует, не сознаётся. 
То, что сознаётся, не существует. 
 
(That which exists is not acknowledged. 
That which is acknowledged does not exist.) 
-Soviet-era proverb 
 
On August 8, 2008, on the first day of the Summer Olympics in Beijing, the 
Russian 19
th
 Motorized Rifle Division crossed into Georgian territory. The invasion was 
justified on the grounds that Georgia was engaging in genocide in South Ossetia and that 
Russian citizens, whom the Kremlin had a duty to protect, were caught in the crossfire. 
Only four days later, the fighting was over. The Georgian military had been routed, 
Russia controlled the main highway connecting eastern and western Georgia, effectively 
bisecting the country, and much of Georgia‟s infrastructure lay in ruins. What became 
known as the Five Day War provoked an avalanche of criticism and commentary in the 
Western press. Much of this commentary focused on assigning blame for the war to one 
side or the other, trying to fit the conflict into some larger ideological framework, or 
attempting to find in it some greater meaning or lesson for policymakers regarding the 
future of European security and Russia‟s place in it. Was the war Moscow's response to 
the West's support for Kosovo's independence? Were these the opening moves of a "new 
Cold War?"  
The exact causes of the Five Day War remain obscure. Some argue that the 
President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, provoked the attack by recklessly trying to 
 2 
reestablish Tbilisi‟s jurisdiction in South Ossetia.1 Others maintain that the invasion had 
been in the works for years, and that the timing of it was basically incidental.
2
 Regardless 
of the true reason, the Kremlin ultimately claimed that it had a right and duty to defend 
Russian citizens in South Ossetia, whom, it claimed, had come under attack by Georgian 
forces. An attack on its citizens, even if they lived beyond the borders of the Russian 
Federation, was treated as an attack on the territory of Russia itself. Numerous 
commentators
3
 have pointed out that the "citizens" in question were neither ethnic 
Russians, nor did they have any factual connection to Russia itself.
4
 Their status as 
Russian citizens, in fact, was the product of a relatively recent program of 
"passportization," the mass conferral of Russian citizenship on non-Russians living 
outside the borders of the Russian Federation.  
Unfortunately, much of what has been written about the Five Day War has largely 
ignored the issue of passportization. When passportization is mentioned, it is usually 
treated in a somewhat cursory fashion. Most commonly, it is simply noted that the newly 
naturalized Russian citizens conveniently constituted populations that Russia was able to 
justify "defending" in accordance with Article 61 of the Russian Constitution, which 
pledges "defense and patronage" to Russian citizens living beyond the borders of the 
                                                     
1
 Timothy Thomas, “The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-Day War in South 
Ossetia,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22 (2009): 33-35. 
 
2
 Andrei Illarionov, "The Russian Leadership‟s Preparation for War, 1999-2008," in The Guns of August 
2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, ed. Svante Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, M.E. Sharpe & Co., 
2009). 
 
3
 See, for example: Illarionov, 56.; Ronald Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, 
and the Future of the West (New York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010), 42. 
 
4
 According to the official European Union report on the war, "[a] sufficient factual relationship is created 
by residence in the territory, when the person to be naturalized has a biological (family) relationship to the 
state, and when he or she was in the governmental service of the state." See: Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), Report Vol. 2 (2009), 160. 
 3 
Russian Federation. The traditional narrative of the war thus argues that passportization 
simply created a convenient excuse for Russia to go to war; Other factors, such as 
"revenge for Kosovo," "punishment for American meddling in Russia‟s „backyard,‟" and 
"preventing Georgia from joining NATO" are commonly cited as the proximate causes of 
the conflict. 
While not necessarily dismissing these popularly accepted explanations for the 
war, I argue that passportization had important territorial and legal repercussions, and 
was therefore a far more complex phenomenon than is normally understood, one that 
cannot be reduced to a mere ploy to manufacture a casus belli. Passportization was also a 
means of subverting the norms of international law and the modern state system by 
discursively laying claim to parts of Georgia‟s territory and quietly violating the principle 
of territorial sovereignty. One scholar has aptly called passportization "the 
instrumentalization of citizenship to justify territorial claims… a form of imperialism by 
civic means."
5
  
Although passportization was not introduced until 2002, it was one of the most 
drastic measures taken by the Russian government to solidify its hold over the 
secessionist territories.
6
 It also had the most far-reaching consequences. By converting 
the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Russian citizens, not only did Russia 
grant itself de facto veto rights over any decisions made in Tbilisi regarding the status of 
the secessionist provinces, it also contributed to the effective territorial dismemberment 
of the Georgian state. As a result of passportization, which exploited the longstanding 
                                                     
5
 Florian Mühlfried, "Citizenship at War: Passports and Nationality in the 2008 Russian-Georgian 
Conflict," Anthropology Today 26, no. 2 (2010): 9. 
 
6
 IIFFMCG, Report Vol. 2, 147. 
 4 
discursive link between population and territory, any attempt by Georgia to re-integrate 
the de facto states would immediately escalate to an inter-state conflict with the Russian 
Federation; any attack on Abkhazia or South Ossetia would be treated as an attack on 
Russia itself. In effect, passportization created "Russian spaces" within the internationally 
recognized borders of Georgia in which the government in Moscow had more effective 
control than even the authorities in Tskhinvali or Sokhumi, to say nothing of officials in 
Tbilisi. 
Against this backdrop, the passportization can be viewed as a last-ditch attempt to 
prevent the collapse of a political-territorial regime that persisted since the early 1990s 
rather than as an excuse to start a war. When Abkhazia and South Ossetia attempted to 
break away from Georgia shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia sided 
with the separatists, ensuring that Georgia had little chance of prevailing in its attempts to 
prevent their secession. Once the fighting ended, however, the government in Moscow 
stopped short of recognition for the new de facto states. Instead, it established 
peacekeeping missions and began to provide significant political and economic support 
for the separatist regimes.  
This arrangement was consistent with Russian policy elsewhere in former Soviet 
realm. Hoping to preserve Russian influence in the newly independent states at a 
relatively low cost, the Kremlin opted to "freeze" the conflicts in Georgia. Moscow 
stepped in as a putative mediator between Tbilisi and the de facto regimes and Russian 
military personnel led the peacekeeping forces in the region, but in reality the Kremlin 
worked to prevent a real rapprochement between Georgia and the separatists. Until 2008, 
Russian recognition of the de facto states hung over the head of the government in Tbilisi 
 5 
like a Sword of Damocles, forcing the Georgian government to accommodate Russia‟s 
interests.  
Due to its focus on the link between passportization and territory, this thesis 
avoids trying to answer questions such as "who shot first" or to confirm or refute 
explanations such as the "Kosovo" or "NATO" theses. These topics have already been the 
subject of numerous treatments by Ronald Asmus, David Smith, and others.
7
 Nor do I 
take a position on whether Abkhazia and South Ossetia are morally or historically 
deserving of statehood. Instead, this thesis explores the largely neglected territorial 
aspects of passportization as well as its implications for international law, putting 
passportization, as well as the wider conflict between Georgia and Russia, into a 
historical context. 
The study begins with a discussion of Soviet nationality policy. When the Soviet 
Union fell apart, the internal borders that were drawn by Soviet cartographers frequently 
became sites of violence between competing ethnic groups. The thesis goes on to trace 
the contours of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. If it was Soviet nationality policy that 
set the stage for the violence that erupted in Georgia in the 1990s, then it was Russian 
involvement that eventually "froze" the conflicts and helped to prevent their resolution. 
Support for the de facto regimes in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali was perceived by Moscow as 
a low-cost means of keeping Georgia destabilized and reestablishing Russian hegemony 
in the Transcaucasus. In the wake of Georgia‟s Rose Revolution in 2003, however, the 
new Western-oriented and reformist government began to undermine Russian hegemony 
                                                     
7
 See, for example: Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World.; David Smith, "The Saakashvili 
Administration‟s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 2008 War," in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s 
War in Georgia, ed. Svante Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, M.E. Sharpe & Co., 2009), 122-142. 
 6 
by openly declaring its commitment to joining NATO and taking more aggressive steps 
toward reestablishing Georgia‟s territorial integrity.  
The fifth chapter of this study investigates the territorial and legal aspects of 
passportization. Russia soon realized that it could no longer rely upon the presence of its 
peacekeeping forces alone to discourage Georgia from attempting to revise the status 
quo. The chapter also documents how passportization was employed to capture the 
populations of the de facto states, a process I call "biocolonization." The result of this 
process was the discursive redefinition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "Russian 
spaces” within the borders of Georgia. It was in defense of the residents of these 
territories that Russia went to war in 2008, invoking the controversial and little-used legal 
concept of the protection of nationals abroad to justify its invasion of Georgia.  
Beyond the obvious fact, then, that it created a potential casus belli to justify 
Russia‟s invasion of Georgia, passportization is also problematic in terms of international 
law and presents distinct challenges to the logic of the modern state system. Not only did 
the large-scale naturalization of Georgian citizens represent a fairly clear violation of 
Georgia‟s territorial sovereignty and personal jurisdiction, but the net result of 
passportization was the creation of two new and largely unrecognized states in the South 
Caucasus. In the aftermath of the conflict, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
as independent states, although their legal status remains unclear. Despite that the 
international community maintains that the recognition of Kosovo is a sui generis case, 
Russia has nevertheless cited Kosovo as a precedent for recognizing Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, raising questions about whether they themselves will be seen has having set a 
precedent for the recognition of other separatist territories elsewhere in the world. 
 7 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Even seemingly small and unimportant political territories have the 
capacity to empower, differentiate, and provide meaning and identity… 
-Robert Ostergren
8
 
 
As is the case with most military conflicts, the Five Day War did not materialize 
out of thin air. The war that broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008 was the 
product of numerous historical and political circumstances that date back in some cases 
to the early 1920s, if not before. Of particular importance to the political and territorial 
situation in post-Soviet Georgia was Soviet nationality policy, which was responsible for 
initially constituting Abkhazia and South Ossetia as autonomous units subordinate to the 
government in Tbilisi.
9
 The political borders drawn by Soviet ethnographers frequently 
did not conform to the actual distribution of populations; this was no accident. The Soviet 
government created numerous pseudo-autonomous ethno-territorial units, such as South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and subordinated them to larger, more powerful republics, like 
Georgia. This practice effectively built instability and inter-communal friction into the 
territorial network of the USSR. Writing in 1992, Minogue and Williams once noted the 
“curious fact” that, in their words, “the Bolsheviks seem to have created, quite 
deliberately, some of the problems they now face.”10 With the Soviet government playing 
the role of peacemaker, the system held together for several decades. However, fuelled by 
                                                     
8
 Robert Ostergren, “Defining Liechtenstein,” in Borderlines and Borderlands, ed. Alexander Diener and 
Joshua Hagen (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 138. 
 
9
 Robert Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 412. 
 
10
 Keith Minogue and Beryl Williams, “Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union: The Revenge of 
Particularism,” in Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study 
of the USSR, ed. Alexander Motyl (New York, Columbia University Press, 1992), 226. 
 8 
the sudden availability of ethno-nationalism as an ideological alternative to Communism 
during the period of glasnost’ and perestroika in the 1980s, the autonomous regions of 
Georgia began to demand independence from Tbilisi, just as Georgia itself was seeking 
independence from the Soviet Union. The result was the outbreak of bitter wars between 
the Georgian government and the separatist movements in the early 1990s. 
Ultimately, it was thanks to Russian support, military and otherwise, that the 
secessionist regimes were able to survive.
11
 After an initial period of withdrawal from its 
former empire, the Russian government eventually reengaged in the so-called "near 
abroad." Moscow's patronage of the separatist governments in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali 
states can be seen as a continuation of the old Soviet policy of "divide and rule," which 
been a key feature of Russian imperialism in the Caucasus for centuries.
12
 By the time the 
Five Day War broke out in 2008, the long-simmering conflict between the Georgian 
government and the separatist regimes had been transformed from an inter-ethnic conflict 
between the secessionist regimes and metropolitan Georgia into an interstate conflict 
between Georgia and Russia, one in which the de facto states themselves played a 
somewhat peripheral role. 
2.1: Georgia Until 1918 
Fifteen independent states emerged out of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some, 
such as Kazakhstan, had no history of statehood prior to their creation as Soviet 
republics. Other states could point to a long historical existence that in some cases pre-
dated both the Soviet and Russian Empires. In Georgia, as in the Baltic States, a long pre-
                                                     
11
 Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus 
(New York, New York University Press, 2007), 135. 
 
12
 Ibid. 
 9 
Soviet history proved to be a potent rallying point for the incipient nationalist movement. 
Inspired by discourses of anti-imperialism that emphasized Georgia's historical and 
cultural distinctiveness, the Georgian national movement quickly became one of the most 
powerful in the in the late Soviet Union. Ghia Nodia has described the Georgian 
nationalists‟ uncompromising stance, writing that 
[t]he predominance of radical philosophy could be 
explained by the Georgian political heritage. Historical 
memory traced Georgia‟s glorious past as an independent 
country to medieval times. Decades of communist rule had 
destroyed the elements of civil society that had emerged 
before the forcible Soviet occupation of 1921, and had left 
the intellectual elite, and the general public, with mostly 
medieval ideals of political behavior. The heroic 
„irreconcilable‟ stance had much stronger appeal than the 
search for concrete political means of achieving specific 
ends. The radical mood was characterized by a lack of (if 
not contempt for) political sobriety and tolerance.
13
 
The vehemence with which Georgian nationalists argued for separation from 
Russia has its roots in the conflicted relationship between Georgia and Russia, which 
dates from the latter half of the 18
th
 century. Throughout history, the Caucasus region has 
been a proverbial "crossroads of empires." Variously falling under the control of the 
Roman, Persian, Mongol, Ottoman, and Russian empires, Georgia, being small and 
relatively weak, has often had little choice but to accept domination by its more powerful 
neighbors. Russia began to throw off the shackles of Mongol dominance in the 16
th
 
century and Georgia, which had Christianized in the 4
th
 century, began to see the growing 
Orthodox power to its north as a possible protector against its traditional suzerains, the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires. The Georgian monarchy's appeals to Russia produced few 
tangible results, however, until 1801, when Tsar Aleksandr I politically annexed eastern 
                                                     
13
 Ghia Nodia, "Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia," in Contested 
Borders in the Caucasus, ed. Bruno Coppieters (Brussels, VUBPRESS, 1996), 76. 
 10 
Georgia. Although the Russian Empire had established a presence in the western part of 
Georgia as early as 1812, this region, which included Abkhazia, was not fully integrated 
until 1864, when it was ceded to the Tsar by the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the 
western part of the country was considered a separate territory, only coming under 
Russian control at a relatively late date would eventually prove to be a crucial factor in 
Abkhaz territorial discourses, which emphasized Abkhazia‟s "historical separateness" 
from the rest of Georgia.
14
 
While annexation by Russia more or less ensured that the Orthodox Georgians 
would remain free from Islamic rule, it also laid the foundations for a centuries-long 
tension between Georgia and Russia. From the very beginning, Georgia felt abused by its 
more powerful neighbor. For instance, not long after annexing Georgia, Tsar Aleksandr, 
after initially promising to leave the Georgian ruling monarchy on the throne, instead 
abolished outright the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, as it was called at the time. 
As historian Ronald Suny notes: 
By unilaterally removing the [Bagratid dynasty] from the 
[Georgian] throne, Alexander ended any pretense of 
Georgian acquiescence in Russia‟s actions. Instead of 
signing a treaty of mutual consent, the tsar made the final 
decision without even consulting the Georgian 
representatives in St. Petersburg.
15
 
Such imperial arrogance would become all too familiar to Georgian elites, whose 
wariness of Russian – and later, Soviet – power has its roots in centuries of highhanded 
imperial arrogance.  
                                                     
14
 Stanislav Lak‟oba, "History: 18th Century – 1917," in The Abkhazians: A Handbook, ed. George Hewitt 
(Richmond, Curzon, 1999), 84. 
 
15
 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2
nd
 edition (Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 59.  
 11 
After annexation, Georgia became a key part of the Russian Empire. Its capital, 
which at that time was known by its Armenian name, Tiflis, was considered to be one of 
the empire‟s most cosmopolitan cities. The Georgian aristocracy was highly integrated 
into Imperial power structures, with numerous Georgians, such as the famous Pyotr 
Bagration, who fought against Napoleon, holding high rank in Russian society. The bulk 
of Georgian society, meanwhile, remained predominantly agrarian. Ethnic Russians 
oversaw the administration of the territory while Armenians largely controlled the 
economy.
16
 The predominantly rural nature of pre-Soviet Georgian society is illustrated 
by the fact that, by the turn of the 20
th
 century, ethnic Georgians only made up just over a 
quarter of the population in their own capital city, while Armenians were nearly 40%. A 
century early, Armenians had constituted over 75% of Tiflis' population, while most 
Georgians remained peasants.
17
  
Russian and Armenian control of the country largely relegated the native 
Georgian aristocracy to the management of their own estates, which left them particularly 
vulnerable to the changing social currents in the Russian Empire. Indeed, when Tsar 
Aleksandr II abolished serfdom in 1861, the Georgian aristocracy had few means of 
supporting itself and swiftly became impoverished. It was around this time that the 
Georgian national movement began to coalesce, and it is important to note that the 
nascent national movement was almost entirely limited to the upper class, which resented 
its perceived oppression at the hands of Russians and Armenians. 
                                                     
16
 Ibid., 139. 
 
17
 Ibid., 116. 
 
 12 
If nationalist ideas began to gain a foothold among the upper classes, socialist 
ideas began to acquire a great deal of currency among the growing Georgian working 
class in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. As in Russia, the growth of socialism was 
driven to a large extent by the migration of the peasantry into cities in search of work 
after the abolition of serfdom.
18
 In Georgia, however, socialist ideas quickly became 
intertwined with nationalism. "In the view of the Marxists," writes Suny, "Georgia could 
be returned to the Georgians only when the revolution eliminated the dual domination of 
Russian bureaucracy and Armenian industrialists."
19
 While it would be a mistake to 
portray socialist agitation in Georgia as being primarily a nationalist project, the anti-
imperialism embedded in Marxist discourses nevertheless lent itself to the Georgian 
national struggle. In the words of one historian, Georgians became known as 
perhaps the most sophisticated Marxists in the empire, 
taking over from the Austrian Marxists the notion of 
individual cultural autonomy as the best way of making 
possible inter-ethnic cooperation in a multi-national state. 
They also adapted their original agrarian programme so that 
it met the demands of peasants, and in that way were able 
to make themselves the leading political force in the 
countryside as well as the towns.
20
 
As Marxism gained more widespread support in Georgia, however, major 
cleavages began to develop in the movement. As in Russia, perhaps the most famous – 
and ultimately the most historically significant – was the schism between the moderate 
Menshevik and the more radical Bolshevik factions. After the February Revolution of 
1917, the Mensheviks, led by the popular Noe Zhordania, seized control of the 
                                                     
18
 Ibid., 115. 
 
19
 Ibid., 145. 
 
20
 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001), 386. 
 
 13 
government. Zhordania later criticized the October Revolution in Russia, condemning the 
new Bolshevik government "illegitimate and irresponsible."
21
 Despite presiding over a 
weak, post-colonial economy and an unstable political landscape, the Mensheviks 
enjoyed widespread support throughout Georgia, although both the Ossetian and Abkhaz 
populations supported the Bolsheviks. 
The collapse of the Russian Empire severely undermined the old center-periphery 
relationship between Russia and its former colonies, and the need for some semblance of 
political structure in the Transcaucasus during the chaos of the Civil War forced the 
Mensheviks to accede to the creation of the Democratic Federative Republic of 
Transcaucasia, a short-lived attempt to unite Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In April 
of 1918, Turkey, eager to aggrandize its territory at the expense of Russia, began to 
pressure the Transcaucasian Republic to declare its independence. The Transcaucasian 
Republic proved to be politically unworkable, however, and Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan were all more interested in pursuing their own national interests than they 
were in regional cooperation. The republic disintegrated into its constituent parts after 
only one month, leaving the Mensheviks in control of the first independent Georgian state 
in over a century. 
This period of independence, although it was brief, was a crucial moment in 
Georgian history. For the first time in centuries, Georgia was free from external control, 
whether Russian, Turkish, or Persian. Despite grievous economic problems, many of 
which were the result of centuries of Russian domination, the government enjoyed 
                                                     
21
 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 191. 
 
 14 
genuine popularity.
22
 When Georgia once again became an independent state in 1991, 
Menshevik Georgia the only previous example of self-government that the country‟s 
political class could draw upon. The importance of the Menshevik period on post-Soviet 
Georgia was reflected by the fact that the new Georgian republic quickly reverted to the 
flag flown by the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia between 1918 and 
1921. The brevity of Georgia‟s existence as an independent state in the modern era, 
however, also left it without a deeply rooted political tradition, which led to confusion 
and chaos when it seceded from the Soviet Union. 
Having finally achieved independence from Russia, Georgia was once again to 
fall victim to Russian imperialism. In 1920 Lenin signed a treaty giving up all Russian 
claims to Georgian territory.
23
 The Bolsheviks soon violated this accord. In an echo of 
Tsar Aleksandr I‟s abolishment of the Georgian monarchy in 1801, the Red Army 
invaded Georgia in 1921 to support a Bolshevik insurrection in southern Georgia, an 
uprising that Azerbaijani and Armenian Bolsheviks had organized in the first place.
24
 The 
Menshevik government was quickly toppled and, within a year, Georgia had once again 
been merged with its neighbors. The new state called the Federal Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia (FSSSRZ), once again combined Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The decision to create the FSSSRZ was strenuously opposed 
even by Georgian Bolsheviks, but in the end, they were overruled by Moscow. By the 
end of 1922, the FSSSRZ itself had once again been reorganized, this time into the 
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Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (ZSFSR), which was forced to join 
the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  
Interestingly, while the ZSFSR itself theoretically had the right to secede from the 
Soviet Union, none of its constituent parts were afforded the right to secede either from 
the ZSFSR or from the Soviet Union itself. There can be little doubt that this arrangement 
was intended to prevent Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan from attempting individually 
to assert their independence from the Soviet state. It was only in 1936, when Soviet 
control was firmly established in the region, the states of the Transcaucasus once again 
became separate republics. As discussed later in this chapter, Soviet laws regarding the 
rights of different kinds of federal units to secede would prove to be of paramount 
importance in building ethno-territorial conflict into the geography of post-Soviet 
Georgia. 
2.2: The Soviet Period 
From its very inception, the Soviet government was faced with the problem of 
trying to implement a putatively internationalist socialist ideology in an empire 
characterized by a high degree of ethnic diversity. There is no room here, of course, to 
delve too deeply into the details of Soviet nationality policy.
25
 Suffice it to say, however, 
that from its very inception the Soviet Union was organized around the principle of 
ethno-territorial “autonomy.” Georgia's modern-day territorial configuration, moreover, 
is a direct result of the application of Soviet nationality policy. As will become clear, the 
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repercussions of these policies lie at the very heart of the events that resulted in the Five 
Day War. 
2.2.1: The Territorial Organization of the Soviet Union 
By the end of the Civil War, most of the former Russian Empire had come under 
Soviet control. Before the Revolution, Marxists had engaged in heated debates over the 
so-called "national question," or how socialism, which was conceived of at the time as an 
internationalist movement, was to relate to the problem of nationalism. Some socialists, 
such as Rosa Luxemburg, argued that nationalism was corrosive to proletarian unity and 
that territorial autonomy based on national identity was impermissible.
26
 Others, like Otto 
Bauer and other so-called "Austro-Marxists," were heavily influenced by the fraught 
national politics of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They favored of what they called 
"cultural autonomy." Cultural autonomy was an arrangement in which different groups 
would live in a multi-ethnic state and have the right to manage their own affairs while not 
possessing any particular territory of their own.
27
 Still others, such as Lenin and Stalin, 
advocated full territorial autonomy for minorities, arguing that democracy was 
impossible without the right to self-determination, which would remain impossible unless 
national groups controlled their own territories and had the right to secede.
28
 
When the Bolsheviks assumed control over the remnants of the multi-ethnic 
Russian empire, the "national question" became much more than a purely theoretical 
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problem. On the one hand, while Lenin supported territorial autonomy, he remained wary 
of ethno-federalism. He feared that the subordination the various ethnic territories to a 
central Russian government could eventually result in a return to the sort of Great 
Russian chauvinism that had characterized the late Tsarist era. On the other hand, Lenin 
had, following contemporary Marxist thought, originally assumed that economic factors 
would discourage separatism. Events proved him wrong. After the rapid secession of 
virtually all of the Russian Empire‟s minority populations, Lenin no longer harbored any 
illusions that non-Russian nationalities would willingly remain yoked to Russia if given 
the chance to secede. Reluctantly, then, Lenin acceded to proposals to establish the Soviet 
Union as a federal state comprised of national republics, all of which were nominally 
equal in status. 
In reality, real power was not invested in the republics themselves. Instead, the 
supposedly "above national" Communist Party assumed control of the state and the 
republics had only a limited amount of autonomy in making policy. The amount of actual 
independence enjoyed by a given republic depended on its level of autonomy, but in the 
end most important decisions wound up being dictated from “the center." The result was 
an arrangement that historian Richard Pipes has described as "a peculiar brand of pseudo-
federalism that provided neither equality nor authority" to the republics.
29
  
Ultimately, the Soviet Union wound up being organized as a rigidly hierarchical 
state. Beneath the "all-Union" level were the Union Republics (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, etc.). Beneath the Union Republics were the Autonomous Republics 
(ASSRs) and Autonomous Oblasts (AOs), like Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Svante 
                                                     
29
 Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York, Vintage Books, 1996), 108. 
 
 18 
Cornell has described the Union Republics as "smaller versions of the [Soviet] Union 
itself, with parliaments, constitutions, and virtually all the state structures enjoyed by 
independent states,” while Autonomous Oblasts and Republics were usually limited to 
deciding on certain cultural policies, although they too had some institutions of state.
30
 
Importantly, Union Republics possessed the legal right to secede from the Soviet Union, 
although Stalin once wryly observed that "[o]f course, none of our republics would 
actually raise the question of seceding…"31  
Crucially, the right to secede was only given to Union Republics; territorial units 
with lower levels of autonomy had to petition their Union Republic or the authorities in 
Moscow to effect any change in their status. The fact that only Union Republics were 
allowed the right to secede was to have serious repercussions in the early 1990s, when the 
Soviet Union was in the process of disintegration. Under Soviet law, the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (SSR) had the right to withdraw from the Soviet Union, but neither 
South Ossetia nor Abkhazia, both of which desired to separate from Georgia, could 
legally secede without authorization from both Moscow and Tbilisi. Ultimately, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia had little choice but to resort to violence to achieve their 
goal of independence. 
Soviet nationality policies, however, gave even Autonomous Republics and 
Oblasts a number of benefits, including, in some cases, access to native language 
education for non-Russian speakers. The state also implemented a number of "affirmative 
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action" policies that gave the titular nationality
32
 of a given republic preferential access to 
primary schooling, higher education, jobs, and positions in the government. Similar 
benefits did not accrue to non-titular nationalities living in the same republic. This meant, 
for instance, that Georgians and Mingrelians, who made up nearly half of the population 
of Abkhazia, found themselves at a severe disadvantage in relation to ethnic Abkhaz, 
who made up less than a quarter of the population.
 33
 Unsurprisingly, ethnic Georgians 
began to feel discriminated against. As Soviet power began to wane, the state was 
increasingly unable to moderate such disputes, and the bottled-up tensions that resulted 
from Soviet “affirmative action” policies became increasingly difficult to keep in check. 
2.2.2: Practical Applications of Soviet Nationality Policy  
During the Imperial period, internal borders between regions where different 
national groups lived were seldom demarcated. While numerous administrative districts 
were created, these borders were often drawn in accordance to the structure of military 
commands or the requirements of colonial government. During the early Soviet period, 
however, the government was constantly involved in the project of drawing and re-
drawing its internal borders in accordance with Lenin and Stalin‟s theories regarding 
national self-determination. Although some analysts have described Soviet border 
drawing as "arbitrary,"
34
 this should not be taken to mean that it was without rhyme or 
reason. While geography and population size played an important role in determining 
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whether a group was allowed to have an autonomous territory, and what level of 
autonomy that territory was could have, numerous scholars have pointed out that 
nationality policy was frequently instrumentalized by the state as a means of achieving 
concrete political goals.
35
 The power to draw the borders of autonomous regions, for 
instance, was utilized by the Soviet regime to weaken potentially threatening populations, 
a strategy commonly referred to as “divide and rule.” 
Perhaps the classic case of the Soviet government employing policies of "divide 
and rule" is Bashkiria, which many scholars agree was created to prevent the formation of 
the proposed Idal-Ural Republic. Had this republic been created, it would have been a 
powerful, Tatar-dominated republic at the heart of the Soviet Union.
36
 The Bolsheviks 
feared the emergence of a unified Turkic or Islamic resistance movement, and so Idal-
Ural Republic represented a serious potential threat to Soviet power. While David Laitin 
et al. argue persuasively that the Bolsheviks "probably overestimated" the pan-
Turkic/Islamic menace,
37
 there was nevertheless a perceived danger that a powerful, 
unified Tatar Republic at the heart of the Soviet Union could threaten Soviet power.  
Although the threat may not have been as imminent as the Bolshevik government 
imagined, it was nevertheless taken quite seriously, as is indicated by the extraordinary 
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steps that were taken to prevent the emergence of the Idal-Ural Republic. The Soviet 
government's response was to preempt the creation of the republic altogether by instead 
establishing several smaller, and Tatar republics that could be more easily controlled by 
the state. As Azade-Ayse Rorlich has written: 
To prevent Turkic unity and the emergence of a dynamic 
republic in the Middle Volga, the Soviet government chose 
to sponsor the formation of smaller republics; by doing so, 
it also fostered isolation and even nourished old jealousies 
and rivalries, thus facilitating its control over the peoples of 
the area.
38
 
The Bashkir ASSR, formed in 1919 out of a piece of territory that would have 
been included in the Idal-Ural Republic, wound up being the first Autonomous Republic 
established in the Soviet Union. The Tatar ASSR itself followed in 1920, along with the 
Chuvash, Mari, and Urdmurt Autonomous Oblasts, each of which would have been 
included in the proposed Idal-Ural Republic. In addition to preventing the consolidation 
of a powerful Tatar state, the new republics were also useful for propaganda. They served 
as concrete examples of the Soviet state‟s supposedly "progressive" attitudes toward 
ethnic minorities and its support for national self-determination.  
Although the Bashkir case is perhaps one of the clearest examples of Soviet 
"divide and rule" tactics, similar methods were employed throughout the Soviet Union, 
including in the Transcaucasus. Within the Georgian SSR, for instance, there were three 
autonomous regions: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjara.
39
 This meant that Georgia 
contained more autonomous regions than any other Union Republic except for Russia 
itself. The first of these, Abkhazia, has a long history as both an independent kingdom as 
                                                     
38
 Rorlich, 434. 
 
39
 See Map 1, 147. 
 
 22 
well as a constituent part of Georgia. Originally formed as a Union Republic in 1921, 
after supporting the Bolshevik faction against the Menshevik government in Georgia, 
Abkhazia subsequently subordinated to Georgia as an Autonomous Republic.  
The Abkhaz ASSR was likely created to foster pro-Soviet sentiment among the 
large Abkhazian diaspora living in Turkey,
40
 which would fit the Soviet pattern of 
creating what historian Terry Martin has called Soviet "Piedmonts." This term, of course, 
refers to the state of Sardinia-Piedmont, which served as a base for spreading Italian 
nationalism. In the Soviet context, in Martin‟s words, it refers to the idea that "cross-
border ethnic ties could be exploited to project Soviet influence into neighboring 
states."
41
 Additionally, by making the Abkhaz ASSR administratively subordinate to the 
Georgian SSR, the Soviet government ensured that Georgia would be a divided state, 
weakening the potential threat of Georgian nationalism.  
The borders of Abkhazia were drawn, for instance, in such a way that they 
bisected a large proportion of Georgia‟s Mingrelian population, which speaks a dialect of 
Georgian, between Georgia and Abkhazia. Despite having a total population several 
times as large as the Abkhaz, however, the Mingrelians were never given autonomy. 
Over time, and as a result of policies that encouraged ethnic Georgians to migrate to 
Abkhazia, tensions between Abkhazia and Georgia began to grow. Ethnic Abkhaz 
increasingly considered the republic‟s Mingrelian population little more than agents of 
Georgian chauvinism.
42
 Meanwhile, the Georgian government frequently complained 
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that, despite making up nearly half of the population of the Abkhaz ASSR, Mingrelians 
and other Georgians living in Abkhazia faced discrimination in hiring, access to higher 
education, and representation in the government. 
By drawing Abkhazia‟s borders to include part of the sizeable Mingrelian 
population and subordinating it to the Georgian republic, then, the Soviet government 
was able to drive a wedge between the two groups. The result was that the Soviet 
government effectively built inter-ethnic tensions into the political geography of the 
Soviet Union and ensured that disputes would have to be arbitrated by the government in 
Moscow. More than anything, this reinforced the center-periphery dynamic that 
emphasized the primacy of the Soviet central government over the republics. As 
discussed later, the center-periphery relationship was in some ways reproduced after the 
Soviet collapse when, after Georgia became independent, the secessionist governments in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia effectively became clients of Moscow as a matter of survival 
in the face of Georgia‟s attempts to forcibly reestablish its territorial integrity. 
Although Abkhazia was by far the largest and most important autonomous region 
in Georgia, Soviet cartographers also created two other, smaller autonomous units: 
Adjara and South Ossetia. The former was unique in the Soviet Union because its titular 
nationality was not in fact a "nationality" at all, but a religious group. The Adjars are 
ethnically and linguistically Georgian, distinguished mostly by the fact that they are 
Sunni Muslims who converted during a period of Ottoman rule. It therefore seems 
unlikely that the Soviet authorities would have attempted to play the Adjars off against 
their fellow Georgians. Not only is there no history of antagonism between Georgians 
and the Adjars, but the atheist Soviet state was also extremely reluctant to employ 
 24 
religion as a wedge in the same way that it used nationality. Instead, the creation of 
Adjara can likely be interpreted as an attempt to create a "Piedmont" republic with the 
purpose of influencing other Muslim populations living along the Georgian-Turkish 
border. One example of such a group would be the Laz, who speak a Kartvelian language 
related to Georgian and whose population is distributed on both sides of the border with 
Turkey. 
While the creation of Adjara was probably not intended to foster ethnic divisions, 
the case of South Ossetia would seem to be a fairly unambiguous case of using a national 
minority to weaken Georgia. In the Soviet Union, minorities that already had a 
"homeland" were not given autonomous structures within other republics. This policy 
explains, for instance, why the sizeable Russian populations that lived in places like 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan were never given territorial autonomy. The Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) already existed as a “homeland” for ethnic 
Russians, and therefore they were not provided with autonomous territories elsewhere. 
The policy also explains why the sizeable Azeri and Armenian populations living in the 
southeastern parts of Georgia did not receive autonomous structures. 
South Ossetia, however, provides an exception to the rule. Despite the existence 
of the North Ossetian ASSR, which during Soviet times was part of the RSFSR, South 
Ossetia was made an Autonomous Oblast within Georgia in 1921. The Ossetes were a 
mostly Orthodox population and had been traditional allies of Russia since the 19
th
 
century. Moreover, along with the Abkhaz, they supported the Bolsheviks against 
Zhordania‟s Mensheviks.43 The creation of South Ossetia was therefore likely an instance 
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of the Soviet government attempting to weaken Georgia by creating another autonomous 
unit within its territory, one that Moscow could expect to be reliable and loyal. 
Despite much evidence to support it, however, some scholars reject the "divide 
and conquer" thesis. Charles King, for instance, maintains that Soviet border drawing was 
little more than the product of local circumstances. In his popular history of the Caucasus, 
The Ghost of Freedom, he writes that 
[t]he decision of Soviet leaders to draw boundary lines in 
one place and not another… had little to do with any 
putative grand strategy… Indeed, if Soviet officials had 
been able to foresee the violence that would erupt over 
precisely these borders in the 1980s and 1990s, they might 
well have opted for a different arrangement.
44
 
Counterfactual speculation aside, of course, it is impossible to know for sure what the 
Soviet leadership would have done had circumstances been completely different. In any 
case, whether there was or was not in fact a "grand strategy" of divide and rule is, in 
some sense, irrelevant. The practice of manipulating boundaries and dividing ethnic 
groups between multiple polities persisted throughout the Soviet period. Even if the 
creation of inter-ethnic tension was not intended, the list of places where just such a 
policy did create conflict is long; besides Georgia, it includes almost the whole of the rest 
of the Caucasus region, much of Central Asia, and even parts of Ukraine, Belarus, and 
even in Russia itself. 
2.2.3: Soviet Collapse 
During the Second World War, numerous national groups – the so-called 
"punished peoples" – had been deported for disloyalty to the state. These groups, 
including the Chechens and the Ingush, were "rehabilitated" and allowed to return to their 
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newly reconstituted homelands under Khrushchev.
45
  While Stalin‟s death ended the 
large-scale deportations and other efforts to drastically reconfigure the ethnic landscape 
of the Soviet Union, the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras witnessed the growth efforts to 
russify the Soviet population as a whole, driven by an ideology that sought to create a 
"new Soviet man" through the “merger” of the Soviet Union's different nationalities. 
Major revisions of borders, however, became increasingly infrequent. Particularly under 
Brezhnev, the state's emphasis was on stability, and the ethno-territorial system that was 
put in place in the 1920s and 1930s would persist with relatively few modifications until 
the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. 
During the Brezhnev era, the entire Soviet Union experienced deepening stagnation 
and rampant corruption. Although the USSR remained a police state, the renunciation of 
terror
46
 meant that Moscow gradually began to lose its grip on the republics which, over 
time, became "fiefdoms to be exploited for the benefit of the local party aristocracy."
47
 
Moreover, it became increasingly clear that, despite widespread linguistic russification,
48
 
little progress was actually being made toward creating the hoped-for "Soviet” nation. If 
anything, the republics had become even more "national" in character than they had been 
during the time of Stalin, controlled as they often were by local cadres for whom 
Moscow's writ was increasingly unimportant. Indeed, the patronage systems that 
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developed in the periphery, especially in the Caucasus, became nodes of quiet resistance 
to the center.
49
 
The severity of the Soviet Union‟s situation in the early 1980s was understood 
very well by Brezhnev‟s successor, Yuri Andropov. Perhaps by dint of his long tenure as 
the chief of the KGB, Andropov had an unusually sober assessment of the social and 
structural problems facing the USSR, and seemed aware that nationalism in the republics 
was beginning to pose a serious challenge Soviet power. Dying after only fifteen months 
in office, however, he never had the opportunity to make any real attempt to mollify the 
growing restiveness among the Soviet Union‟s non-Russian minorities. Likewise, 
Andropov‟s even more short-lived successor, the neo-Brezhnevite Konstantin Chernenko, 
possessed neither the time nor the interest in addressing the problems facing the USSR, 
dying within months of taking office. According to one account, throughout the 
Andropov and Chernenko periods, the “emphasis remained on improving the teaching of 
Russian, instilling „internationalist‟ values, while at the same time continuing to suppress 
national dissent and combat „hostile‟ foreign influences."50 Meanwhile, nationalism 
continued to inspire dissident movements throughout the Soviet Union. 
After Chernenko‟s death, the new Soviet Premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, developed 
a plan to revitalize the Soviet Union by addressing both the economic woes that were 
crippling the state as well as attempting to foster more open political expression, at least 
within certain limits. The vaunted policies of glasnost’ and perestroika, however, had the 
unintended side effect of encouraging alternative forms of political organization outside 
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of the Communist Party‟s purview. National identity, even in the forms officially 
sanctioned by the state, proved to be a convenient rallying point for disaffected Soviet 
citizens, especially in the non-Russian republics.
51
 
It is not difficult to see why nationalism proved so attractive to Soviet citizens in 
the 1980s. As Ernest Gellner has pointed out, by the early 1980s, socialism had become 
largely discredited, at least in the Soviet Union. The clear failure of Marxism-Leninism 
left behind an ideological vacuum that nationalism, facing few rivals, was poised to fill.
52
 
Especially in places such as Georgia, Armenia, and the Baltic states, nationalists could 
draw upon romantic narratives that emphasized the historic independence of their peoples 
before succumbing to imperial subjugation.  
Nationalists discourses throughout the Soviet Union were aided the very 
structures of national autonomy that the Soviet state had cultivated since its very 
inception. If other alternatives to Communism did not yet exist, or were still in their 
infancy, "nationhood" was a category that already possessed a great deal of cultural 
capital of its own as well as, in many cases, autonomous territorial units and functioning, 
if frequently powerless, governments. The very identities and institutions that the Soviet 
state had fostered became focal points around which opposition movements began to 
coalesce. Dissidents in numerous republics, especially in the Baltic States and in Georgia, 
where nationalist sentiment was particularly strong, began forming so-called "national 
fronts,” which were essentially alternative political parties. Seizing on the rhetoric of 
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glasnost' and perestroika, they marched through the streets bearing portraits of 
Gorbachev and demanded a devolution of power from the center to the republics and an 
end to Russian domination. 
Glasnost’ and perestroika put the Communist Party into an increasingly untenable 
position: if the Soviet Union was to be saved, at least according to Gorbachev's thinking, 
it had to become more open and democratic. On the other hand, the very sort of openness 
envisioned by Gorbachev seemed only to be adding fuel to the nationalist fire that was 
burning the USSR to the ground. There seemed to be no way to square the circle between 
real democracy and "Soviet democracy." 
The paradox was not entirely lost on Gorbachev, but he nevertheless seemed 
unsure how to respond. While he was certainly aware that there was a contradiction at the 
heart of his ideas, there is strong evidence to suggest that he did not really understand its 
nature. In his book Perestroika, he wrote that “[e]very nation is entitled to choose its own 
way of development, to dispose of its fate, its territory, and its human and natural 
resources.”53 It is clear, in this case, that Gorbachev was writing about “nation-states” in 
general, but the same arguments applied just as easily to the nations of the USSR, a 
connection he does not seem to have made. Indeed, Gorbachev seems to have confused 
"nationalism" for "patriotism," in the words of Walker Connor, and "loyalty to the 
nation" for "loyalty to the Soviet state."
54
 He appears to have believed that nationalism 
was little more than a response to dissatisfaction with the ossification of the Soviet 
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economy and society, and was thus something that could be remedied by means of the 
right reforms. Reminiscing in 2000, Gorbachev wrote: 
Were there problems in the Soviet Union, including ethnic 
problems? Yes, there were political, economic, and social 
problems. These were not, however, problems of our 
country as a whole but of the system that had been 
established.
55
 
Judging from this, it would appear that Gorbachev viewed the nationalism in the Soviet 
Union as a problem that could be solved by perestroika and glasnost', rather than being a 
symptom of them. "We were moving away from traditional attitudes," he wrote, "and 
heading toward a policy aimed at transforming the bureaucratic, unitary Soviet Union 
into a democratic federation of independent states."
56
 What Gorbachev failed to 
understand, however, was that the Soviet Union's non-Russian minorities no longer had 
any interest in being part of the state he was so desperately trying to preserve, and no 
amount of social or economic reform could alter that fact.  
Perhaps as a result of this misunderstanding, Gorbachev‟s responses to the 
challenges posed by nationalism were erratic and halfhearted. The few times the state 
attempted to use force against protesters, as in Tbilisi in 1989, it managed to spill just 
enough blood to completely discredit itself and cede the moral high ground dissident 
nationalists without achieving any desirable results.
57
 Certain concessions were 
eventually given by the state in the areas of economic decentralization and language 
policy,
58
 but the "national question" was not – indeed could not have been – definitively 
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solved within the framework of the Soviet system. By granting legitimacy to nationalism 
outside of the control of the Party and the state, and thereby undermining policies that 
had stood since the time of Lenin, Gorbachev unwittingly conceded that Stalin's old 
dictum about the nature of the republics, "national in form, socialist in content," was by 
the 1980s an empty slogan; nationalists in the Soviet Union had long since begun to 
demand political structures that were both national in form and national in content. 
As Ronald Suny has pointed out, the national groups that emerged from the ruins 
of the USSR were radically transformed by 74 years of Soviet rule. "Their pasts," he 
writes, "were constructed and reconstructed; traditions were selected, invented, and 
enshrined; and even those with the greatest antiquity of pedigree became something quite 
different from past incarnations."
59
 In Georgia, there was to be no return to the halcyon 
days of some imagined past. Even the memory of the short-lived Menshevik experiment 
after the collapse of the Russian Empire proved to be of little more than symbolic value, 
and provided little in the way of tangible experience that could be applied to the problems 
of governing a state. “The independent republic of Georgia,” he wrote,  
is a nation possessed by its own history. Like the other 
republics floating free after the demise of the Soviet 
empire, Georgia is reinventing its past, recovering what had 
been forgotten or distorted during the long years of Soviet 
rule and reconstructing the story of Georgia as a land 
belonging for all time to the Georgian people… [T]he rapid 
unraveling of Communist rule in Georgia, the end of 
empire, and the evaporation of the “socialist choice” 
brought to power a fractured political elite and an 
exclusivist nationalism imbued with an authoritarian 
political culture inherited from the years of Soviet power.
60
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Linked to the problem of “exclusivist nationalism,” and further complicating 
matters was the conflict between different versions of what Alexander Murphy has called 
“regimes of territorial legitimation.” Murphy defines these regimes as consisting of “the 
institutions, practices, and discourses that are designed to legitimate a particular territorial 
conception of a state.”61 Among the discourses underlying regimes of territorial 
legitimation are historical links between a particular territory and a particular ethnic 
group, the physical uniqueness of the area where a state is located, and the ability of a 
state to trace its roots back to some older political entity.
62
   
In the case of Georgia, the newly independent government could make strong 
claims to each of these discourses, particularly the first and third: the Georgian people 
have lived in more or less the same area for millennia, and, as mentioned, Georgia has a 
long and well-documented history of statehood. Unfortunately Georgia‟s discourses of 
territorial legitimation were incompatible with those of other minorities living in 
Georgian territory, particular the Abkhaz, who could themselves argue that Abkhazia was 
the historical home of the Abkhaz people and that, moreover, Abkhazia had a history of 
statehood, albeit ancient.
63
 Combined with the decades of ethnic tensions fostered by 
Soviet nationality policies and the political legacy of Soviet domination, these competing 
regimes of territorial legitimation resulted in a series of civil wars that were to leave tens 
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of thousands of people dead and hundreds of thousands more displaced from their homes, 
to which many may never return. 
2.3: Civil War in Independent Georgia 
The resurgence of nationalism during glasnost’ was not directed solely at the 
Soviet government. Accompanying it was widespread inter-ethnic conflict that grew in 
large part from the "divide and rule" policies pursued by the state. Clashes between 
Armenians and Azeris in 1988, for instance, eventually escalated to all-out war over the 
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, a sizeable autonomous region within Azerbaijan 
containing an Armenian majority population. The war, which resulted in tens of 
thousands dead and wounded, and hundreds of thousands of refugees, was one of the 
worst post-Soviet conflicts. But it was by no means the only one. Aside from the tragedy 
that unfolded in Chechnya, there was also a short war between North Ossetia and 
Ingushetia over the Prigorodnyi District, which had been administratively re-assigned to 
North Ossetia when the Ingush were deported in 1944 and never returned. A terrible civil 
war was fought in Tajikistan, and war also broke out between Transdnistria and Moldova. 
In Georgia, too, the situation was beginning to unravel. Nationalist discontent 
reached a fever pitch after a protest in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989, when Soviet airborne 
troops killed 20 people, mostly women and children, and wounded over 6000 others. 
Rumors at the time held that Soviet troops had in fact used trenching spades and toxic gas 
to beat back the protesters.
64
 While never substantiated,
65
 such stories were frequently 
repeated and readily accepted by a Georgian public that was all too ready to believe the 
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worst about the Soviet empire. "It would be difficult," writes one scholar, "to exaggerate 
the impact of these events – made worse by the subsequent attempted cover-up by Soviet 
authorities – on Georgian politics. Public opinion was inflamed, and what was afterwards 
referred to as the „April tragedy‟ fundamentally radicalized political life in the 
Republic."
66
 
"Independence" became the watchword of the Georgian political scene. Even 
Georgian Communists favored separation from the Soviet Union. In addition to declaring 
Georgia an "annexed and occupied state,"
67
 the Georgian Communist Party participated 
in a massive demonstration in Tbilisi and declared ten minutes of silence at 3:30 pm on 
the one-year anniversary of the April tragedy.
68
 Despite their pro-independence stance, 
however, the Communists were by that time totally discredited in Georgia. The 1990 
elections handed a resounding victory to the "Round Table," a nationalist party led by 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Mingrelian and dissident intellectual. Gamsakhurdia‟s 
government wasted little time, quickly declaring Georgia to be an independent republic in 
April of 1991. Until the legal dissolution of the USSR in December of the same year, this 
act was of purely symbolic value, but it nevertheless signaled the effective end of Soviet 
Georgia. 
                                                     
66
 Darrel Slider, "Democratization in Georgia," in Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
161 
 
67
 Zürcher, 123. 
 
68
 Peter Nasmyth, Georgia: A Rebel in the Caucasus (London, Cassell, 1992), 80. 
 
 35 
2.3.1: Tensions in Abkhazia 
Unfortunately, untangling itself from the legacy of seven decades of Soviet rule 
was not so simple: Many of the internal borders of the Soviet Union, as we have seen, 
were drawn for purely political reasons. After independence – and in some cases, even 
before – they became sites of violence. In the absence of a strong center capable of 
preventing conflicts from spiraling out of control, inter-ethnic tensions became 
unmanageable. Even prior to Georgia‟s secession from the Soviet Union, ethnic 
Georgians living in Abkhazia complained of discrimination at the hands of the 
numerically inferior Abkhaz. As the titular nationality, ethnic Abkhaz, despite 
comprising less than 18% of the population, held 67% of government positions in the 
republic, wildly out of proportion to the size of their population.
69
 They also had better 
access to jobs and higher education. Georgians, who made up nearly half of the 
population of Abkhazia, complained that their interests were being ignored.
70
  
For their part, ethnic Abkhaz worried about the possibility of being 
demographically overwhelmed by Georgians. Abkhaz nationalists argued that Georgian 
chauvinism and Soviet policies that promoted Georgian migration into Abkhazia had 
caused the Abkhaz to become a minority in their own republic. While this was largely a 
fiction, since even before 1917, Abkhaz only made up about one quarter of the population 
of Abkhazia,
71
 they nevertheless exploited the political, economic, and cultural privileges 
that came with Soviet autonomy as a means of shoring up their national identity. Not 
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surprisingly, the spiral of antagonism between Georgians and Abkhaz eventually resulted 
in protests and sporadic violence.  
The Abkhaz government finally demanded to separate from Georgia and to 
become a Union Republic, a request that was denied by the Soviet government. This 
came as little surprise, as the Abkhaz ASSR had requested a similar adjustment in its 
status in 1957, 1967, and 1977. Each time, the request was denied and subsequently 
followed up with a new package of political and economic concessions that benefited 
ethnic Abkhaz at the expense of other minorities living in Abkhazia. By the end of the 
1980s, the Georgian government began to feel that, despite the fact that Abkhazia was 
technically subordinate to the Georgian government, it was increasingly slipping out of 
Tbilisi's control.
72
  
2.3.2: War in South Ossetia 
Meanwhile, in August of 1990, South Ossetia voted to raise itself from the status 
of an Autonomous Oblast to an Autonomous Republic. Gamsakhurdia‟s government 
responded by stripping South Ossetia of its autonomy altogether and attempting to 
impose direct rule on the breakaway province. The resulting war devastated the already 
destitute South Ossetian landscape. The capital city, Tskhinvali, was shelled by the 
Georgians and became, in the words of one author, an "Ossetian Sarajevo."
73
 Nearly sixty 
thousand people were forced to flee the region. Most of them were Ossetes, who fled 
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across the mountains into neighboring North Ossetia.
74
 Attacks also increased on the 
large Ossetian community in Tbilisi, which was home to more Ossetes than in South 
Ossetia itself.
75
 
Crucially, the South Ossetians received support from Russia. While the Georgian 
armed forces could hardly have been called a formidable war machine, comprised as they 
were of independent armed militias that were barely under the control of the government, 
the small and poorly armed Ossetian militias, which could initially muster no more than 
about 300-400 fighters,
76
 were even less effective and stood little chance of winning a 
protracted conflict. Thomas Goltz, who was in Georgia during this period, has written 
that  
without overt and covert Russian military intervention it is 
difficult to imagine that the grossly outgunned and 
outnumbered South Ossetians could have held their own 
against the Georgians.
77
 
Moscow's involvement in the South Ossetian war, however, was not large. While Russian 
peacekeepers eventually enforced a ceasefire between the two sides, most of the arms 
obtained by the Ossetian militias were "leaked" from arms depots located in North 
Ossetia and smuggled across the mountains.
78
 The extent of Russian collusion in such 
smuggling is difficult to ascertain, though it seems likely that weapons and ammunition 
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from ex-Soviet military caches were sold on the black market by freelancers in the 
Russian armed forces. 
2.3.3: War in Abkhazia  
The situation in Georgia continued to deteriorate. By December of 1991, even 
before the end of the war in South Ossetia, Gamsakhurdia himself had been overthrown 
and replaced by the former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, who had also 
served as the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party from 1972 until 1985. 
Hailed as something of a moderate, at least in comparison with the erratic and 
increasingly dictatorial Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze seemed overwhelmed by the 
fractious political landscape in Georgia. Between the time of Gamsakhurdia being 
toppled and November of 1993, a brutal civil war raged between Shevardnadze‟s faction 
and the so-called "Zviadists," partisans still loyal to Gamsakhurdia. Shevardnadze, 
moreover, shared Gamsakhurdia‟s uncompromising stance on Georgia‟s territorial 
integrity. When the Abkhaz unilaterally declared their independence in July of 1992, 
Shevardnadze immediately declared the action legally null and void. Shortly thereafter, 
following the kidnapping of a government minister in Abkhazia, a number of semi-
autonomous Georgian militias crossed into Abkhazian territory. Despite the ongoing civil 
war, the invasion proceeded with Tbilisi‟s blessing and the support of the government. 
The ensuing war in Abkhazia was, in the words of one scholar, "the worst event in 
the contemporary history of Georgia."
79
 The republic was laid waste. Most of the 
country‟s infrastructure was destroyed and the capital city, Sokhumi, was ravaged by 
bitter urban warfare. Hundreds of thousands of people, including most of the ethnic 
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Georgian community, were driven from their homes. Although some have managed to 
quietly (and unofficially) return, to this day most still live in makeshift shelters for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs).
80
 The mass exodus of Georgians – nearly half of the 
pre-war population – left many parts of Abkhazia almost entirely de-populated, which 
has had severe consequences for the already weak  Abkhaz economy.
81
  
The Abkhazians received far more assistance from Russia than did the South 
Ossetians. Alone, the Abkhaz were a more formidable foe than the Ossetians had been. 
For one, they had access to a substantially larger number weapons and resources. They 
also benefited from the presence of so-called "North Caucasian volunteers" – fighters 
from places such as Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan, including the 
infamous Chechen guerilla leader Shamil Basayev – who came to Abkhazia to help the 
Abkhaz repel the “Kartvelian” invaders. But it was Russian intervention that tipped the 
scales decisively in Abkhazia‟s favor. In addition to receiving aid in the form of weapons, 
armored personnel carriers, and helicopters, Russian fighter jets were used to attack 
Georgian positions, even going so far as to bomb Sokhumi, which at that time was held 
by the Georgians.
82
 Besides giving Abkhazia substantial amounts of military hardware, 
Russian units fought alongside Abkhaz formations on the front lines, and proved to be 
more than a match for the poorly trained and disorganized Georgian forces. 
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Russia‟s role in the Abkhaz war was more or less understood at the time. While 
the Abkhazians possessed a somewhat more formidable fighting force than the Ossetians 
had, they nevertheless had little access to heavy weaponry, to say nothing of aircraft. By 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, of course, it was not uncommon for various parties to 
procure armaments from Soviet arsenals on the black market, but the massive array of 
tanks, heavy artillery, and ammunition that appeared in the hands of the Abkhazians and 
their allies in the early 1990s seems to have come largely from the Russian military. 
Shevardnadze himself, in an interview with Thomas Goltz, claimed that between 80 and 
90% of the forces arrayed against the Georgians in Abkhazia were Russian citizens, 
people "who just happened to have very good connections to the Russian defense 
establishment and enjoyed access to everything from fighter-bombers to satellite 
photography."
83
 While the "80 to 90%" figure is almost certainly an exaggeration, the 
Russian presence in Abkhazia was nevertheless substantial.  
The Georgian forces, as was the case in the war in South Ossetia, consisted 
largely of private militias. Since the Georgian government at this time was too destitute 
to properly fund a military, these militias largely financed themselves by looting and 
pillaging, and selling whatever they could on the black market.
84
 The militias' ranks were 
thus filled with so-called "weekend fighters" and unemployed young men with relatively 
little military experience, who were lured by the possibility of monetary gains. As the 
Abkhaz continued to receive heavy weapons and reinforcements from Russia and the 
North Caucasus, their resistance stiffened and the morale of the poorly armed and 
disorganized Georgian fighters withered. Whatever remained of the military effectiveness 
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of the Georgian forces quickly crumbled and the war was essentially decided in 
Abkhazia‟s favor. 
2.3.4: The Rationale for Russian Intervention 
The importance of Russian involvement was demonstrated not by how much 
material support they provided to the Abkhaz, nor to the Abkhazians' seemingly unlikely 
success on the battlefield. Russian political clout also had a profound effect on how the 
war was finally ended. The Abkhazians only agreed to a ceasefire after Shevardnadze 
himself flew to Moscow made a direct appeal to Boris Yeltsin to put a stop to the 
fighting. By the time the Abkhaz War was over, Russia had thus already begun to reassert 
its hegemonic position in Transcaucasia. In the end, after all, it was the Kremlin, rather 
than the Abkhaz government, with whom the Georgians ultimately had to negotiate. 
Curiously, despite its support for the separatists, at no time did Russia ever 
support their claims for independence. Formally, the Kremlin maintained its commitment 
to Georgia's territorial integrity until the Five Day War in 2008. The extent of Russian 
"neutrality," of course, is debatable. Worried as it was about a possible "spillover" of 
violence into the North Caucasus, the government in Moscow was anxious to see an end 
to the fighting between Tbilisi and the separatists. Intervening in Georgia thus made a 
certain amount of sense from the standpoint of Russian security. Even after the debacle in 
Chechnya some years later, Russia was a more formidable military power than either 
Georgia or the de facto states. Although it remained hesitant to exercise hard power after 
its defeat in Chechnya, Russia was nevertheless able to in some ways reproduce the role 
once played by the Soviet state in preventing the further outbreak of widespread 
hostilities between ethnic groups in Georgia.  
 42 
Some have argued that the Russian intervention in the de facto states was initially 
the result of little more than the actions of "rogue elements" within the Russian military, 
rather than a deliberate decision by the Russian government.
85
 While it is easy to 
overstate the actual autonomy of the military forces stationed in the Caucasus, the fact 
remains that the Kremlin‟s attention, at least until mid-1993, largely lay elsewhere. 
Yeltsin‟s authority in 1993 was not at its apogee and control over the military was, at 
times, dubious at best. Despite the bureaucratic infighting between the Ministries of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs, to say nothing of Yeltsin‟s shaky credibility within the 
defense establishment, Russian forces in the Caucasus were nevertheless acting within 
certain general parameters set by Moscow. Roughly speaking, these parameters were to 
prevent a power vacuum from developing along Russia‟s southern periphery, to prevent 
conflicts in the former Republics from spreading into Russia itself, and to secure Russian 
interests in the post-Soviet sphere.
86
  
These parameters were dictated by the necessity of massively realigning Russian 
foreign policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which did not, after all, mean 
simply the end of the Cold War, but also the demise of the Russia‟s internal empire. 
Republics like Kazakhstan, Georgia and Ukraine became independent states that were at 
least nominally outside of Moscow‟s control. Suddenly, Russia found itself ringed by 
what Dov Lynch has termed a "belt of insecurity… rife with political and economic 
instability, and local armed conflicts."
87
 Making sense out of this new political landscape 
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was one of the key challenges of the new Russian government. Differing views on what 
Russia‟s orientation should be toward the former Soviet republics, especially those in 
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, led, as Sengupta says, to a fierce debate over how to 
determine "what constituted „critical space‟ for the new Russian state…"88 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Vladimir Putin once described the collapse of the USSR as the "major 
geopolitical disaster of the century,”89 which numerous commentators have incorrectly 
interpreted as evincing nostalgia for the Soviet Union.
90
 In reality, Putin was giving voice 
to the geopolitical angst that has preoccupied Russian policymakers since 1992. Russia‟s 
rapid loss of empire in the wake of the Soviet collapse, and the country's subsequent 
military weakness and financial travails, were a bitter pill to swallow for a state that had 
recently been one of the world‟s two superpowers.  
A sort of duality has thus characterized Russia‟s post-Soviet foreign policy. On 
the one hand, there is a firm belief that Russia is a “great power.” And yet, shortly before 
he replaced the ailing Boris Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation, Putin gave 
voice to the anxieties that had accompanied Russia‟s precipitous decline, warning of the 
danger that Russia could become a “second-, and possibly even a third-rate nation.”91 
“Stripped of the geopolitical and ideological certainties at the heart of Soviet politics,” 
writes Jeffery Mankoff, “contemporary Russia has been forced to answer a series of 
fundamental questions about its relationship to the post-Cold War world and its own 
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identity as a state.”92 Attempting to resolve the apparent contradiction between its “great 
power” ambitions and the reality that it is too weak, economically, socially, and 
militarily, to fulfill that role has been at the heart of the Kremlin‟s foreign policy since 
independence. The circumstances that led to the Five Day War were in fact rooted in 
Russia‟s attempts at reestablishing itself as a hegemonic power in the post-Soviet space. 
3.1: “Post-Colonial Confusion” 
Initially, the Kremlin‟s policies toward the former Soviet republics were 
characterized by a certain confusion. Indeed, in the wake of the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the Russian leadership was faced with the task of elaborating a new, post-
colonial discourse vis-à-vis the newly independent states. Given the shock of the Soviet 
collapse and the social and political upheavals that followed in its wake, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Russian foreign policy during this period has been characterized as 
having a “certain mesmerized fixation on the ruins of the Soviet order.”93 Indeed, 
Vladimir Putin once described the early 1990s as a time of “clearing the debris resulting 
from demolishing the old edifice.”94 75 years of communism, after all, had left an 
indelible mark on Russia and its neighbors, and when Soviet power disintegrated, Russia 
suddenly found itself having to reevaluate its relationship with its former empire. 
Economic, military, and cultural ties continued to bind the newly independent states to 
the old imperial center, and even twenty years after the Soviet Union dissolved, these ties 
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remain strong. The Russian government has also had to formulate a policy regarding the 
millions of ethnic Russians who suddenly found themselves living in independent states 
such as Kazakhstan and Estonia, where they were often considered unwelcome at best. 
The fate of this "beached diaspora," as David Laitin has called it,
95
 has remained a top 
priority for the Kremlin. While much of the old Communist ideological “debris” was 
eventually swept away, the structures of imperial rule and the dynamics of center-
periphery relations have persisted nevertheless.  
Walking away from empire, as it were, has proven difficult for Russia. Indeed, the 
new Russian government found the task of formulating a coherent foreign policy, both 
toward the former Soviet republics as well as the rest of the world, confusing and 
frustrating. The Kremlin‟s sometimes erratic policies in the 1990s, particularly 
immediately after the Soviet collapse, has led Leszek Buszynski to write that Russia 
began the 1990s with a “foreign policy of disorientation.”96 Even Russia‟s relations with 
the so-called "near abroad,” the states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire, represented kind of anchor to an imperial past that Russians were eager to leave 
behind.
 97
 As Pavel Baev has written, 
Yeltsin started his reign with one really dramatic cut of 
Russia‟s external involvement and during his first year in 
the Kremlin insisted that he was serious about it. Yegor 
Gaidar argued with facts and figures that there was no 
money for a proactive course in the newly created CIS, and 
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Andrei Kozyrev translated this imperative into a policy of 
benign neglect…98 
Alexander Pikayev concurs, writing that “[u]ntil mid-1992 and to a lesser extend during 
the second half of that year, the official line of the Kremlin was motivated by an 
isolationist vision.” This policy, he claims, had four chief goals: 
1. Withdrawing Russian troops from the near abroad as quickly as possible; 
2. “Tacit support” for the new national governments in the near abroad taking 
control of some former Soviet military assets; 
3. Establishing strong diplomatic ties with the new national governments while 
simultaneously refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of separatist 
movements; 
4. Attempting to involve the international community in efforts to mediate inter-
ethnic conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh.
99
 
 
It is clear from these objectives that Russia initially had little interest in continuing to 
attempt to assert itself as an imperial power in the post-Soviet space. Indeed, Russian 
policymakers viewed disengagement with the newly independent states, which had long 
been dependent on subsidies from Moscow, as a kind of “self-liberation,” both 
economically and spiritually, even while it pursued close relations with the governments 
of the newly independent states, which were often headed by former Communist 
officials.
100
  
Despite Russia‟s apparent commitment to dismantling its former empire, the 
relationships of power that had developed between Moscow and the republics were not so 
                                                     
98
 Pavel Baev, “Russia‟s Departure from Empire: Self-Assertiveness and a New Retreat,” in Geopolitics in 
Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory, Identity, ed. Ola Tunader, Pavel Baev, and Victoria Einagel 
(London, Sage, 1997), 181. 
 
99
 Alexander A. Pikayev, “The Russian Domestic Debate on Policy Toward the „Near Abroad,‟” in 
Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, ed. Lena Jonson and Clive Archer (Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1996), 52-53.  
 
100
 Jaba Devdariani, "Georgia and Russia: The Troubled Road to Accommodation,” in Statehood and 
Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution, ed. Bruno Coppieters and Robert Levgold (Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 2005), 159. 
 
 48 
easily dissolved. Although Russia‟s goal had been a near-total military withdrawal, 
Soviet-era military units, which were now mostly under Russian command,
101
 remained 
stationed throughout the newly independent states. The Russian military headquarters for 
the Caucasus region, for instance, remained in Tbilisi, despite the vehemently anti-
Russian attitudes of Georgia's president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
102
 Moreover, new 
strategic concerns meant that instability in Russia's so-called "southern tier" – the 
Caucasus and Central Asia – became increasingly important relative to old Cold War-era 
priorities in the northern and western regions of the country.
103
 Russian military units, 
moreover, were already embroiled in local conflicts throughout the near abroad on the 
eve of independence. Although the government in Moscow still looked hopefully to the 
West, Russia‟s disengagement from its former empire was never as complete as might 
have initially been hoped.  
Increasingly, the Kremlin began to assert what Graham Smith has called “a more 
active, even interventionist, role within the post-Soviet Eurasian space, in order to protect 
its own geopolitical interests...”104 This strategy reflected both a growing sense that 
Russia‟s security was indelibly linked to events in the former Soviet republics as well as 
increasing dissatisfaction with what was perceived as a lack of concern for Russia‟s 
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interests on the part of the West. “[T]he external world confronting Russia,” writes 
Mankoff,  
continued to look much as it had during the Cold War. 
Institutions such as NATO had not themselves undergone 
sufficient transformation since the end of the Cold War and 
were in the mid-1990s torn between attracting Russian and 
containing it in the event that democracy failed. With no 
formal institutional mechanisms for managing Russia‟s 
integration with the West, Moscow often felt itself faced 
with a series of faits accomplis that it had no ability to 
influence, above all in connection with the expansion of 
NATO.
105
 
In the face of NATO‟s apparent indifference to Russian security concerns, Russian 
policymakers began increasingly to turn away from engagement the West and to pursue a 
more independent foreign policy. Protecting Russia‟s geopolitical interests by necessity 
implied a re-engagement with the near abroad and an abandonment of the old policy of 
what Pavel Baev has called “benign neglect.”106  
Moscow‟s fear of instability in the near abroad spilling across Russia‟s borders 
meant that, by the time the 1993 “Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation” 
was published, the newly independent states had been discursively transformed from 
being a "drain" on Russian coffers and an unpleasant reminder of Soviet imperialism into 
being the lynchpins of Russia‟s security.107 The “Foreign Policy Conception” declared 
that “eradicating armed clashes, settling conflicts around Russia and preventing them 
from spilling into [Russian] territory and ensuring strict observance of individual human 
rights and minority rights in the countries of the near abroad, particularly the rights of 
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ethnic Russians and Russian speaking populations” were Moscow‟s “most important 
foreign policy tasks.”108  
Although the government continued to disavow overt imperialism, Russia 
nevertheless began to once again assert a right to intervene in the affairs of its neighbors 
in order to ensure peace and stability. This shift did not reflect a new policy of altruism. 
Indeed, the Foreign Policy Conception hinted rather ominously that it would be in the 
newly independent states‟ best interests to align themselves with Moscow: 
In a number of CIS states, the formation of foreign policy is 
being affected by ostentatious dissociation from Russia, so 
typical of the initial stages of state-making, as well as by 
territorial disputes fueled by nationalist sentiments, 
including claims to Russia, and by an aversion to anything 
that is a reminder of their past dependence on the union 
structures. Some time will pass before these states realize 
that resolution of their national problems can be facilitated 
if they chose to rely on their ties with the renewed 
Russia.
109
 
 In reality, securing Russia‟s interests often trumped other concerns, and the 
Kremlin sometimes supported both sides of a given conflict at different times in a bid to 
engineer a favorable outcome for itself. As discussed in Chapter 4, for instance, the 
Kremlin‟s decision to intervene in the civil wars in Georgia followed precisely this 
pattern: Russia first supported the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia against the 
Georgian government, thereby weakening Georgia. Moscow then lent assistance to the 
government in Tbilisi against a nationalist insurgency to prevent its collapse. The result 
was a weakened Georgian government that owed its existence to Moscow‟s benevolence 
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while simultaneously fearing that Russia would extend recognition to the de facto states 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It was therefore in Georgia‟s best interests to 
accommodate Moscow as much as possible, and the Georgian government in fact granted 
a whole host of concessions to this very end. 
3.2: “Diaspora Politics” and Passportization 
The Russian diaspora living in the newly independent states has proven to be a 
particularly problematic issue for the Russian government. Numbering some 25 million 
people,
 110
  it is distributed throughout the post-Soviet space, particularly in Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
111 
In some of the newly independent states, notably the Baltic 
States, ethnic Russians have been viewed as unwelcome colonizers and have faced 
discrimination and nationalist factions in Russia have put pressure on the Kremlin to 
address the plight of these "compatriots."
112
 The government has, to some extent, been 
willing to oblige. For example, relations between Russia and Estonia declined 
dramatically in 2007 after the Kremlin signaled its tacit approval when a mob of ethnic 
Russians rioted after the Estonian government attempted to relocate a Soviet-era war 
memorial in Tallinn. Interestingly, the incident culminated in a large cyber-attack on 
Estonia's internet infrastructure, a tactic that would be repeated against Georgian 
government websites in 2008.
113
 Around the same time, “activists” affiliated with the 
racist and nationalist youth organization, Nashi, which has ties to the Russian 
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government, defaced the Estonian embassy in Moscow.
114
 On the other hand, the Russian 
government has not done a great deal to solve the problem of the “beached diaspora,” and 
has sometimes sidelined its commitment to ethnic Russians living in the near abroad 
when politically expedient.  
Early in the 1990s, dual citizenship was considered as a possible solution to the 
diaspora problem. Indeed, Russia‟s first passportization program, which occurred in 
1993, was targeted at ethnic Russians living in the newly independent states. Unlike in 
2008, the distribution of Russian passports was limited only to ethnic Russians living 
outside of the borders of the Russian Federation. As Igor Zevelev has noted, however, 
this solution was itself problematic, since many of the newly independent states do not 
recognize dual citizenship.
115
 The problem of dual citizenship would raise its head again 
in Georgia after 2002, when the Georgian government claimed that the passports 
distributed by the Russian government to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
were null and void, arguing that Abkhazians and South Ossetians were already Georgian 
citizens. Russia disagreed and continued to treat Abkhazians and South Ossetians who 
held Russian passports as if they were in fact Russian citizens. 
The “beached diaspora” has also served as a convenient lever that Russia has 
employed from time to time against its neighbors. While numerous commentators decried 
Russia‟s cynicism in creating new Russian citizens in Georgia‟s de facto states and 
subsequently using their “safety” as a pretext for invading Georgia, it should be noted 
that this strategy was not a particularly new innovation. As King and Melvin have noted, 
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diaspora politics legitimated an active Russian engagement 
with the internal and external affairs of the new states of 
Eurasia. At a time when many of the non-Russian successor 
states and the international community harshly criticized 
Russia‟s potential neo-imperial designs, the Russian 
government was able to couch its interests in the “near 
abroad” in broadly humanitarian terms. Concern for the 
cultural, linguistic, educational, and political rights of the 
Russian diaspora became an important component of 
Russian official discourse.
116
 
As we will see in Chapter 5, a similar narrative was invoked to justify Russia‟s invasion 
of Georgia during the Five Day War – namely that “Russian citizens” were under attack 
and that Russia had both the right and duty to intervene on their behalf.  
3.3: Geopolitics and Ideology 
Upon independence, the Russian government staked a great deal of hope on 
developing strong ties with the West. However, “Westernizers” in the government, such 
as Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, began to face increased criticism when the vaunted 
partnership with Russia‟s old Cold War enemies appeared to be paying few dividends. 
Faced with growing skepticism over Russia‟s “Western” course, the Yeltsin government 
began seeking a new organizing principle, what Natalia Morozova has called a “new 
rational consensus,” around which the Russian Federation‟s foreign policy could be 
constructed.
117
 According to Jeffrey Mankoff, 
Russia‟s foreign policy “revolution” was the result of the 
mounting frustrations evinced by the Russian population 
(elites as well as masses) over the course of the country‟s 
reforms in the early 1990s, the failure of the West to step in 
to rescue the Russian economy or integrate Russia into 
Western security structures, and the perception that 
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Kozyrev was kowtowing to the west without achieving 
anything appreciable in return. For a Russian elite… that 
had never ceased to think of the country as a major world 
power, Kozyrev‟s approach was both humiliating and 
counterproductive.
118
 
Russian policymakers eventually turned to what has been called “great power 
politics” to fill the gap left by the ideological bankruptcy of communism.119 “Great power 
politics,” with its strong emphasis on staking out “spheres of influence” and its tendency 
to view international relations as a zero-sum game, is heavily infused with classical 
geopolitics. Mankoff writes that “[t]he focus on states and power generally, coupled with 
the belief that Russia‟s position in the world is threatened by the formation of a world 
order from which it is excluded, are the basic tenets of what could be termed a 
geopolitical understanding of world politics.”120  
The idea of “great power politics” is not necessarily tied to the political ideologies 
that defined the Cold War rivalry. Morozova argues that the new emphasis on geopolitics 
was “intended to close the door on the ideology-permeated foreign policy of the Soviet 
past” and to “call off the centuries-old search for a distinct Russian identity and move the 
debate from the discussion of identity into the discussion of Russian national 
interests.”121 It is debatable, of course, whether Russian geopolitics can truly be 
considered to be “non-ideological.” But it is clear, in any case, that rather than focusing 
on ideological abstractions like spreading Communism, Moscow‟s new foreign policy 
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focuses almost exclusively on advancing Russian economic and security interests, which 
in turn has justified reengagement in the near abroad. Bassin and Aksenov argue that  
[t]he sudden erosion of [superpower] status, which appears 
to undermine Russia‟s ability to contend with and resist the 
strategic and civilizational challenges it faces from the 
surrounding world, stirs deep feelings of unease mixed with 
chagrin and resentment. This in turn engenders an 
obsession of sorts with planning for its reacquisition.
122
 
Geopolitics in the guise of “great power politics” has thus provided Russia with a 
convenient rationale for abandoning the “humiliating” policies of the early 1990s and 
embracing its old role as a hegemonic “great power,” looking to the former Soviet empire 
as its “privileged sphere of influence.” 
Geopolitics quickly gained widespread currency in Russian foreign policy circles 
all across the political spectrum. From old guard Communist figures such as Gennady 
Ziuganov to extreme nationalists such as Aleksandr Dugin, geopolitics suddenly became 
the answer to the question of what post-Soviet Russia‟s place was in the post-Cold War 
world. Most proponents of geopolitics drew in one way or another on the so-called 
“Heartland Theory” elaborated by Sir Halford Mackinder in the early 20th century.123 
Mackinder loosely identified much of Russia and Central Asia as the geostrategic 
“heartland” of the Eurasian continent.  
The combination of the “Heartland Theory,” with its attendant preoccupation with 
security and territory, and various “Eurasianist” ideas emphasizing Russia‟s cultural and 
civilizational distinctiveness from the West were the new ideological bases for Russia‟s 
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new foreign policy, which Sengupta has described as being “imperial without being 
nationalistic.”124 As James Sherr notes, Russia‟s foreign policy has been largely 
influenced by 
the geopolitical determinism of the military establishment 
which, thanks to the popularization of the works of 
Russia‟s traditional and neo-geopolitical theorists, has 
acquired influence beyond this narrow milieu. In the 
Russian understanding, geopolitika refers not only to 
“struggle” between powers, but ethnoses (civilizations). 
With its Darwinian resonances, its emphasis on the “who-
whom” of politics, and its “scientific” categories and idiom, 
geopolitics has filled much of the intellectual vacuum 
created by the collapse of Marxism-Leninism.
125
 
Despite the influence Eurasianism has had on the foreign policy discourse in 
Russia, and while certain Eurasianist ideas continue to enjoy some currency at the highest 
levels of the Russian government, it is important to recognize that Eurasianism as such 
does not enjoy widespread support in Russia. According to a study published by John 
O‟Loughlin, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, and Vladimir Kolossov, “the Eurasianist geopolitical 
orientation among the Russian population is confined to a small Communist sub-cluster.” 
Moreover, they write, there is “no apparent popular constituency for the extremist 
Heartland visions of Aleksandr Dugin.”126 Despite the visibility of some of Eurasianism‟s 
most vociferous proponents, like Ziuganov and Dugin, the Russian government has 
consistently emphasized the necessity of cooperation with the West, rather than rivalry, 
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and integration into the world economy. Eurasianists largely oppose these policies. 
Pragmatism, especially since the advent of Vladimir Putin, has been one of the central 
tenets of Russian foreign policy. “Fundamental national interests,” rather than ideological 
concerns, have been the watchwords of Russian administration, which has foresworn 
“conquest” for “security.”127  
3.4: Defining a Privileged Sphere of Influence 
The newly independent states were increasingly imagined by Russia as belonging 
to its “exclusive sphere of influence.” This outlook was shaped not only by the growing 
influence of geopolitics in the Kremlin, but also by the realities of power relations in the 
former Soviet Union: 
[the newly independent states] became the “near abroad,” 
accepted (at least formally) as independent neighbors but 
taken for granted as not quite foreign. These were states in 
which Russia had very tangible interests. Their economies 
were inextricably linked to the old center and now to 
Russia, providing raw materials, manufactured goods, 
markets, and access to the rest of the world… In security 
terms, their territories had constituted the USSR‟s frontiers; 
the new Russia had no border defenses and considered it 
natural to be vitally concerned about the condition of its 
neighbors‟ defenses.128 
Of paramount importance to the Kremlin was the perceived necessity of preventing other 
powers from gaining a foothold in the near abroad; As Graham Smith points out, defining 
the near abroad as a Russian space implied the exclusion of other actors.
129
 In the 
Caucasus, which has become one of the most sensitive regions in the post-Soviet space, 
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Russia has faced three potential challengers: Turkey, the United States, and, to a lesser 
extent, Iran. 
Of particular importance here is the United States and the challenge posed by 
American foreign policy to Russian hegemonic ambitions in the Transcaucasus. Even 
before the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a moderate amount of Western 
attention on the region. Azerbaijan in particular, began to attract a great deal of attention 
from European and American investors. Azerbaijan‟s petroleum resources had turned the 
country‟s capital city, Baku, into a boomtown as early as the 19th century, and with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign investors once again began to flock to city. 
Meanwhile, Georgia's strategic location as a transit point between the Caspian Sea and 
Turkey attracted increasing attention and investment.  
American attention to the newly independent states has not been driven only by 
interest in petroleum resources. After 9/11, for example, the United States began to 
engage heavily with several Central Asian states, particularly Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, in order to secure access to airbases crucial to prosecuting the war in 
Afghanistan. Especially after the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia too has sought closer 
ties to the West, and part of its strategy has been to cooperate with NATO. Saakashvili‟s 
government has gone so far as to contribute troops to US-led operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. In return, Georgia has enjoyed significant investment and a moderate 
improvement in its image in the West.
130
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Russia‟s reactions to these encroachments on its “sphere of influence” have been 
varied. Putin, for example, acquiesced without much complaint to the stationing of 
American troops in Central Asia, perhaps sensing a commonality between American 
goals in the War on Terror and Russia‟s own problems with Islamic terrorism in the 
North Caucasus. At other times, however, Russia has been more cautious with regards to 
what it has seen as Western “meddling.” According to Mankoff, 
the Kremlin and independent Russian observers often argue 
that outsiders' involvement in the CIS – whether in 
supervising Ukrainian and Georgian elections or seeking 
energy deals with countries like Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan – is predicated on precisely the same kind of 
geopolitical view of the world adhered to by much of the 
Russian elite and is designed to promote anti-Russian 
groups on Russia's borders.
131
 
Russian fears of Western encroachment into its sphere of influence are especially 
pronounced in the Transcaucasus, a region considered by many in the Kremlin to be 
Russia's "soft underbelly."
132
 Although Armenia has been a loyal client of Moscow since 
1992,
133
 both Georgia and Azerbaijan have adopted strongly anti-Russian foreign 
policies. Both, moreover, have sought closer ties with the West and Turkey. Marshall 
Goldman argues that, particularly in the case of Georgia, Russian Realpolitik has been 
driven by its concern that “foreign intervention” might threaten its monopoly over oil and 
gas pipelines in the region. “As for Georgia,” he writes, 
given its crucial role as the connecting link between Baku 
and Ceyhan, Russia has done its best to destabilize the 
region and keep Georgia from operating the pipeline in an 
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orderly and reliable way. If Georgia collapses in turmoil, 
investors will not put up the money for a bypass pipeline 
and Russia will be able to maintain its pipeline monopoly. 
That, at least in part, explains why the Russian government 
has provided rather open support for South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, two regions that seek to separate from Georgia 
and align themselves instead with Russia.
134
 
Moreover, given Moscow‟s fear of “outside meddling,” it was perhaps inevitable 
that the Orange and Rose Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, respectively, were viewed 
by Russia through the lens of geopolitics. Rather than being understood as expressions of 
popular dissatisfaction with corrupt and unpopular governments, the revolutions were 
interpreted in the Kremlin as undisguised attempts to encircle Russia by replacing the old, 
more or less friendly governments with American-supported regimes that were hostile to 
Moscow. According to some analysts, Putin took the Orange Revolution as a personal 
affront.
135
  According to Ronald Asmus,  
[w]hen the Rose and Orange Revolutions occurred in 2003 
and 2004 respectively, they were greeted in the West as 
new democratic breakthroughs and a chance to extend the 
wave of democratization of the 1990s further eastward. In 
Moscow, however, they were seen as dangerous. The same 
Putin who two years earlier had suggested he was relaxed 
about the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO now reacted 
as if developments in Ukraine and Georgia were mortal 
threats to Russia.
136
  
In order to head off the possibility of Ukraine moving further from Moscow‟s orbit, the 
Russian government became heavily involved in the Ukrainian Presidential elections in 
2004. Moscow eventually went so far as to send future president Dmitri Medvedev, who 
was at the time Putin‟s chief of staff, to organize the Kremlin‟s campaign to help elect the 
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pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovich. The strategy that ultimately backfired.
137
 The 
result was a resounding victory for Yanukovich‟s opponent, Viktor Yuschenko, who 
suffered hideous facial scarring as the result of ingesting poison in what many believe 
was a Russian attempt on his life.
138
  
NATO expansion has also been consistently and bitterly opposed by Russia. The 
Russian political class does not accept the idea that NATO is remains anything but an 
anti-Russian alliance and dismisses outright claims that NATO “has become a political-
military alliance dedicated to strengthening common security are regarded as risible and 
insulting.”139 Boris Yeltsin once went so far as to warn that enlarging NATO would run 
the risk of “plunging [Europe] into a cold peace,”140 and in his explosive 2007 speech at 
the 43
rd
 Munich Conference on Security Policy, Vladimir Putin railed against the 
alliance, saying:  
I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have 
any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or 
with ensuring security in Europe On the contrary, it 
represents a serious provocation… And we have the right 
to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?
141
 
Such reactions would seem to be a function of the Kremlin‟s tendency to view the 
world in purely zero-sum geopolitical terms: any expansion of NATO necessarily entails 
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a weakening of Russia‟s security.  In spite of Russian opposition, however, the 
enlargement of NATO has proceeded apace. Particularly with regards to NATO and 
Western intervention in the war in the former Yugoslavia, Russian foreign policy during 
the 1990s has emphasized what Bobo Lo describes as the "primacy of participation over 
results."
142
 In its weakened state, Russia has had to make do with protesting the 
expansion of NATO and Western bombing of Serbia, even though such protests have 
almost never had any appreciable effect on Western policy. Nowhere was this policy this 
more evident than in Moscow's campaign to prevent the expansion of NATO into Eastern 
Europe. "During its losing battle to stop NATO expansion," writes Lawrence Caldwell,  
the Kremlin initially attempted to prevent former Warsaw 
Pact states from joining; then, in the late 1990s, when it 
was evident that it did not have the resources to prevent the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland from becoming 
members of NATO, the Yeltsin government attempted a 
variety of threats and inducements to dissuade NATO from 
starting the process of offering admission to the Baltic 
States. Moscow expended a great deal of emotional effort 
and diplomatic effort into preventing, then proscribing 
NATO s move eastward. This policy, too, failed…143 
Stripped of its ability to effectively project power beyond its own borders, Russia had to 
make do with empty threats and aggressive posturing.  
Further underlining Russia‟s relative impotence with regards to NATO expansion, 
both Ukraine and Georgia have been involved in preliminary talks regarding the 
possibility of their joining the alliance in the future, although the election of Viktor 
Yanukovich in Ukraine and the Five Day War in Georgia would seem to have put such 
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talks on indefinite hold. As we will see in the following chapter, Georgia's Rose 
Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili's efforts to re-align Georgia toward the West by 
courting NATO and the European Union decisively undermined already sour relations 
between Georgia and Russia. The latter continues to interpret any encroachment into the 
former Soviet bloc as a mortal threat to its security and regional influence while the 
former‟s flirtations with the West were interpreted as signs that Moscow s grip on 
Georgia was weakening even further, representing a potential threat to Russia's 
hegemony in the Transcaucasus.  
3.6: Chechnya and the Decline of Russian Hard Power 
Although the Russian Federation continued to toughen its stance toward the 
newly independent states and insisted on its right to intervene militarily in the new 
republics to prevent instability, it faced serious internal turmoil of its own. In addition to 
the country's crippling economic woes and perceived humiliation at the hands of the 
West, Russia was plagued by ethnic separatism. Many of the autonomous regions that 
had been created during the Soviet period now began to agitate for greater independence 
from Moscow.
144
 Others, taking advantage of the weak central government, became little 
more than the personal fiefdoms of their governors.
145
 Although Yeltsin eventually 
managed to assuage most of the separatists with a variety of concessions, tax breaks, and 
subsidies, there remained one major exception: Chechnya.
146
 The Russian experience in 
Chechnya fatally undermined Russia‟s ability to rely on hard power to coerce its 
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neighbors to accommodate its interests, and would prove to be a powerful influence on 
Russia‟s policies toward the separatist regions in Georgia.  
Chechnya had, to put it mildly, never been entirely sanguine about the prospect of 
subordination to Moscow‟s authority, and declared its independence in 1991. Yeltsin 
initially declared a state of emergency and sent 600 Interior Ministry troops to restore 
order. Upon arriving in Grozny, however, these forces found themselves vastly 
outnumbered. Yeltsin was forced to agree to a humiliating truce with the secessionist 
government of Dzhokar Dudayev, the former Soviet Air Force commander who had 
returned to his native Chechnya to become president. In return for the truce, Dudayev 
ordered the Russian prisoners to be loaded onto buses and escorted safely out of the 
country.
147
 By June of 1992, all remaining Russian troops were withdrawn from 
Chechnya.
148
  
Throughout the next several years, the political relationship between Chechnya 
and Russia remained unclear. Sebastian Smith notes that, while Chechnya had abandoned 
any pretense of subservience to Moscow, the Russian government continued to provide 
pensions to some Chechens until sometime in 1993. Moreover, contemporary 
government publications in Russia refer to Dudayev as the “President” of Chechnya, and 
there is even some evidence of semi-official contacts between Dudayev and Yeltsin.
149
  
On the other hand, in 1994, the Russian government began actively supporting the 
Chechen opposition. This policy culminated in another humiliating defeat for Russia 
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when the oppositionists, bolstered by elements of the Russian military, attempted a 
brazen assault on downtown Grozny in November of 1994. The attackers were ambushed 
and hundreds died. The Chechen government paraded dozens of Russian prisoners in 
front of the media
150
 and by December, Yeltsin had had enough. He ordered 40,000 
Russian troops to invade Chechnya, setting off what Yeltsin himself would eventually 
call "the most botched war in the history of Russia."
151
  
The first question that arises is: why did Yeltsin, after years of tolerating 
Chechnya‟s de facto independence, suddenly decide to topple Dudayev? Moshe Gammer 
has blamed the war on “inconsistent policy," citing “indecision between reaching a 
compromise with the Dudayev regime and trying to replace it…”152 The logic 
underpinning the invasion acquires a certain coherence, however, if one remembers that 
much of Yeltsin‟s policy was driven by the perceived necessity of preventing the further 
erosion of Russian power and preserving Russia‟s territorial integrity, two of the 
Kremlin‟s top priorities in the 1990s. The invasion of Chechnya was therefore totally 
consistent with Russian geopolitical thought at the time. “The plan,” according to 
Christoph Zürcher, “was to stage Yeltsin as preserver of Russian unity and guarantor of 
law and order…”153 Sebastian Smith concurs, writing that “[f]orcing Chechnya into line 
would signal that the superstate was safe in Yeltsin‟s hands… he‟d be remembered as 
Yeltsin the preserver.”154 
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The plan, of course, failed spectacularly. Not only did Russia fail to recapture 
Chechnya, but it failed to do so at a staggering cost. In addition to thousands of military 
dead, and tens of thousands more wounded, some estimates put the civilian death toll of 
the First Chechen War at somewhere between 40,000 and 100,000, with an estimated 3-
400,000 refugees.
155
 When the shooting stopped, moreover, there was an effective return 
to the status quo ante: Chechnya continued to enjoy de facto independence and the war 
had done nothing to remove the threat of separatism in the Caucasus. Russia wasted huge 
amounts of money and manpower in its attempt to retake Chechnya, to no effect. Given 
the shaky state of the Russian economy throughout the 1990s, Russia‟s military 
expenditures were simply no longer sustainable. By the time the war ended, the military 
was strained to the limit. Entire units had been decimated and morale was essentially 
non-existent. The war in Chechnya was also a disaster in terms of public opinion and, 
until 2008, the Russian public had little stomach for further military adventures elsewhere 
in the former Soviet Union.  
Pavel Baev once declared that “[t]he Chechen War, from its very first day, was 
such an obvious and humiliating disaster that geopolitics went out of vogue overnight.”156 
While it is true that the war accelerated a period of strategic decline and military 
withdrawal, the Kremlin nevertheless remained committed to hegemony. The assertion 
that the Kremlin abandoned geopolitics after its defeat in Chechnya, however, is simply 
not tenable. Aside from their value as levers against the Georgian state, for instance, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia – the latter in particular – have no real value to Russia. Their 
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economies are small and their populations are even smaller. They have no appreciable 
resources to speak of. On the other hand, their territory is strategically important: both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia lie on the southern end of two of the major north-south roads 
across the Caucasus, and Abkhazia has a reasonably large coast on the Black Sea, 
something which Moscow was largely deprived of when the Soviet Union collapsed. 
Moreover, as has been noted, they were considered valuable to Russia due to their utility 
in keeping Tbilisi compliant. In short, Russia‟s interest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
stems from a classically geopolitical way of viewing the world. 
Thus, while Russia remained committed to maintaining its hegemony in Georgia, 
as result of its defeat in Chechnya its ability to do so, at least by means of exercising hard 
power, were severely constrained. "The irreducible strategic fact," writes Baev, “is that 
the war in Chechnya, while underscoring Russia's need to strategically position forces 
toward the Caucasus and Central Asia, drastically reduces its ability to do so."
157
 As will 
be discussed in Chapter Five, however, the Kremlin increasingly resorted to relatively 
inexpensive means, including passportization, of keeping restive neighbors such as 
Georgia destabilized and obedient. 
3.7: Retrenchment: 1996-1999 
The period from the end of the First Chechen War until the advent of Vladimir 
Putin was a difficult interlude for Russian foreign policy. Boris Yeltsin‟s health remained 
poor, and he took lengthy breaks from his duties running the country. "In his second 
term," writes Daniel Treisman, "he seemed to visit the hospital almost as often as the 
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Kremlin."
158
 The health of Russia‟s government during this period was scarcely better: 
Yeltsin's administration went through five Prime Ministers between 1996 and 1999, with 
four of the five serving brief terms between 1998 and 1999.  
In addition to weak leadership, Russia‟s financial situation suffered from 
continuing instability. A crisis rocked Russian markets in 1998, and Avraamova and 
Ovcharova concluded that “the uneven and incomplete nature of [market] reforms, the 
lagging nature of structural transformations, and the not yet fully formed institutional 
framework of the market economy” were largely to blame.159 While some of these 
problems were probably inevitable given the staggering scope of Russia‟s economic 
transformation, the war in Chechnya did little to help.
160
 
On the foreign policy front, matters were hardly better. The war in Chechnya had 
decimated the Russian military, and Russia's influence abroad looked increasingly 
uncertain. "In need of Western capital to finance marketization, possessed of a 
dilapidated and demoralized military, and preoccupied with the task of state building 
amid domestic ferment," writes David McDonald, "the new Russian state lacked the 
physical ability to act, even as it gained recognition as the successor to the USSR in 
international organizations…"161 Beset by political turmoil and a collapsing economy, 
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Russia entered a period of relative withdrawal and retrenchment. Even the role of the 
peacekeeping missions in Georgia, which had become so central to Russia's policy in the 
Transcaucasus, came to be questioned. After effectively shattering the Russian military in 
Chechnya, the Kremlin had become increasingly worried about the prospect of being 
dragged into a shooting war in the Caucasus. Developments in Abkhazia, in particular, 
underlined the very real risk of Russian lives being in potentially costly conflicts in 
Georgia, conflicts that Russia itself had a hand in prolonging.  
3.8: Recovery: 2000-2008 
Vladimir Putin's term in office is widely seen as a period of renewal for Russia.
162
 
Steep energy prices helped to bolster the country's economy, which in turn meant 
improved living standards for ordinary Russians.
163
 Putin's style of governance, 
moreover, was far more muscular and proactive than that of the weak and often erratic 
Yeltsin. His energetic and athletic public image, combined with the perception that Putin 
had cracked down on the worst political and economic abuses of the 1990s and, 
moreover, put Russia back on the right track, means that, even as Prime Minister, Putin 
remains more popular by between 5 and 10 percentage points than the current President, 
Dmitri Medvedev.
164
 Putin is thus in some ways a personification of Russia‟s post-Soviet 
renewal.
165
 
Indeed, Putin's rise coincided with Russia's ability to once again able to assert 
itself as a "great power." Nicu Popescu has attributed Russia‟s new foreign policy vigor 
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to a number of factors.
166
 First, of course, is that the improvement in Russia‟s economy 
from its mid-1990s nadir meant that it had more resources to devote to projects beyond 
its borders. Putin himself has argued that the growth of the economy has strengthened 
Russia‟s position vis-à-vis the rest of the world.167 Not only has the economic recovery 
helped to stabilize budgets, but the petroleum industry also has provided Russia with 
substantial income as well as a powerful foreign policy lever. Both Georgia and Ukraine, 
for instance, have seen prices for energy substantially increased – and have even had 
deliveries halted entirely – when they have run afoul of Moscow.  
Second, Russia s domestic situation has stabilized and Putin‟s clique has nearly 
unquestioned control over the organs of state. Unlike Yeltsin, who was often distracted 
by ill health and the messy internal politics of the 1990s, neither Putin nor Medvedev, 
despite sporadic protests, have faced any serious challenges to their authority. Moreover, 
numerous Russian media outlets, especially television networks, are owned by or 
sympathetic to the government. Gazprom, the gigantic, government-controlled energy 
corporation, has also bought up numerous newspapers and magazines.
168
 Control of the 
media gives the government a reasonable degree of power to shape the popular discourse. 
This leaves them a great deal of leeway to pursue policies that, if not totally 
unconstrained by domestic concerns, then are at least not hamstrung by widespread 
popular opposition.  
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Third, the United States is widely seen to have become bogged down in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In addition to the strain put on American and NATO military forces, 
worldwide disapproval of the invasion of Iraq left the United States with little political 
capital with which to mount a serious opposition to Russian interventionism in the former 
Soviet realm. Even after Barack Obama‟s vaunted “reset with Russia,” US-Russia 
relations have been confined largely to negotiations over largely outdated strategic arms 
treaties initially drafted during the Cold War.  
Finally, the almost total destruction of the Chechen nationalist movement in the 
Second Chechen War has meant that “the Chechen factor is no longer a constraint on 
[Russia‟s] policies toward the secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova.”169 
Previously, the government in Moscow had found itself in the uncomfortable position of 
opposing separatism in Chechnya and Kosovo while simultaneously sponsoring the 
separatist regimes in Georgia. These constraints no longer exist, and may have 
contributed to the Kremlin‟s aggressive strategy in Georgia in the lead-up to the war.170  
Perhaps ironically, at the same time that Russia became able to once again begin 
to seriously assert itself as a regional hegemon, events in Georgia began to undo much of 
the progress that the Kremlin had made during the 1990s. As we will see in the next 
chapter, despite having more or less successfully reestablished itself as a regional 
hegemon, Russian influence in Georgia began to crumble. Instead of driving events, as it 
had anticipated, Russia soon found itself reacting to developments such as the Rose 
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Revolution and the ouster of Adjaran strongman Aslan Abashidze, a longtime client of 
Moscow, which exposed the limits of Russian power in the region and threatened to 
diminish it even further.  
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CHAPTER IV 
HEGEMONY AND CHALLENGE 
“You think you can trust the Americans and they will rush to assist you? Nobody 
can be trusted! Except me. I‟ll provide what I promise. That is how it is.” 
-Vladimir Putin to Mikheil Saakashvili
171
 
 
Dov Lynch has written that the term “frozen conflict,” which is used to describe 
the situations that emerged in the de facto states after CIS peacekeeping units were 
deployed, is in fact somewhat misleading.
172
 The term, after all, implies a stasis that in 
reality did not exist. Although no major developments in the peace process between 
Tbilisi and the de facto regimes were ever achieved, the period between the end of the 
war in Abkhazia and the Five Day War in 2008 nevertheless witnessed major 
developments in Georgia‟s political landscape and in Tbilisi‟s relationship with Moscow, 
Sokhumi, and Tskhinvali. While some of the dynamism in Georgia during this time was 
driven by policy decisions in Moscow, political developments in Georgia revealed the 
limits of Russia‟s ability to control events in the region.  
4.1: Rebuilding Russian Hegemony 
As we have seen, one of the major goals of Russian foreign policy after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was the reestablishment of Russian hegemony in the post-
Soviet space. For a variety of reasons, Moscow viewed the Transcaucasus, and Georgia 
in particular, as critical regions for Russia‟s security. Rebuilding its influence in Georgia, 
especially in the conditions of near-collapse that prevailed in the country after 
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independence, was not a trivial undertaking. Indeed, the re-establishment of Russian 
hegemony in the South Caucasus was not a foregone conclusion in 1992, but rather the 
product of a number of circumstances that Russia was able to successfully exploit to its 
own benefit.  
By 1993, Georgia had come dangerously close to becoming a failed state. South 
Ossetia had managed to secure its de facto independence, and the war in Abkhazia was 
not going well. The poorly led and equipped Georgian military, made up as it was by 
private militias and amateur soldiers, was increasingly ineffective against the more 
motivated Abkhazian troops, their North Caucasian allies, and the well-trained Russian 
forces arrayed against them. Moreover, “Zviadist” rebels had managed to build up a base 
of power in Western Georgia and forces loyal to Gamsakhurdia continued to wage a civil 
war against the central government, effectively preventing the nascent Georgian state 
from consolidating its jurisdiction over significant parts of its territory.  
From the Russian point of view, then, the situation in Georgia was becoming 
worrisome. Although supporting the de facto states against Tbilisi served Moscow's 
purposes, the prospect of the total disintegration of the Georgian state represented a 
potentially serious threat to Russia‟s security. In the hopes of stabilizing the situation, the 
Russian government offered Shevardnadze a sort of Faustian bargain: in return for 
military assistance against the “Zviadists,” Georgia would agree to join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and allow the Russian military to keep its Soviet-
era bases on Georgian soil. Shevardnadze agreed, and Russian troops subsequently 
intervened in the Georgian civil war, arming and fighting alongside pro-Shevardnadze 
forces while simultaneously taking control of the country‟s transportation system in order 
 75 
to deprive rebel forces of ease of movement around the country. Russian assistance was 
thus a critical factor in ultimately putting down the "Zviadist" insurgency.
173
 
On a purely practical level, backing Shevardnadze over Gamsakhurdia was not a 
difficult choice for Russia. In the words of one scholar, Shevardnadze was a "good fit" 
for Moscow
174
: as the former Soviet Foreign Minister, he was well connected in the 
Russian government and was, unlike the virulently anti-Russian Gamsakhurdia, willing to 
work with Moscow. Gamsakhurdia‟s defeat and subsequent death precluded the 
possibility of him returning to power in Georgia, helping to ensure that Russia would not 
be bordered in the south by a hostile state, at least for the time being. Support for 
Shevardnadze was also consistent with Russia's desire for stability on its southern flank. 
With violence in Georgia threatening to spill over into the North Caucasus, taking steps 
to stop the fighting was a prudent decision. Not only did it help bring an end to the 
conflict, reducing the possibility of violence spreading into the Russia itself, but it also 
helped to remind Tbilisi that it remained dependent on Moscow for its security. 
In return for helping defeat the “Zviadists,” moreover, Russia was able to extract 
a number of valuable concessions from the Georgian government. When it joined the 
CIS, for instance, Georgia became part of what Dov Lynch has called the Kremlin‟s 
“forward-positioning network,” which also included Kazakhstan, Armenia, and 
Tajikistan. Despite its name, which suggests an outward-facing posture, the "forward-
positioning network" was in reality intended to be little more than a buffer between 
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Russia and its neighbors, insulating Russia in the same capacity as the Warsaw Pact 
states had for the Soviet Union.
175
 Svante Cornell concurs with this assessment, writing 
that the South Caucasus formed part of a “buffer zone between the Russian North 
Caucasus and the Islamic World to its South; in particular, the region is adjacent to 
Turkey and Iran, two states whose influence Russia sees as challenging to its own 
role.”176 In addition to joining the CIS and allowing Russia to maintain bases on its soil, 
Georgia also handed the defense of its borders over to Russian troops and gave the 
Russian military control of a major railway with great strategic. In return, Russia 
transferred arms, mostly of Soviet vintage, to the Georgian military.
177
  
By the middle of the 1990s, then, Georgia had once again been pulled into 
Russia‟s orbit. The country remained deeply divided, and many considered President 
Shevardnadze to be a “traitor” who had “delivered” the country back to Moscow.178 
Nevertheless, many Georgians now began to view the nationalist fervor that had swept 
their country over the last decade as nothing less than a “catastrophe,”179 and there was 
little enthusiasm for more conflict in a country that Shevardnadze himself described as 
“exhausted.”180 For Shevardnadze, and indeed Georgia as a whole, achieving some 
semblance of stability after years of violence was the top priority. It is no wonder, then, 
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that Shevardnadze himself once told Thomas Goltz that “[t]he most important thing is 
guaranteeing security through the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the region.”181 
As we will see, however, the peacekeeping missions that the Georgian President hoped 
would bring security to the region would in the end only serve to help perpetuate the 
problem of separatism. 
4.1.1: Peacekeeping Missions 
The Russian military would not again attempt military operations on the scale of 
the Chechen War during Yeltsin‟s term in office. The massive drain on men, material, 
and morale had all but crippled Russia's armed forces, and the country had neither the 
economic means nor the political will to attempt any major mobilization for the 
remainder of the decade. Despite its growing inability to project hard power, however, 
the Kremlin was not willing simply to abandon its ambitions of rebuilding its hegemony 
in the post-Soviet space. Increasingly, Moscow resorted to comparatively cheap and low-
risk means of coercing its neighbors into accommodating its interests.  
One of the chief means by which Russia remained militarily engaged in the South 
Caucasus was by pushing for the establishment of Russian-led peacekeeping missions in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The peacekeeping units were ostensibly inserted into the 
conflict zones to help enforce cease-fires between Georgian forces and those belonging to 
the separatist regimes, but they all too frequently became a component of what Dov 
Lynch has called a strategy of "forceful reengagement" in the post-Soviet space. Despite 
mounting criticism by the Georgian government, CIS peacekeepers remained deployed in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia until the outbreak of the Five Day War. While Georgia also 
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had a contingent of peacekeepers, they were subordinate to a Russian commander and 
were outnumbered by their Russian and Abkhaz or Ossetian counterparts. Indeed, when 
fighting broke out in August of 2008, the non-Georgian peacekeeping battalions joined 
the Russian military to fight against Georgia.
182
  
For many, the word “peacekeeper” conjures up images of neutral soldiers wearing 
blue helmets, deployed for the express purpose of preventing warring factions from 
engaging in violence. Pavel Baev has enumerated six main characteristics of these rather 
familiar UN peacekeeping operations: 
1. Peacekeepers are usually multilateral in nature, rather than a "unilateral 
instrument employed by self-interested states”; 
2. UN peacekeeping missions are "set up with the consent of cooperation of 
the parties involved"; 
3. UN peacekeepers are assumed to be impartial; 
4. Peacekeepers, as much as possible, were provided by "small and medium 
powers, in order to exclude superpower rivalry from an operation"; 
5. Use of force by peacekeepers is limited to self-defense; 
6. Peacekeepers, traditionally, have only been deployed after the negotiation 
of a cease-fire.
183
 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, of course, these guidelines have undergone certain 
modifications. "Humanitarian interventions" launched without the consent of all involved 
parties, for instance, have become more common since 1991, but the general principles 
underlying UN peacekeeping operations have not changed dramatically.
184
  
There are, however, several key differences between Russian-led CIS 
peacekeeping operations and more familiar UN peacekeeping missions. In Georgia, for 
instance,  
                                                     
182
 Lynch, 2004, 74. 
 
183
 Baev, 2000, 19-20. 
 
184
 Ibid., 21. 
 
 79 
Russian “peacekeeping” operations occurred after 
unilateral coercive intervention by Russian forces already 
in the combat zones. The nature of the consent afforded to 
these operations has been suspect, as Russia itself had been 
a party to these conflicts… 
Moreover, according to Baev, "[a]ll Russian deployments have altered the prevailing 
distribution of power in these conflict zones in order to further Russian aims."
185
 That is 
to say that, although CIS peacekeepers were often (though not always) successful in their 
mission to enforce cease-fires between Georgia and the de facto states, the actual purpose 
of their deployment was simply to ensure a stable situation, rather than taking proactive 
measures to find a peaceful resolution to the conflicts.
186
 Russia, meanwhile, as both the 
leader of the CIS peacekeeping missions as well as the chief mediator in the peace talks, 
became a major stakeholder in the peace process, further magnifying the importance in 
the region of decisions made in Moscow. 
In some ways, then, support for the de facto states can be seen as a continuation of 
the old strategy of “divide and rule,” which had been a feature of Russian policy in the 
region throughout both the Imperial and Soviet periods. By ensuring that the separatist 
governments remained reliant on Russian peacekeepers to prevent Georgia from 
attempting once again to reintegrate their territories, Moscow guaranteed that it would 
continue to have loyal and reliable allies. At the same time, by positioning itself as a 
mediator, as well as by holding in reserve the threat of recognition for the de facto states, 
Russia made certain that Tbilisi would have to remain more or less compliant.
187
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In some respects, peacekeepers were extremely convenient and effective tools for 
maintaining a strong Russian presence in Georgia. Many individual peacekeepers were 
drawn from Russian units that were already stationed in the Transcaucasus after the 
Soviet collapse. Russian airborne troops that had fought on the side of the Abkhaz, for 
instance, formed the core of the peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia.
188
 The fact that 
Russian troops already stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could simply be 
converted into “peacekeepers” obviated the need to waste resources on re-deploying 
troops to the Caucasus from other parts of the former Soviet Union. 
Interestingly, the peacekeeping missions also enjoyed a certain amount of 
international legitimacy, at least initially. In the face of Western disinterest in the region, 
Moscow‟s eagerness to intervene and put a stop to the violence in Georgia was welcomed 
as a positive sign that post-Soviet Russia was serious about engaging constructively in 
world affairs. Indeed, the CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia operated under the auspices of 
the UN, which itself maintained a small and largely impotent "observation" mission in 
the southern part of the territory. In South Ossetia, CIS peacekeepers worked with 
another "observation" contingent, this one from the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Despite such minor gestures of cooperation, Russia has, 
in the words of one analyst, "jealously guarded its peacekeeping mandate in Georgia" and 
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has sought to limit international involvement in peacekeeping operations in the de facto 
states.
189
 
The reluctance to internationalize the peacekeeping missions may be related to 
Russian suspicions of outside involvement in military operations in its "sphere of 
influence." As Jaba Devdariani has written, 
[b]y 1994, in holding the keys to a resolution of the 
"frozen" ethnic conflicts, Russia had essentially realized a 
Pax Russica in the region. To institutionalize this 
dominance, the Russians worked to undercut international 
participation in the OSCE's Minsk Group, an international 
body mandated to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
problem. Russia made similar efforts at the UN and OSCE 
to prevent "internationalization" of the peacekeeping 
operations in Abkhazia beyond the UN/OSCE mission.
190
 
The problem for Moscow was that internationalizing the peacekeeping missions, as 
Georgia repeatedly demanded, might have resulted in a weakening of Russia‟s grip on 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If either the OSCE or the UN assumed a more prominent 
role in the region, greater pressure could be put on all of the actors, including the 
Kremlin, to finally resolve the “frozen conflicts.” As long as Russia remained the chief 
guarantor of the de facto states‟ “independence,” however, the threat of recognition could 
continue to be wielded against the Georgian government; so as long as Russia controlled 
the peacekeeping missions, it could continue to coerce Georgia into cooperation.
191
 As 
Andrew Bennett has written,  
[b]y 1993 the dominant view shifted toward unilateralism 
as it became apparent that other states and international 
organizations… would insist on greater neutrality in 
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peacekeeping missions than Russian Nationalists were 
willing to tolerate.
192
 
By serving as a "protective" ring behind which the secessionist governments 
could develop the institutions of statehood,
193
 the peacekeepers helped to effect what 
amounted to a drastic reconfiguration of Georgia's internationally recognized borders. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, these borders had been created as internal administrative borders 
in the 1930s. As the 1990s wore on, however, the formerly internal borders of Georgia 
began to ossify into something resembling international boundary lines.
194
 Despite the 
fact that international law continued to recognize Georgia‟s borders as including 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the peacekeepers made it impossible in practice for the 
Georgian government to attempt to reestablish control over the secessionist territories 
without risking war with the Russian Federation. 
4.1.2: Government and Gas 
In addition to the use of peacekeepers to effectively guarantee the independence 
of the de facto states, Russia also began the gradual “infiltration” of the institutions of 
government in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali by agents of the Russian state.
195
 Indeed, 
Russia‟s desire to maintain control over the de facto states was evidenced by its active 
involvement in the Abkhaz elections in 2004 and 2005. As Antonenko writes, 
Russia had too many interests at stake, and Russian 
politicians not only stressed the importance of these 
elections but took a very active part in trying to shape their 
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outcome. Indeed, the elections were important because they 
determined the transfer of power from the first postwar 
president of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, to a new leader, 
who would be presiding for the next four years over 
important changes both within Abkhazia and potentially in 
its relations with Georgia, Russia, and the outside world.
196
 
Antonenko points out that Ardzinba had been a “convenient leader for 
Moscow”197 due both to his “uncompromising” stance toward reunification with Georgia 
as well as his close ties with senior Russian officials, including Yevgeny Primakov. 
There was some worry that whoever succeeded him would be more amenable to finally 
resolving the conflict with Russia, which the Kremlin viewed as a potential threat to its 
influence. Russia therefore decided to support its own candidate for president. This 
campaign 
amounted to unprecedented external interference in the 
electoral process at all its stages. This policy can be 
compared only with Russia‟s on “elections” of governors, 
which under Putin depend almost entirely on decisions 
made in Moscow and are simply “ratified” through 
manipulated elections.
198
 
Unfortunately for Moscow, it misjudged the Abkhaz people‟s genuine desire for 
independence, and the Kremlin‟s candidate, Raul Khadzhimba, wound up losing the 
election to his opponent, Sergei Bagapsh. Moscow refused to recognize the results of the 
election and organized a runoff between Khadzhimba and Bagapsh, a contest that has 
been described in no uncertain terms as “rigged.”199 Bagapsh himself refused to 
participate, and Russia responded by closing the Russian-Abkhaz border and banning the 
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import into Russia of Abkhaz produce, which was a vital lifeline to the shaky Abkhaz 
economy.
200
 Indeed, Russia at one point even threatened to use military force against 
Abkhazia if Bagapsh did not concede the elections, though in the end it never followed 
through on such threats.
201
  
 It almost goes without saying that such open interference in the Abkhaz elections 
was clearly contrary to Russia‟s stated roles both as the leader of supposedly neutral 
peacekeeping operations and as an ostensible mediator in the “frozen conflicts.” 
Moscow‟s attempts to “rig” the Abkhaz elections, however, illustrate very clearly the 
geopolitical interests that the Kremlin felt were at stake in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Indeed, Jeffrey Mankoff has noted striking similarities with the so-called “Orange 
Revolution” in Ukraine, another former Soviet state where Russia‟s hegemony was 
beginning to appear increasingly shaky: 
Bagapsh was not Russophobe (no Abkhaz politician could 
afford to alienate the region‟s only outside supporter), but 
his candidacy had developed outside the framework of the 
Kremlin patronage that sustained his rival, Raul 
Khadzhimba. The Abkhaz crisis of 2004-2005 was thus a 
smaller version of the struggle for Ukraine going on at the 
same moment.
202
 
The internal affairs of the Georgian government were themselves subject to 
Russian meddling.  One result of the concessions given up by Shevardnadze in return for 
support against Gamsakhurdia was that the Russian government had acquired a great deal 
of influence over the appointment of officials in a number of crucial ministries within the 
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Georgian government, including the Ministries of Defense, Security, and the Interior.
203
 
In some views, this influence allowed Russia to effect the appointment of individuals that 
would steer Georgia‟s security apparatus away from closer ties with the West. As 
Thornike Gordadze writes, “Russia jealously supervised every move of the Georgian law 
enforcement and security forces and was careful to prevent links between them and their 
Western counterparts.” The end result of such “steering” was that “[w]ith both its security 
and defense in the hands of Russian appointees, the Georgian government took no steps 
to move closer to NATO for several years.”204 This situation would only begin to change 
after the Rose Revolution of 2003. 
In addition to Russia‟s effective supervision of some of the Georgian 
government‟s most critical ministries, throughout Shevardnadze‟s terms in office the 
country itself remained economically dependent on Russia for imports and exports and 
largely reliant on Moscow for deliveries of fuel and energy.
 205
 As a result, Georgia 
became a victim of Russia‟s so-called “pipeline politics.” For instance when, in 2006, 
Tbilisi expelled a number of Russian embassy workers, having charged them with 
espionage, Russia responded by declaring an embargo on Georgian goods, effectively 
cutting the country off from its largest market. Moreover, as Goldman writes, 
transportation and postal routes were also closed, and ethnic Georgians began to be 
expelled from Russia en masse.
206
 “In addition,” he writes, 
                                                     
203
 Gordadze, 35. 
 
204
 Ibid., 36. 
 
205
 Trenin, 100. 
 
206
 Goldman, 150. 
 
 86 
There were disruptions in the flow of electricity from 
Russia. At about the same time in January 2006, the gas 
pipeline passing through North Ossetia from Russia to 
Georgia mysteriously exploded. This coincided with the 
campaign against Ukraine and the application of similar 
pressure on Moldova. As with Ukraine, the Russians 
demanded that Georgia and Moldova pay the much higher 
Western European market price for gas.
207
 
Indeed, although prices were ostensibly raised in order to bring them into conformity 
with “market prices,” many analysts have interpreted such manipulation – in Ukraine, 
Georgia, and elsewhere – as a fairly naked attempt by Russia to bully former Soviet 
republics that began to wander too far from Moscow‟s orbit.208 
4.2: Challenge 
By the end of the 1990s, dissatisfaction with the “Pax Russica” was growing. 
Even Shevardnadze, who in many ways owed his presidency to Russia, began to more 
openly challenge the Kremlin, even while Georgia itself remained too weak to effect any 
serious changes to the status quo. This is not to say, however, that Russia‟s hegemony 
went unchallenged. The Georgian parliament passed a law in 1997, for instance, that 
required Russia to finally relinquish control of Georgia‟s borders, including the sensitive 
Georgian-Turkish border, to Georgian border guards by 1999.
209
 Somewhat surprisingly, 
Russia appears to have basically acquiesced to this plan, and the handover proceeded 
without incident. 
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4.2.1: Closing Russian Military Installations 
More problematic was the Georgian government‟s decision to close all of the 
regular Russian military bases stationed on Georgian soil.
210
 According to one analyst, 
there were roughly 1,600 bases and other military facilities of varying sizes on Georgian 
soil that were “inherited” by the Russian military after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.
211
 From the Russian standpoint, these bases were crucial outposts for securing 
Russia‟s southern flank, and there was little willingness on the part of the Kremlin to 
dismantle them. Communist and nationalist factions in the Russian Duma bitterly 
attacked any plan to close the bases. Despite their resistance, most of the less important 
installations were eventually closed between 1997 and 1999.
212
  
By the end of 1999, only four bases remained, although these facilities were by 
far the most important and, perhaps not coincidentally, were located in particularly 
sensitive parts of Georgia‟s territory: There was a base in Gudauta, in Abkhazia, and 
another outside of Batumi, in Adjara; a third base was located in Javakheti, an 
occasionally restive majority Armenian region in the south of the country; the last base 
was located in Vaziani, which was in close proximity to Tbilisi itself.
213
 Talks over the 
status of these bases took years. After ten rounds of negotiations, the Kremlin finally 
demanded fifteen years and $500 million in recompense; Russia was later convinced to 
reduce the timetable to 11 years, though it refused to budge from the $500 million price 
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tag.
214
 Throughout the period that the negotiations were taking place, the Russian side 
continually dragged its feet and even fomented some unrest among the Armenians in 
Javakheti, where the base was a major employer, in the hopes of forestalling the closure 
of the facility.
215
 
The policy of demanding the closure of Russian bases in Georgia carried through 
the Rose Revolution of 2003. Although initially Moscow expected the new government 
to downplay the issue in order to ingratiate itself with its powerful neighbor, this did not 
occur. If anything, the new president took an even more activist approach to the issue. By 
early 2006, Tbilisi threatened that the remaining bases “would be effectively put under 
siege,” in the words of Sokov. “Siege” would have entailed the stoppage of water and 
electricity services to the bases, and the revocation of visas for military personnel, as well 
as the effective confinement of military units to the bases. Tbilisi‟s threats forced the 
Kremlin‟s hand and, the 11-year timeframe was abruptly reduced to 3-4 years, while the 
steep $500 million price tag was halved.
216
 By 2008, all of the bases were officially 
closed. 
The closure of the bases was seen as “a major blow to Russia‟s interests in the 
Caucasus,” in the words of Thornike Gordadze. Not only did the removal of Russian 
regular army troops begin to open holes in Moscow‟s “forward positioning network,” but 
it weakened Russian hegemony in the Transcaucasus. Russia responded to the base 
closures by implementing a strict visa regime on Georgians, making it extremely difficult 
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for them to enter into or work in the Russian Federation. Significantly, this visa regime 
did not apply to residents of South Ossetia or Abkhazia whom, for “humanitarian” 
reasons, were exempted from the new rules.
217
 
4.2.2: The Pankisi Gorge  
Tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi also came to a head over the question of 
whether or not to allow Russian troops to enter the Pankisi Gorge, a remote region in 
northern Georgia that borders on Chechnya. During the Second Chechen War, which 
began in 1999, Russia alleged that large numbers of terrorists – including Osama bin 
Laden himself – were taking refuge in Pankisi with Georgia's blessing. It is impossible to 
say for certain whether such charges were true. One scholar puts the number of actual 
“terrorists” in the Pankisi Gorge as only numbering in the hundreds.218 The significance 
of this number becomes clear when one keeps in mind the fact that, due to the massive 
destruction the Russian military was visiting upon Chechnya itself, some 12,000 refugees 
were living in the area. In any case, Shevardnadze refused to allow Russian troops to 
patrol the Georgian side of the border. The Russians had demanded access to Pankisi 
ostensibly to slow the flow of weapons and reinforcements into the country. After being 
refused ground access to the region, the Russian military simply commenced a bombing 
campaign in the Pankisi Gorge, which represented a fairly clear violation of Georgia‟s 
territorial sovereignty. 
                                                     
217
 Gordadze, 45. 
 
218
 Ibid. 42. 
 90 
4.2.3: The “Six Day War” in Gali and the Failure of Peacekeeping 
Perhaps the greatest rift that developed between Russian and Georgia, however, 
was the result of ongoing instability in the Gali region, an area in southern Abkhazia 
bordering on Georgia. Since the end of the war in 1994, some 30-40,000 ethnic 
Georgians and Mingrelians, who had been driven from their homes during the fighting, 
had quietly returned to the area on their own, making Gali a particularly sensitive region 
for both the Georgian government and the Abkhaz de facto government.
219
 The exact 
cause for the fighting that broke out there in 1998 – the so-called “Six Day War” –
remains unclear, although some reports indicate that Georgian nationalist militias, 
bearing names such as the “White Legion” and the “Forest Brotherhood,” attacked 
Abkhaz police units in the area.
220
 The Georgian government, for its part, alleged that it 
was Abkhaz forces that had first attacked Georgian settlements in the Gali district. These 
attacks, according to the Georgians, were met with “armed resistance” from the local 
population, leading to further attacks by the Abkhaz.
221
 Whatever the actual sequence of 
events was, what is clear is that, within weeks, both the Abkhaz and the Georgian 
government had moved military units into the area and there was a very real threat that a 
more general war between Georgia and Abkhazia could reignite.  
The fighting lasted only for six days, however, and, regardless of which side 
actually started shooting first, the Georgian and Mingrelian population living in Gali 
nevertheless became the target of systematic reprisals by the Abkhaz side. Russian 
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peacekeepers, meanwhile, stood by and refused to intervene to stop the fighting, although 
they did attempt to prevent the infiltration of heavy weapons, such as artillery, from 
entering the combat area. Civilian casualties were numerous, and the result was that the 
Georgian and Mingrelian populations, who had been driven out of Abkhazia during the 
last war, were once again forced out of their homes,
222
 many of which were razed.
223
 
After the fighting was over, Abkhaz forces engaged in a campaign of looting and burning 
villages, which was meant to serve as a disincentive for refugees to attempt to return to 
Gali in the future.
224
 
Although the situation had threatened to spiral out of control, the fighting quickly 
died down after the Georgian forces beat a hasty retreat. Despite fears of another war in 
Abkhazia, none materialized. There were nevertheless several important long-term 
consequences. First, the legitimacy of the Russian-led peacekeeping missions was fatally 
undermined by the fact that peacekeeping troops had failed to intervene on behalf of the 
Georgian and Mingrelian civilians living in Gali.
225
 Russia‟s reluctance to get involved 
may have been linked to the growing numbers of casualties sustained by Russian 
peacekeepers in Georgia throughout 1997 and 1998, largely as a result of incidents 
involving landmines.
226
 After the disaster of the First Chechen War, the Russian 
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government was wary of angering the war-weary electorate by risking Russian lives, 
especially on behalf of places as insignificant as South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
Whatever the reason, as a result of Russia‟s decision to not commit peacekeeping 
forces during the conflict in Gali, the Georgian government‟s level of confidence in the 
peacekeeping missions, which had never been high to begin with, completely collapsed. 
Calls for the missions to be radically restructured, internationalized, or abolished entirely 
reached a fever pitch. Shevardnadze, who had only a few years earlier announced that 
deploying peacekeepers was “the most important thing,” publically announced his 
opposition to their continued presence. For its part, the Abkhaz de facto government also 
registered its displeasure with the Russian peacekeepers, claiming that they had not done 
enough to prevent groups such as the White Legion and the Forest Brotherhood from 
encroaching on Abkhaz territory.
227
  
In retrospect, the unrest in Gali in 1998 was the beginning of the end of Russia‟s 
reliance on peacekeepers alone to sustain its hegemony in the South Caucasus. Not only 
was there little stomach for more bloodshed in a Russia that was still licking its wounds 
after being defeated in Chechnya, but the merits of the peacekeeping missions themselves 
were also increasingly under attack. Boris Yeltsin gave voice to Russia‟s frustration in 
March, 1997 when he said, “If someone does not want Russia‟s help, we can withdraw 
our peacekeepers… it is now high time for the conflicting parties to start making 
decisions.”228 Indeed, already by this time, and certainly after the Gali incident, Russian 
policies toward the de facto states had begun to shift. Although Russia‟s new approach 
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toward maintaining its hegemony in Georgia would not come to full fruition until early in 
Vladimir Putin‟s first administration, by the end of the 1990s the Kremlin was already 
reconsidering the central role that had been played by peacekeepers since 1994. Writing 
in 2000, Dov Lynch noted that 
the Russian leadership… recognized the dangers involved 
in the reliance on the military as a tool of policy. The 
importance of this region for Russia remains unchanged. 
The means by which the government pursues its objectives 
in the region, however, may change radically. The 
appointment of Primakov in early 1996 resulted in 
increased emphasis on diplomatic measures, and 
strengthened the MFA‟s [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] role 
in policy-making.
229
 
Among the new means employed by Moscow was passportization, which, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, fundamentally altered discourses of territoriality in the de 
facto states in a way that Russian peacekeepers, by their very nature as parties “external” 
to the conflict, were unable to do. 
4.2.4: The Rose Revolution 
 Aside from hollowing out what remained of the peacekeepers‟ legitimacy, the 
unrest in Gali had other significant ramifications as well. The short conflict was 
extremely unpopular in Georgia, where it was taken as a sign that the government was 
unwilling or unable to protect Georgians against ethnic cleansing.
230
 Moreover, although 
the “Zviadist” insurgency had been crushed, parts of western Georgia remained restive. 
For instance, Shevardnadze and his government were deeply unpopular in Mingrelia, 
where Gamsakhurdia remained a local hero.  The violence in neighboring Gali, 
moreover, had threatened to further destabilize the region, where people complained that 
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the government was not doing enough to support the new flood of refugees from 
Abkhazia. Tbilisi found that it had little choice but to begin sending large sums of money 
to Mingrelia to calm the situation. The payments, however, proved to be unsustainable 
given the rampant corruption that characterized Georgia throughout Shevardnadze‟s 
tenure in office. The already weak Georgian economy began to slump even further and a 
major financial crisis ensued. The financial crisis that erupted in Russia at roughly the 
same time did little to help Georgia‟s recovery.  
It was in this context that Georgia began the process of holding elections. 
Shevardnadze‟s position was so desperate that both the parliamentary elections in 1999, 
as well as the presidential elections, which were held in 2000, were rigged. According to 
Irakly Areshidze, “[t]hese two elections, especially the one in 1999, were characterized 
by greater and more serious electoral violations than anything ever seen in Georgia 
before or since.”231 Shevardnadze‟s victory, however, did little to alleviate Georgia‟s 
problems, as Lincoln Mitchell describes: 
Shevardnadze‟s regime was rife with corruption, unable to 
deliver basic services or economic growth of any kind and 
relying increasingly on Shevardnadze‟s reputation, 
continuing mastery of politics and ability to keep the 
Georgian opposition disunified.
232
 
By the time the 2003 parliamentary elections came around, Shevardnadze‟s party, 
Citizens‟ United Georgia (CUG) had begun to splinter. Forming a new party, For New 
Georgia, the old Soviet Foreign Minister made one final bid to hold onto power. 
However, when exit polls from the 2003 elections wound up differing sharply from the 
                                                     
231
 Irakly Areshidze, Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition (East Lansing, Michigan 
State University Press, 2007), 49. 
 
232
 Lincoln Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution 
(Philadelphia, PENN, 2009), 43. 
 
 95 
official results, which indicated a victory for the For New Georgia party, it became clear 
that the process had once again been rigged. This time protesters took to the streets to 
demand Shevardnadze‟s resignation.233  
There is of course no space here to give a full account of what became known as 
the Rose Revolution, which was replete with the requisite politicking and power grabs. 
Suffice it to say that, when the dust began to settle, Mikheil Saakashvili, perhaps the most 
popular and visible reformist politician in the country,
234
 emerged as the new president of 
Georgia. An energetic, English-speaking, Columbia-educated reformer, Saakashvili faced 
numerous challenges almost immediately upon taking office. In striking similarity to the 
problems faced by the Menshevik government after the collapse of the Russian Empire, 
Saakashvili‟s government rode a wave of optimism, even though, in the words of Niklas 
Nilsson, it “inherited extremely weak and corrupt governmental institutions, poverty, and 
a lack of control over a significant portion of the country‟s territory.”235 
4.2.5: The Adjara Crisis 
At the top of Saakashvili‟s agenda was the question of territorial integrity. Little 
progress had been made under Shevardnadze to finally resolve the problem of the de 
facto states on Georgia‟s territory. Possessed, in Nilsson‟s words, by a “zeal for territorial 
integrity,” Saakashvili immediately began to make plans to bring the de facto regimes 
back into the fold. Saakashvili believed that Adjara would be the most readily 
reintegrated, due in large part to the growing unpopularity of Aslan Abashidze who, in 
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the words of Christoph Zürcher, “ruled Adjara as a personal fiefdom…”236 In addition to 
highly successful non-violent protests organized by Tbilisi against Abashidze, the 
Georgian government also held “large military exercises just across the administrative 
border” that separated Adjara from Georgia proper.237 
At first, Abashidze remained unimpressed. Adjara had long since become what 
Georgi Derlugian has called “a Russian military protectorate,”238 and the presence of a 
large Russian military base close to Batumi, Adjara‟s capital city, reinforced his belief 
that there was little that Georgia could do to unseat him. He was not alone in this 
assessment. One Western scholar, writing in 2004 about Georgia‟s ongoing campaign to 
close all Russian military bases in Georgia, confidently asserted: 
In short, there are reasons to say that Adjara is well beyond 
Tbilisi‟s reach and that Tbilisi lacks a leverage to remove 
the Russians by means other than negotiations. Adjara 
benefits from the base by having another ally on the ground 
and Moscow benefits from the strategic reach given by the 
current situation and hence there are no incentives for them 
to leave.
239
 
Russia, however, would refrain from intervening militarily to prevent Abashidze‟s ouster; 
indeed, committing the troops stationed in Batumi to Abashidze‟s defense would have 
represented a serious breach of international law. In the end, Abashidze was convinced to 
step down by the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Igor Ivanov, whereupon he 
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left Adjara for Moscow.
240
 Ominously, Putin warned Saakashvili, “Now remember, we 
did not intervene in Adjara, but you won‟t have any gifts from us in south Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.”241 
4.3: Exporting the “Adjara” Template 
 The peaceful removal of Abashidze was a major coup for the new Georgian 
government, as well as for Saakashvili personally. Outside of Georgia proper, however, 
the developments in Adjara appeared worrisome. The narrative in the Russian press 
during this period highlighted Georgia‟s supposed aggressiveness, and numerous articles 
published at the time warned of the danger of further attempts by Tbilisi to reintegrate the 
de facto states.
242
  
Indeed, it is clear that there was some fear in Russia that the “Adjara scenario” 
could be replayed in Sokhumi or Tskhinvali, as evidenced in an article published in 
Vremya novostei on May 20, 2004, entitled “Last Stop – Sokhumi: Abkhazia Wants to 
Protect Itself From the Export of the Georgian Revolution”: 
[C]onsultations [with Russia] are acquiring a special 
relevance since Abkhazia fears the export of the Georgian 
“Rose Revolution” along the lines of the Adjar scenario. 
Vice-President of Abkhazia, Astamur Tania, told Vremya 
novostei that “the peace process was under serious threat.” 
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In his words, “the Georgian authorities are actively talking 
about the restoration of territorial integrity…”243 
Such fears were not necessarily unfounded. Throughout the period leading up to the Five 
Day War in 2008, Saakashvili‟s government attempted unsuccessfully to duplicate the 
success of the “Adjara scenario” in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Saakashvili, 
however, seems to have seriously misjudged the difficulties he faced in the remaining de 
facto states. Unlike in Adjara, for example, the populations were not ethnically Georgian 
and had little interest in being part of a Georgian state. Perhaps more importantly, Adjara 
and Georgia had never fought a war against one another. By contrast, the memories of 
war, particularly in Abkhazia, remained fresh, and mistrust of and antipathy toward 
Georgia and ethnic Georgians remained high. Lastly, Russian control over the de facto 
governments in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali was far stronger than it had been in Batumi, 
despite Moscow‟s close relations with Aslan Abashidze. This was due in part to Adjara‟s 
physical remoteness from Russia as well as to Abashidze‟s highly personalized style of 
rule. 
 It was due in large part to Saakashvili‟s misunderstandings about the very real 
differences between Adjara and the other two de facto states that led him to adopt 
policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia that in hindsight appear rather rash and ham-
fisted. For example, as Niklas Nilsson points out, 
Between December 2003 and May 2004, Tbilisi mounted a 
campaign to undermine the South Ossetian authorities 
through an anti-smuggling operation. Checkpoints along 
the administrative border were closed, the Ergneti border 
market closed, and roads used for smuggling were blown 
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up. These efforts were aimed at fanning dissatisfaction with 
the de facto authorities and were combined with promises 
of humanitarian aid to win the hearts and minds of the local 
population. This strategy backfired, however, as the 
government apparently underestimated South Ossetian 
fears of Georgian aggression. This enabled the Kokoity 
government to mobilize significant support.
244
    
Indeed, despite Saakashvili‟s various attempts to recreate his victory in Adjara, which 
often included wide-ranging proposals to give the de facto states substantial 
independence from Tbilisi in return for maintaining Georgia‟s territorial integrity, the 
peace process remained deadlocked.
245
 Each of his proposals was rejected out of hand. 
Attempts to establish “alternative” Abkhazian and South Ossetian governments on 
Georgian-controlled territory in the de facto states, and neither the new Abkhaz 
“government in exile” nor the Georgian-backed “government” of Dmitri Sanokaev in 
South Ossetia ever garnered any real support.
246
 
 The reluctance of the de facto governments in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali to take 
seriously any of Saakashvili‟s proposals was likely linked to the increasing levels of 
support they had begun receiving from Russia in the wake of Abashidze‟s ouster. In 
addition to intensifying the campaign of passportization in the de facto states, Russia also 
unilaterally withdrew from the CIS-imposed sanctions that dated from 1996 and which 
had prohibited the transfer of armaments into Abkhazia by any member of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.
247
 Additionally, in April of 2008, Moscow 
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normalized relations with the de facto regimes while continuing to formally recognize 
Georgia‟s territorial integrity. According to Andrei Illarionov,  
President Putin ordered the Russian government and 
Russian regional authorities to establish direct relations 
with the governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. The 
specific type of relationship which he proposed was 
virtually identical to that which existed between Moscow 
and the federal territories within Russia proper.
248
 
Russian decision-making vis-à-vis Georgia after the Rose Revolution makes a 
great deal of sense when viewed as a means of preserving Russian hegemony in the 
region. Not only did Saakashvili‟s “zeal for territorial integrity” threaten to undermine 
Russian influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the Georgian President‟s stated 
goals of leading Georgia into NATO and the European Union were also seen as major 
threats to Russia‟s security interests. As Jeffrey Mankoff explains, support for the de 
facto regimes, which guaranteed a continuation of the “frozen conflicts” served the 
Kremlin‟s purposes by effectively preventing the necessary conditions for Georgia to join 
Western security organizations: 
the Kremlin used the existence of the frozen conflicts (in 
Georgia as well as in Moldova and Azerbaijan) to keep a 
leash on post-Soviet states‟ ambitions of joining the EU or 
NATO, which are pledged not to admit member states with 
unresolved territorial disputes.
249
 
 Despite the fact that Saakashvili was probably too optimistic about his chances of 
successfully coaxing Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into communion with Georgia, it 
is clear that Russia was alarmed at the prospect of “losing” the de facto states and, 
immediately after the “loss” of Adjara, Moscow began to take steps to ensure that South 
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Ossetia and Abkhazia would not be similarly pried from its grip. As we have seen, 
normalizing relationships with the secessionist governments was one method by which 
Russia tried to strengthen the regimes in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi. Despite closer political 
ties, however, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained outside of Russia‟s effective 
jurisdiction. As we will see in the next chapter, however, passportization was the means 
by which Russia was able to discursively transform the de facto states into spaces where 
the Kremlin was able to argue that it had the right to exercise something resembling 
sovereign control, something that peacekeepers and political support for the separatist 
regimes could never have accomplished. 
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CHAPTER V 
PASSPORTIZATION AND TERRITORY 
“I would rather die of hunger than take a Georgian passport - that would be a betrayal of 
the memory of my brother, who died in the war.” 
-“Lasha,” an Abkhazian250 
 
As the 1990s wore on, Russia started to view peacekeeping with a somewhat 
more jaundiced eye. Given the state of the Russian armed forces after the catastrophe of 
the First Chechen War, as well as continuing uncertainty about the future of the shaky 
Russian economy, particularly after the financial collapse of 1998, there was some 
trepidation in Moscow over the possibility that peacekeepers could wind up drawing 
Russia into an unwanted war in the Caucasus. This fear was not entirely unwarranted. 
The situation in South Ossetia remained peaceful, if tense, with the relative calm 
occasionally punctuated by small-scale skirmishes between Georgian forces and Ossetian 
militias. Abkhazia was more problematic, and major incidents, including the “Six Day 
War” in Gali, brought the region to the brink of war. The failure of CIS peacekeepers to 
intervene on behalf of the ethnic Georgians who were driven out of their homes by 
Abkhaz militias during the 1998 unrest in Gali caused the Georgian government to begin 
to openly question the worth of continued peacekeeping operations and tensions between 
Russia and Georgia declined dramatically when the Georgian government began to push 
for the complete removal of Russian military bases from its territory. 
Russian peacekeepers, of course, remained deployed until after the Five Day War, 
but the Russian government was eventually forced to agree to the gradual closure of 
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military bases on Georgian soil. While this process did not proceed entirely smoothly,
251
 
the last Russian base was finally closed in 2008, shortly before the war broke out. Russia 
was also forced to hand over control of Georgia's borders, which had previously been 
patrolled by Russian troops, to the Georgian military in 1999.
252
 The decline in Russia‟s 
ability to project hard power, along with growing Western attention to Georgia and 
Saakashvili‟s ambitions of joining NATO and the EU, gradually began to undermine 
Russia‟s hegemonic position.253 
As Russia‟s ability to rely on military force to ensure Tbilisi‟s obedience began to 
crumble, the Kremlin was forced to innovate and find new ways of preserving its 
influence in Georgia. This chapter explores the phenomenon of passportization, which 
represented one of Moscow‟s most radical attempts to maintain its foothold in the South 
Caucasus. It argues that the widespread distribution of Russian passports carried with it 
not only legal and political ramifications, but territorial ones as well. By granting itself 
the right to intervene militarily wherever its citizens might live, and showing little 
hesitation to “manufacture” new citizens beyond its borders, Russia effectively created 
the right to violate the sovereignty of any state where the Kremlin determines that the 
lives of Russian citizens are at risk. Much like the "Bush Doctrine," which many agree 
essentially gives the United States the "right" to fight unilateral, preemptive wars 
anywhere in the world, Russia‟s use of the "right to protection of nationals abroad," 
which is linked to the right to self defense enumerated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
poses potentially significant challenges to international legal and territorial norms. 
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Russia's program of passportization in the de facto states, of course, was not the 
first instance of passportization in history. Although the Bolsheviks initially abolished the 
old Tsarist system of internal passports after the October Revolution,
254
 for instance, 
passports were eventually reinstituted in the early 1930s during Stalin's industrialization 
and collectivization campaigns. Passportization in the Soviet Union took place on a 
massive scale, and by the end of 1934 some 27 million people, mostly in urban areas and 
other "strategic" regions of the Soviet Union, had been passportized.
255
   
The documents distributed by the state served largely as a means of controlling 
the movement of people in the Soviet Union. "The introduction of the internal passport," 
writes Robert Conquest, “tied down the workers, whose possession of the document, and 
of the „labour book,‟ was, with other measures, used to keep them in their jobs, or at least 
their cities."
256
 Moreover the residency permit, or propiska, effectively tied peasants to 
the land by denying them the right to leave their collective farms or to reside in cities. 
The propiska, according to Conquest, "prevented not only kulaks, but any peasants who 
might wish to move to the cities from doing so without authorization."
257
 
In addition to controlling movement, the passport also doubled as a means of 
identifying individual citizens, constituting them as either belonging to the body politic or 
being excluded from it. One contemporary description of the Soviet passport 
characterized it as 
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a biographical capsulization of its bearer in booklet form. It 
states, inter alia, his name, place and date of birth, 
nationality (based upon the nationality of his parents), 
information concerning his marital status and the identity of 
his children, a record of his military service, his place of 
work, notations concerning his failure to make court-
ordered alimony payments, if applicable, and, most 
importantly, a propiska.
258
 
"Despite the existence of other means of documenting identity," notes David Shearer, 
"the passport system became a primary means by which Soviet officials defined the 
social and ethnic composition of Soviet society, the degree of loyalty of different 
populations, and the geographic distribution of those populations."
259
 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the system of internal passports 
persisted in the Russian Federation, although it is no longer nearly as pervasive as it once 
was.
260
 In most other newly independent states, however, the internal passport system 
quickly disappeared. In Georgia, the propiska‟s disappearance was due partly to the 
extreme antipathy toward any reminders of Russo-Soviet domination that prevailed at the 
time of independence as well as to the almost total breakdown of the ability of the 
Georgian government to administer its territory during the civil war. When the situation 
stabilized after Gamsakhurdia‟s death, the Georgian government officially abolished the 
propiska system. The Georgian Constitution, meanwhile, guarantees the freedom of 
movement within the country.
261
 Despite being officially abolished, however, internal 
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passports have nevertheless remained acceptable forms of identification in Georgia, due 
in no small part to the fact that new Georgian ID cards and passports are expensive and 
frequently difficult for citizens to obtain.
262
  
The Soviet government, of course, was not alone in using documentation as a 
means of social control. The Nazi regime also engaged in something like passportization, 
implementing a massive program of enumerating and identifying the Reich's Jewish 
population, which ultimately laid what John Torpey has called the "administrative 
foundation for the deportations to Auschwitz and the other death camps."
263
 Jews, whose 
identity was documented in a variety of ways, were frequently forced to sell their homes 
and move to ghettoes and so-called Judenhäuser, where they were subjected to frequent 
“spot checks” by the Gestapo. Part of the Gestapo‟s job, aside from simple harassment,  
was to ensure that Jews were complying with a laundry list of arbitrary rules and 
regulations, including possessing proper means of identification.
264
 Moreover, the so-
called "Office for Jewish Emigration," which was responsible for issuing to Jews 
passports that would permit them to leave the Reich, was soon transformed into an 
instrument "not of emigration," in the words of William Shirer, "but of 
extermination…"265  
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It is important to remember, however, that passportization has not always been 
employed purely as a means of repression. During the Second World War, for example, 
there were numerous instances of foreign passports being distributed to Jews in desperate 
attempts to protect them from deportation to the extermination camps. One of the most 
dramatic cases involved Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat in Hungary who issued 
tens of thousands of so-called “protective passports" to Hungarian Jews.266 While few 
recipients of these passports ever actually emigrated to Sweden,
267
 the passportization of 
Hungarian Jews nevertheless placed passport holders under the protection of the Swedish 
government, with the result that many lives were spared from deportation to the camps. 
Elsewhere in Europe, Jews desperately sought to obtain passports from various Latin 
American countries, including Paraguay, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. Jews 
sometimes knowingly purchasing forgeries of passports from these counties in the hope 
that the falsified documents would be at least convincing enough to prevent their holders 
being sent to the East.
268
 Tragically, the Gestapo learned of the demand for passports and 
exploited it. Many Polish Jews were lured by agents of the state to the infamous Hotel 
Polski after the liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto, for example, with the promise of 
obtaining foreign passports. Most of the documents that were available were either 
forgeries or belonged to people who were already dead, and the people who turned up to 
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claim them were detained and subsequently deported to Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, or 
Treblinka.
269
 
Passportization in the de facto states fell somewhere between the two extremes of 
Stalinist social control and the humanitarian benevolence of Raoul Wallenberg. Most of 
the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were actually quite eager to accept Russian 
citizenship, particularly since a number of benefits accrued to the recipients of passports. 
Such benefits included more freedom to travel in the Russian Federation, where many 
residents found work or had family,
270
 as well as Russian state pensions that were more 
generous than their Georgian counterparts. While the Soviet government had employed 
passports in part to exclude what Shearer calls "social aliens" from the body politic, the 
Russian government instead used passports to stake a claim to the populations of the de 
facto states by explicitly including them within the Russian polity. The darker side of 
passportization in Georgia was that, by naturalizing the residents of the secessionist 
territories, the Russian government effectively "captured" a sizeable portion of the 
population and territory of the Republic of Georgia and laid the discursive foundations 
for war. 
5.1: The Rationale for Passportization in the De Facto States 
Not long after the end of the Five Day War, Russia recognized Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as independent states, joined only by Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru. 
The new states remain entirely dependent on Russia for their political and economic 
survival. Moscow, meanwhile, has signed defense treaties with the de facto governments, 
some of which give the Russian military control over their borders, effectively moving 
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the frontiers of the Russian Federation up to what had previously been internal borders 
within Georgia. Given that Russia had already established effective sovereignty over the 
de facto states, however, one can argue that the Five Day War only formalized a situation 
that had already existed for a number of years. Although it was the force of Russian arms 
that ultimately secured the de facto states' independence, the process of passportization, 
as we will see, had effectively transformed the separatist territories into "Russian spaces" 
inside Georgia s borders, undermining Tbilisi‟s sovereignty in these spaces long before 
the war even began. 
As discussed earlier, one of the Kremlin's main foreign policy goals after the 
collapse of the USSR has been the maintenance of Russian influence throughout the post-
Soviet space. In Georgia, this stance initially meant taking advantage of political 
instability and supporting separatist movements. As the situation began to stabilize, the 
Russian government was able to position itself as an arbiter in the so-called "frozen 
conflicts," which it itself had been instrumental in creating. By lending political and 
economic support to the secessionist regimes, and thereby ensuring that the Georgian 
government would have to consider Russia‟s interests or run the risk of the Kremlin 
withdrawing its stated support for Georgia‟s territorial integrity, Russia succeeded in 
cobbling together on the cheap something resembling hegemony in the South Caucasus.  
As long as the Shevardnadze regime more or less acquiesced to this arrangement, 
or was at the very least powerless to effect any changes to it, Russia‟s interests in the 
region were basically secure. After the Rose Revolution, however, Russian dominance in 
the region began to look somewhat more fragile. Not only was Saakashvili fêted in 
Western capitals – particularly in the United States, whose growing interest in the 
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Caucasus was viewed by Russia as a threat – but he was also far more interested than his 
predecessor had been in strengthening ties between Georgia and the West by courting 
such institutions as NATO and the European Union. This strategy, coupled with growing 
concerns within the Georgian government about the legitimacy of the Russian-led 
peacekeeping missions, as well as Saakashvili's aggressive stance vis-à-vis Moscow‟s 
client regime in Adjara, did little to endear the new Georgian administration to the 
Kremlin.  
Most importantly Saakashvili was intent on pursuing a revisionist agenda with 
regards to the de facto states. His goal of reestablishing Tbilisi‟s sovereignty over South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as his campaign to oust Abashidze, was greeted in 
Moscow with alarm. It was interpreted as a sign that Russia was in danger of losing its 
grip on Georgia. It was feared that if the "Adjara scenario" were repeated in South 
Ossetia or Abkhazia, Russian hegemony in the region would be fatally undermined. 
According to Andrei Illarionov, a former Putin adviser: 
Following the Adjara crisis, Moscow further ratcheted up 
tensions with Tbilisi by expanding Russian military and 
administrative control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
and accelerating the distribution of Russian passports in the 
two territories. Henceforth it could rationalize its actions in 
these two regions by the claim that it was merely defending 
its "citizens." This period also saw growing violence in 
South Ossetia, as well as a botched Russian attempt to 
impose a new leader on Abkhazia, as it had done 
successfully in South Ossetia.
271
 
The events in Adjara had made it clear to the Kremlin that the presence of the 
Russian military alone would not be enough to discourage Saakashvili's plans to 
reintegrate the de facto states. While there were no peacekeeping forces stationed in 
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Adjara, there was still a significant contingent of Russian regular army troops whose 
commanders were personally loyal to Abashidze. Their presence, however, did little to 
dissuade the Georgian government from organizing anti-Abashidze protests and holding 
military exercises of their own just across the Ajdaran border. The expansion of the 
passportization program in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the wake of the Adjara affair 
was thus likely motivated in part by the recognition that relying on peacekeepers alone, 
especially in the face of growing Georgian demands that the peacekeeping missions 
themselves either be internationalized or abolished entirely, was no longer feasible or, 
perhaps, even desirable.  
Although the Kremlin had spent the previous decade patronizing Abashidze, and 
indeed gave him asylum when he was ousted, there was little it could do, concretely, to 
prevent him from being overthrown. First of all, the Russian military units stationed near 
Batumi had no peacekeeping mandate, so employing them to defend Abashidze's regime 
would have been a serious breach of international law; second, due partly to Abashidze's 
highly personal style of rule and partly to the territory‟s remoteness from Russia s 
borders, Adjara had experienced far less Russian infiltration, economically or politically, 
than had Abkhazia or South Ossetia; third, although there had been a plan in place to 
begin distributing Russian passports in Adjara, that plan was preempted by the Rose 
Revolution and Saakashvili's subsequent reintegration of the territory into Tbilisi's 
political power structures.
272
 The fact that there was no significant population of Russian 
citizens in Adjara meant that, unlike in the other de facto states, deprived Russia of any 
plausible pretext for intervening. 
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From the Russian standpoint, the reason that Adjara was “lost” was that, although 
Abashidze‟s government had been effectively independent ever since Georgia left the 
Soviet Union, and although it had enjoyed strong ties with Moscow, Russia had no legal 
justification for preventing Georgia from bringing it back into the fold. When Saakashvili 
moved to reintegrate Adjara, the Kremlin‟s only real options were to either acquiesce to 
Abashidze‟s ouster or to commit Russian troops to defend his regime, the latter course 
being a grievous breach of international law. By contrast, when the Georgian government 
attempted to reintegrate South Ossetia, Russia was able to invoke the controversial, 
though not illegal, right to protect its citizens abroad as a justification for intervention.  
As long as Russia remained publicly committed to Georgia's territorial integrity, 
which it did until the Five Day War, relying on military force alone to maintain control 
over the separatist territories was a risky strategy. The peacekeeping forces, after all, 
were ostensibly deployed simply to prevent violence from breaking out between Tbilisi 
and the de facto regimes. While they could effectively ensure the continued existence of 
separatist governments, their presence, in and of itself, did not affect the discourses of 
territoriality in the region: the de facto states, even as far as Russia was concerned, were 
simply separatist regions of Georgia that happened to enjoy close ties with Moscow. 
Passportization altered this situation by discursively transforming South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia into “Russian” spaces. 
5.2: Legal Issues 
By the start of the Five Day War in 2008, virtually the entire populations of both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia had obtained Russian passports.
273
 Unsurprisingly, the mass 
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distribution of Russian passports within the internationally recognized borders of another 
sovereign state did not take place without some controversy. This section examines some 
of the legal issues that have surrounded passportization in the de facto states.  
5.2.1: Factual Connections 
Although the Georgian government has described passportization as "illegal," the 
reality is that Russia‟s actions seem to exist in a sort of "grey area" of international law. 
The actual process of passportization was fairly straightforward. According to one 
contemporary report from Abkhazia, 
[s]ince June 1, the public organisation, the Congress of 
Russian Communities of Abkhazia, has been collecting 
Abkhazians‟ Soviet-era travel documents. It has sent them 
to consular department specially set up by Moscow foreign 
ministry officials in the city of Sochi, on the Black Sea 
coast just north of breakaway region. When they have been 
checked, they are returned with a new page inserted 
certifying Russian citizenship.
274
 
In its official statement to the IIFFMCG, the Georgian government also claimed that 
representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense were involved in the distribution of 
passports in the de facto states.
275
 The program was not conducted with any particular 
secrecy. The Georgian government repeatedly protested, routinely decrying the 
passportization campaign as part of the "creeping annexation" of their country.
276
 
Although some reports have surfaced indicating that, in certain cases, people were forced 
to accept Russian passports – a flagrant violation of international law277  – these reports 
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are unconfirmed.
278
 For the most part, Russian passports were voluntarily accepted. The 
Russian government, for its part, has said little about the program, simply insisting that it 
was carried out "in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation."
279
 Such 
legislation itself represents a violation of Georgia‟s territorial sovereignty, since accepted 
state practice holds that the laws of one state should not directly apply to the citizens of 
another.
280
 
Nevertheless, as James Green points out, "international law leaves it for a state to 
decide under its own domestic rules whether to confer nationality and upon whom. 
Therefore, Russia was and is entitled to grant nationality to whomsoever it likes."
281
 That 
being said, rulings by the International Court of Justice have established that when the 
effects of the conferral of nationality are "no longer confined within the limits of the 
domestic jurisdiction of [a state] but extends to the international field," international law 
requires "a real and effective nationality" based on strong "factual ties."
282
  Such ties 
include, but are not limited to "the habitual residence of the individual concerned… the 
centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown 
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by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc."
283
 "It is arguable," writes 
Green,  
that there are many more de facto ties between the people 
in [South Ossetia] and Russians – ties of language, for 
example – than there are ties with Georgians. Irrespective 
of this, it may be difficult to hold that the ethnic Ossetians 
in question were „really‟ and „effectively‟ Russian enough 
to give rise to a right of self-defense against another 
sovereign state. The genuine nature of their Russian 
nationality, not just in fact but in international law, is 
debatable at best.
284
  
Thus, although Russia may have been within its rights to naturalize residents of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, it is less clear that there was any real "factual connection," in 
many cases, by which it could have justified doing so. 
5.2.2: Citizenship 
Under international law, South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained part of Georgia 
when that state became independent.
285
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Soviet 
Constitution only granted the right of secession to Union Republics. This meant that, as 
long as the Soviet Union existed, separatist regions had no inherent right to unilaterally 
separate themselves from Georgia. Moreover, the language of international law is written 
in such a way that, in most cases, only former European colonies have a right to 
unilaterally declare their independence.
286
 Neither Soviet nor international law, therefore, 
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recognizes the right of the de facto states to become independent states. Many scholars 
argue that South Ossetia and Abkhazia may have the right to “internal self-
determination” as part of Georgia.287 Nevertheless, “a right to external self-determination 
in the form of secession is not accepted in state practice,” despite Russia‟s citation of 
Kosovo as precedent.
288
 On the other hand, the Republic of Georgia has, not since its own 
independence, been able to establish effective jurisdiction over either Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia. Given that neither of the de facto states have ever had any interest in being part 
of the independent Georgian republic, there has been some dispute over what the 
citizenship status of the residents of these territories is. 
Some commentators, such as geographer Gearóid Ó Tuathail, insist that the 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians became "stateless" after independence.
289
 Generally 
speaking, however, in cases of state succession, international law recognizes a change in 
citizenship as concomitant with a change in territorial sovereignty.
290
 When Georgia 
seceded from the Soviet Union, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained integral parts of its 
territory, a fact that even scholars sympathetic to the secessionists concede.
291
 Therefore, 
the law assumes that the residents of the breakaway territories acquired Georgian 
citizenship along with the rest of the population of Georgia when it became an 
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independent state. As the IIFFMCG report notes, "[t]he right to confer its nationality on 
those living within its borders can be derived from the recognition of the Georgian 
borders by the international community."
292
 Nevertheless, the question of citizenship has 
remained problematic, due to certain minor legal pitfalls. 
The first and most important of these pitfalls was the product of the introduction 
of a new citizenship law in Georgia. In March of 1993, the Georgian government ratified 
a new Law on Citizenship,
293
 which enumerated four criteria for becoming a citizen of 
the new republic:  
1. A citizen must have lived permanently in Georgia for not less than five 
years; 
2. A citizen must have lived in Georgia at the time the Law on 
Citizenship was adopted;  
3. A citizen must not have explicitly refused Georgian citizenship within 
3 months of the Law on Citizenship being adopted; and  
4. A citizen must have received documents confirming their citizenship 
within four months of the law being adopted.
294
  
 
It was the fourth criterion that was most problematic in legal terms. Given that South 
Ossetia had already declared itself independent and the war in Abkhazia had not yet been 
concluded, it was difficult, if not impossible, for many residents to obtain the necessary 
documentation. The establishment of a formal criterion for citizenship meant that, as far 
as the law was concerned, until an individual possessed the necessary documentation, 
they could not be recognized as a citizen. The Georgian government eventually 
recognized this problem and revised the Law on Citizenship in June of 1994, removing 
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the requirement that proof of citizenship be received within four months. "Pursuant to 
this amendment," the IIFFMCG report states, "the acquisition of nationality no longer 
depended on formal criteria. Residents of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia became Georgian citizens even without any documentation"  
It is possible that some people may have wished to refuse citizenship at the time 
and, due to the chaotic situation in Georgia at the time, may have been unable to do so.
295
 
The other major legal difficulty with regards to the citizenship status of the residents of 
the de facto states thus relates to the question of the right of refusal. Residents of the 
secessionist territories who chose to refuse Georgian citizenship faced the same 
difficulties as those who counted on receiving official papers to prove their citizenship. 
Political instability and armed conflict made it difficult, if not impossible, for people in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to communicate with the Georgian government and 
renounce their citizenship and it is probable that some people did in fact choose to 
renounce their Georgian citizenship during this period.
296
 Nevertheless, the IIFFMCG 
report concludes that 
[t]he residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia who had not 
refused Georgian citizenship in a written form before 24 
December 1993 became Georgian citizens for purposes of 
Georgian and international law. Their personal reservations 
against Georgian citizenship are irrelevant, as long as they 
did not exercise the right to refuse Georgian citizenship 
within the statutory delay. Eventual practical difficulties in 
exercising this right of refusal are immaterial from the 
perspective of international law, because international law 
did not require Georgia to grand this option.
297
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Therefore, although some commentators maintain that the residents of the secessionist 
territories were "stateless persons,"
298
 this would appear not to be the case. Even 
acknowledging certain complications in the implementation of the Law on Citizenship, 
the residents of the de facto states indeed become Georgian citizens in 1993, despite 
Tbilisi‟s lack of effective control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the de facto 
regimes‟ close ties to Russia. The only ones who did not were those who were already 
citizens of another state.
299
 
5.2.3: The Right of Protection of Nationals Abroad 
When Russia invaded Georgia in August of 2008, it explicitly invoked its 
"inherent right to self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations."
300
 It did so on the grounds that it was necessary to protect citizens of the 
Russian Federation from Georgian aggression. The right of "protection of nationals 
abroad" entails "the use of force by a state to protect its nationals that are under attack – 
actual or threatened – outside of its own territory, without the consent of the state against 
which the force is used or the authorization of the UN Security Council."
301
 This "right," 
however is not uncontroversial, especially in a case such as South Ossetia, where the 
majority of the citizens on whose behalf the Russian government claimed to be 
intervening had only become citizens of the Russian Federation relatively recently, and 
only by means of a deliberate and controversial program of passportization.  
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Some scholars are skeptical of the "protection of nationals abroad" justification on 
the grounds that the definition of what constitutes "armed attack" under the “protection of 
nationals abroad” concept is not consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter. They argue 
that the case of an "armed attack" mentioned in Article 51 actually refers to an attack on 
the territory of a state.
302
 James Green, however, holds that "there is nothing in [Article 
51] to preclude the extension of self-defense to attacks that occur outside of the territory 
of the responding state."
303
 He cites the cases of the American invasions of Grenada and 
Panama, as well as the Israeli raid on Entebbe, as examples where "protection of 
nationals abroad" was deployed, more or less successfully, as a justification for military 
action. Although none of these military operations were uncontroversial, they 
nevertheless exist as possible precedents for the Russian intervention in South Ossetia.  
While there is therefore some potential precedent for using the protection of 
nationals abroad as a justification for military action, Russia also faces the problem of 
proportionality. Green notes that "all exercises of self-defense must be proportional under 
customary international law, and that „proportionality‟ is calculated by reference both to 
the scale of the response, and, fundamentally, to the necessity of defense."
304
 Russia 
actions in South Ossetia clearly fail on this count. Not only was the invasion of South 
Ossetia itself wildly out of proportion to even major Georgian military actions such as the 
shelling of Tskhinvali, but the Russian military also advanced into Abkhazia, where there 
had been no fighting, and quickly expanded the theatre of war into Georgia proper. The 
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IIFFMCG concluded that, even allowing that there was a potentially legitimate right to 
intervene militarily to protect nationals abroad, the Russian invasion was clearly illegal 
based on its disproportionality. The report noted that 
since 1945, numerous states have led military actions by 
pointing to the need to protect their own nationals abroad. 
In many cases, the legality of these actions was disputed. 
There is no customary law allowing such actions. If at all, 
such actions should be limited in scope and duration and 
exclusively focused on rescuing and evacuating nationals. 
In the case at hand, the action was not solely and 
exclusively focused on rescuing and evacuating Russian 
citizens, but largely surpassed this threshold by embarking 
upon extended military operations over large parts of 
Georgia. Consequently, it must be concluded that Russian 
military action outside South Ossetia was essentially 
conducted in violation of international law.
305
 
It is interesting to note that, based on this quote, it would appear that, had Russia 
limited its operations to South Ossetia only, the IIFFMCG might have ruled that Russian 
intervention on some scale was lawful and appropriate. Green would seem to agree, 
noting that the fundamental problem with Russia‟s response to Georgia‟s attempt to 
retake South Ossetia was its "disproportional nature"
306
 rather than the fact that it 
justified its invasion on the premise that an attack on its newly minted citizens amounted 
to an attack on the Russian Federation itself. This is particularly fascinating, since it 
highlights passportization‟s territorial function: while "humanitarian concern" was the 
stated rationale for the distribution of passports,
307
 the ultimate effect was the discursive 
conquest of Georgian territory by capturing bodies through non-military means and the 
creation of "Russian spaces" within the borders of Georgia. 
                                                     
305
 IIFFMCG, Report Vol. 1, 25. 
 
306
 Green, 70. 
 
307
 Gordadze, 45. 
 
 122 
5.3: The Discursive Capture of Territory 
Although the Russian government remained unquestionably committed to 
preserving its influence in the Transcaucasus it began to develop, not long after Putin 
succeeded Yeltsin, a new strategy for assuring Tbilisi's obedience, one more subtle and 
less dependent on hard power. Michel Foucault once said that "peace itself is coded 
war."
308
 Nowhere was this truer than in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russia 
gradually enveloped the de facto states, discursively asserting territorial control over 
them by naturalizing the majority of their citizens. 
Passportization has been considered by some as little more than a cynical political 
ploy to manufacture a casus belli.
309
 By extending citizenship to the residents of the de 
facto states, however, Russia explicitly brought them into the Russian body politic. By 
doing so, Russia also extended its personal sovereignty over significant new populations. 
Following Samer Alatout, then, who wrote that "every construction of population 
(criminal, patient, citizen) creates a territorial effect (prison, clinic, state),"
310
 we can 
begin to see how, by naturalizing the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the 
Russian government created "Russian spaces" within the internationally recognized 
borders of the Republic of Georgia. Within these spaces, Georgia's ability to exercise its 
legal sovereignty was severely attenuated, if not canceled out entirely.  
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By naturalizing the residents of the de facto states, Russia challenged a number of 
classic territorial assumptions including the inviolability of international borders and the 
right of a state to territorial sovereignty. Indeed, what begins to emerge around this time 
is a pattern of overlapping and conflicting territorial discourses: the Georgian 
government, citing international law and the principle of uti possidetis, continued to insist 
that Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain integral parts of Georgia‟s territory; meanwhile, 
Russia, by naturalizing the populations of the de facto states, was staking its own claim to 
these territories.  
Ernest Gellner once noted a tendency to try to make “culture and polity 
congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at 
that.”311 Although Gellner speaks of culture, he could just as well be speaking of 
“nations.”  Although word “nation” is frequently taken to mean an ethnic community, in 
multi-ethnic states like the Russian Federation, membership in the “nation” is essentially 
synonymous with citizenship and Alexander Murphy has recently pointed out the 
longstanding “conceptual conflation of the terms nation and state.”312 The territorial 
effects of passportization, arguably, were byproducts of this epistemic linkage.  Peter 
Taylor, moreover, has written that, with the rise of the nation-state ideology, the 
“community was indissolubly linked to the land…” This linkage, he says, “completely 
changed the nature of territory, especially the integrity of its borders. From being parcels 
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of land transferable between states as the outcome of wars, all territory, including 
borderlands, became inviolate.”313  
Following Taylor, then, we can begin to see that, by deliberately constituting the 
populations of the de facto states as part of the Russian political nation, Russia was also 
implicitly laying claim to the territory of the de facto states themselves. Despite the fact 
that, as far as international law was concerned the de facto states remained (and remain) 
integral parts of the Republic of Georgia, Russia was able to discursively capture 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This development, in a sense, represented a repurposing of 
the logic of the modern state system to undermine the system itself.  
5.3.1: Signifying Territoriality 
Implicit Russian claims to the de facto states took a number of concrete forms. In 
his study of the Finno-Russian border, Anssi Paasi describes one particularly interesting 
example of how the Finnish government sought to "remind" people living in the country's 
isolated border regions that they were members of the Finnish political community, a 
process he called "signifying territoriality." Paasi writes that  
[a]t Christmas 1934 a candle and a miniature Finnish flag 
were delivered to each of the inhabitants of the border areas 
to remind them through these abstract symbols in which 
country they lived."
314
  
Russian passports arguably functioned in a similar way for the inhabitants of the de facto 
states, albeit in a far more concrete fashion. Rather than simply "reminding" Abkhazians 
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and South Ossetians of their citizenship, the passports served as concrete documents of 
their separateness, politically and territorially, from the Georgian state.  
The Russian territorial embrace of the de facto states was manifested in other 
ways as well. Florian Mühlfried has described how passportization became "embedded," 
in his words, "in other political and economic activities": 
In the case of South Ossetia, the main part of the annual 
budget is provided directly by Moscow and Russia‟s state-
controlled gas consortium Gazprom invests extensively in 
the construction of pipelines to secure the region‟s energy 
supply from Russia. In addition, economic independence 
on Russia has led to the Russian ruble becoming the official 
currency in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
315
 
In both of the de facto states, moreover, Russians and other officials close to the Kremlin 
have taken over important positions in the separatist governments. Indeed, ties between 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia before the Five Day War were so close that one scholar has 
described the governments in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi as having "outsourced" many of 
their state institutions, particularly those concerned with security, to the Russian 
Federation.
316
  
5.3.2: Biocolonization 
Samer Alatout has written that "states derive their power from the recognition that 
populations are not inherent in matters of things – they are constructed and continually 
so."
317
 If passportization was the mechanism by which the populations of the de facto 
states were constituted as Russian citizens, we can give the process itself the name 
"biocolonization." Historically, colonization occurred when a state exported its subjects 
                                                     
315
 Mühlfried, 10. 
 
316
 Popescu, 6. 
 
317
 Alatout. 609. 
 126 
to new territories for the purposes of establishing outposts and colonies, thereby 
enlarging the state and extending the reach of its sovereignty. Biocolonization, by 
contrast, enlarges the state and extends its sovereignty not by means of sending colonists 
from one place to another, but instead by capturing bodies that already reside in the 
territory being colonized. Biocolonization therefore represents a sort of dual colonization, 
one both of the body as well as of territory. 
It is important to reiterate, however, that passportization is not synonymous with 
biocolonization, even though there are certain similarities between what occurred in the 
de facto states and other instances of passportization. Marc Garcelon, for instance, once 
characterized the business of passportization in the Soviet Union as being a process of 
"colonizing the subject." He wrote that  
… the concept of internal colonialism [serves] as a 
particularly apt description of the relation between the 
Party apparat and the nominal citizen in the Soviet Union, 
the archetypal Party-state of the twentieth century. After 
all, the cadres of the Bolshevik Party in effect colonized the 
groups that fell under their domination by forcibly 
mobilizing such groups in to the project of "building 
socialism," along the way subjecting them to the 
administrative fiat, organizational principles, and 
ideological norms of Soviet power. In so doing, the Party 
leadership sought to cultivate a distinctively Soviet 
mentality befitting the "new man" of socialism. This 
strategy entailed marginalizing and co-opting prior 
identities in favor of Soviet ideological norms...
318
  
Although passports were generally distributed on a more voluntary basis in the de facto 
states than they had been in the Soviet Union during Stalin's time, they served a similar 
social purpose: Soviet passports had as one of their functions the discursive normalization 
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of Soviet identity, with all that it entailed ideologically. By accepting Russian passports, 
the residents of the secessionist territories, wittingly or not, became part of Russia's 
geopolitical project in the former Soviet space.  
Like passportization in the de facto states, the Soviet passportization program also 
had a territorial aspect. Garcelon notes that 
internal passports functioned as the principle disciplinary 
mechanism by which the apparat consolidated its dominant 
position and inculcated the standards of the 'new Soviet 
man' among the peoples living beneath the edifice of the 
Party-state. Those who ran afoul of Soviet domination, 
from educated urban dissidents to 'punished peoples' – 
entire ethnic groups like the Chechens singled out by Stalin 
as 'enemies of the people' in the wake of the Second World 
War – discovered that the pasportnyi rezhim [passport 
regime] effectively condemned them to the marginal ranks 
of physical laborers, internal exiles, and labor camp 
inmates.
319
  
The passport regime allowed the Soviet state to control the movement of people 
simultaneously serving as a marker of social inclusion or exclusion. With passports it 
became possible to effectively exorcize certain "undesirable" populations from the body 
politic, which in many cases ensured their geographic isolation in remote "special 
settlements" – or simply outright imprisonment.320 Numerous areas in the Soviet Union – 
almost always far from the developed center – became "dumping grounds" for social 
undesirables. "Thus," writes Shearer, "contingents of people whom the police deported 
were, literally, extracted or "distanced" (udalit') from socialist society," and confined to 
spatially-defined areas: the district, the settlement, the work camp.
321
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This situation contrasts starkly with the territorial function of passportization in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Soviet passports served essentially to circumscribe the areas 
in which different groups of Soviet citizens were allowed to move; these areas, however, 
were already under Soviet control, even if they were sometimes uninhabited. By 
extending its sovereignty – even if illegally – into Georgia's separatist republics, 
however, Russia was engaging in something more recognizably "colonial." By 
constituting the populations of the de facto states as "Russian," it was also implicitly 
drawing upon the epistemic linkages between population/nation and territory, 
discursively constituting the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a subject of 
Russia, though not an official part of the Russian Federation. 
Finally, the Soviet passport was essentially concerned with control over the 
individual. It was a tool of surveillance and a means of ascribing various officially 
sanctioned identities – class, nationality, occupation – to the subjects of the state. 
Passports constituted one of the chief elements in the state‟s attempt to implement so-
called "prophylactic policing," or what David Shearer calls a "positivist vision of 
universal social surveillance."
322
 This is clearly illustrated in the following quote from 
Genrikh Yagoda, People‟s Commissar for Internal Affairs in 1935: 
The passport is a powerful means for the purging of our 
cities, workers‟ settlements, industrial enterprises and 
construction sites not only of criminal, but also of anti-
Soviet, counter-revolutionary elements. In order to realize 
this, it is necessary to make it unthinkable that a person can 
live in an apartment or a barracks without a passport or a 
propiska… We need to create an atmosphere such that 
each citizen feels that without a passport he will be unable 
to travel anywhere, that the single document confirming his 
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identity is the passport. The first question you must ask a 
detained citizen is – show me your passport.323  
Recalling what Foucault has said about "discipline," that it "tries to rule a multiplicity of 
men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies 
that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if need be, punished,"
324
 it makes 
sense to characterize the Soviet passport as being, in essence, a disciplinary tool.  
Passportization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had an altogether different function. When 
Foucault describes what he calls "biopower," he locates it as the opposite pole to 
disciplinary power.  
There is no room here for an in-depth discussion of biopower and discipline, but it 
will be helpful to describe them in brief. "Discipline," for Foucault, is something that 
regulates life. Each movement, each action is quantified and analyzed to determine its 
deviation from the norm. In the words of one commentator, "[d]isciplines attempt to 
codify and enumerate as closely as possible time, space, and movement, and they attempt 
to articulate the analytical space of work."
325
 Discipline is concerned with controlling the 
individual as an individual. 
Biopower, by contrast, is concerned with populations. Biopower focuses "on the 
species body, the body imbued with the mechanisms of life: birth, morbidity, mortality, 
longevity."
326
 Whereas discipline atomizes, biopower is a power that that is "massifying, 
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that is directed not at man-as-body but man-as-species."
327
 Passportization in the de facto 
states can be seen as a biopolitical technique because it was not intended to capture 
individuals as such. Rather, the purpose of passportization was to naturalize individuals 
insofar as they constituted a portion of the entire population. Indeed, merely issuing 
passports to individuals, even important figures such as the presidents of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, while perhaps carrying some symbolic value, would have been virtually 
meaningless in either biopolitical or territorial terms.  
Biocolonization was novel in that it allowed Russia to discursively "cleanse" the 
secessionist territories of Georgian citizens simply by means of distributing passports that 
granted inclusion in the Russian body politic. As Georgian citizens disappeared from 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they were instantly replaced by with Russian subjects. This 
process stands in stark contrast to the more familiar sort of ethnic cleansing that occurred 
in Abkhazia in 1993 and 1994, or in South Ossetia after the Five Day War, when most of 
the remaining Georgian populations were physically driven from their homes, or the 
Russian Empire‟s colonial expansion in the Caucasus in the 19th century, when hundreds 
of thousands of Circassians were killed or displaced to make room for Slavic settlers. 
Even ethnic Georgians living in the de facto states came under significant 
pressures to accept Russian nationality. Amidst the diplomatic fallout from Georgia‟s 
announcement that it intended to close all Russian military bases on its territory,
328
 the 
Russian government suddenly tightened visa restrictions on Georgian citizens living in 
Russia on the premise that it was attempting to stymie the flow of foreign terrorists into 
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Chechnya, despite the fact that most such fighters arrived in Chechnya via Central Asia, 
not Georgia.
329
 These rules, however, were not applied to the residents of the de facto 
states who, for "humanitarian" reasons, faced few restrictions on travel to Russia.
330
 
Writing in 2006, Noelle Cutts noted that 
[e]thnic Georgians living in Abkhazia must obtain Russian 
passports if they wish to travel abroad, vote, or participate 
in the political process. Georgian passport holders are 
denied Russian visas, and most travelers wishing to enter 
Russia from Georgia without a Russian passport must do so 
via a third country.
331
 
Georgia‟s official statement regarding passportization to the EU commission charged 
with investigating the Five Day War also points out that the separatist government in 
Tskhinvali offered to grant ethnic Georgians internal South Ossetian passports. Holding a 
South Ossetian passport would clearly signify that the bearer was a resident of the de 
facto South Ossetian Republic and therefore would permit ethnic Georgians in South 
Ossetia to acquire Russian citizenship papers, "provided they withdrew from their 
Georgian citizenship."
332
 This would allow travel – and access to employment – in the 
Russian Federation.  
The Georgian constitution, however, does not permit dual citizenship. Practical 
and political pressures thus effectively forced ethnic Georgians living in the secessionist 
territories to give up their Georgian citizenship and instead become subjects of Russia if 
they hoped to find work. Those who refuse passports become effectively marginalized 
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and excluded. The only real alternatives to taking a passport was simply to leave their 
homes and join the tens of thousands of other IDPs who had fled during the wars or to try 
to eke out a living in a place where Georgian citizens were increasingly disenfranchised. 
For many, simply accepting Russian passports was the path of least resistance. After the 
Five Day War, of course, most Georgians living in South Ossetia fled to IDP camps 
outside of Tbilisi. In Akhalgori, the largest district in South Ossetia that had been 
controlled by Georgia before the war, only one-fifth of the ethnic Georgian population 
that had lived there in 2008 still remains.
333
 Those who have stayed in their homes seem 
to have acquiesced to new rules requiring them to eventually accept the South Ossetian 
passports that have been introduced since 2008. One Georgian still living in Akhalgori 
described the plight of Georgian citizens living in the de facto states to journalist Ana 
Kandelaki: 
“We buy most of our food in Tbilisi, so we have to cross 
the administrative border several times a month,” said 
Tamar Mearakishvili, who heads a youth centre in 
Akhalgori. “Introducing payments at the checkpoint will 
make life harder for many locals.” 
Mearakishvili said that she hoped the new passport rules 
would not force people to leave their homes, and that they 
would be allowed to keep their Georgian documents. 
“People who live here on a permanent basis are not afraid 
of this passport system. We‟ve lived through too much to 
worry about it. The most important thing is that there isn‟t a 
war,” she said. “Besides, the deadline has been postponed 
several times and it isn‟t clear when it‟s going to start. We 
will deal with the situation as it comes up, since we can‟t 
change anything anyway.”334 
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Passportization and the concept of biocolonization are firmly in keeping with 
Foucault's notion of biopower, which, as the name would suggest, is chiefly interested in 
the regulation of life itself, rather than wielding the threat of death. As Foucault writes in 
the introduction to The History of Sexuality, 
… a power whose task is to take charge of life needs 
continuous regulator and corrective mechanisms. It is no 
longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of 
sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of 
value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, 
appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its 
murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that 
separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient 
subjects; it effects distributions around the norm.
335
 
In other words, the purpose of biocolonization is not to effect the replacement or 
enslavement of one population by another. Rather, it seeks to co-opt the local population 
and to constitute them as members of a new polity. In the case of the de facto states, the 
purpose of this strategy was to prevent the further erosion of Russian influence in 
Georgia by discursively redefining Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "Russian spaces" 
outside of Georgia's sphere of influence, even while remaining within its international 
borders. Geographer Louise Amoore once described the use of so-called "biometric 
borders" to prevent "risky" individuals from entering the United States after 9/11 as 
"something akin to a shift from geopolitics to biopolitics."
336
 The biocolonization of the 
de facto states, on the other hand, represents a merger of geopolitics and biopolitics, 
wherein biopolitical techniques were employed to achieve geopolitical aims.  
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5.4: Implications 
"Independence" for Abkhazia and South Ossetia has, in many ways, been more 
virtual than real. Russia and Georgia continue to wrangle over their legal status
337
 and 
Russia has assumed control of their borders
338
 and came under heavy criticism from 
Tbilisi for deploying short range ballistic missile and anti-aircraft missile platforms in 
both territories.
339
 Russia and Abkhazia, meanwhile, have become embroiled in a 
territorial dispute of their own. Russia now claims a 160 sq. km. tract of land on the 
Abkhaz side of the border, not far from a Russian ski resort that will be used during the 
2014 Olympic games.
340
 Abkhazia is in no position to resist. As Radio Free Europe's 
Brian Whitmore notes: 
The current fears of Russian domination are, in fact, not 
new. When I visited Abkhazia in the June 2009, the signs 
of accelerating Russification were everywhere. 
 
More than 90 percent of Abkhaz residents, for example, 
carry Russian passports. The Russian ruble is the territory's 
official currency. The Russian language is dominant. 
Russian flags are everywhere. Russian television rule the 
airwaves and Russian newspapers are ubiquitous. 
 
Moscow was building a naval base in the port of 
Ochamchire. Russian businesses were snapping up prime 
real estate along Sukhumi's seaside promenade. Russia's 
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state-run oil giant Rosneft won the right to explore and 
develop Abkhazia's maritime oil fields. 
 
And a controversial provision to give Russian soldiers 
serving in Abkhazia the right to purchase property sparked 
howls of opposition. 
 
"After recognizing Abkhazia, Russia is now swallowing 
us," [Abkhaz journalist Inal] Khashig told me at the time. 
"This is happening economically, politically, militarily, and 
socially. Every day we are becoming more and more 
dependent."
341
 
It would thus appear that independence from Georgia did not mean that Moscow would 
be willing to give up its claim to the de facto states. The de facto states are now, perhaps 
more than ever, "Russian spaces.” 
Prior to the Five Day War, the Georgian government had become fond of 
deploying the evocative phrase "creeping annexation," a term that has no legal meaning. 
"Annexation" is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Law as "the acquisition of legal 
sovereignty by one state over the territory of another, usually by occupation or 
conquest,"
342
 and it is clear that passportization fell far short of these criteria. The phrase 
"creeping annexation" nevertheless captures the sense that Georgia's legal sovereignty in 
the de facto states, although not effective, was being challenged by Russia, which all the 
while continued to publicly recognize Georgia's territorial integrity. As we have seen, 
such practices were not entirely uncontroversial from a legal standpoint. The unilateral 
creation of “Russian spaces” inside the borders of Georgia, for instance, was not a 
practice recognized by international law.  
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More obviously, perhaps, Georgia‟s territorial and personal sovereignty were 
violated. The process of passportization itself has been deemed illegal both by legal 
scholars as well as the official EU report on the war. The right to self defense based on 
the protection of nationals abroad, which Russia cited as its chief reason for going to war, 
is legally shaky, to say the least, especially since most of the existing cases of such a right 
being invoked have themselves been controversial and cannot be considered precedent-
setting.
343
 The Russian invasion itself, which immediately expanded into Abkhazia and 
wide swaths of Georgia proper, clearly breached the requirement of proportionality and 
was thus contrary to international legal norms. 
Aside from these rather clear issues, passportization also raises other, more 
theoretical questions pertaining to international law. For instance, there has been a 
longstanding dialectical tension between the principle of "effectiveness," on the one hand, 
and the normative aspects of international law on the other. To put it briefly, the former 
refers to factual situations, while the latter is a measure of validity and conformity with 
legal norms. The tension arises because law based solely upon effective realities is law 
dictated by the fait accompli, whereas law that merely dictates what should be without 
having any correlation to reality is little more than a fantasy.  
In terms of the conflict in Georgia, passportization resulted in a territorial 
situation that could in the future conceivably become legal. Despite the fact that the act of 
passportization itself was probably contrary to international law, Russia‟s claim to self-
defense based on the right to defend its nationals abroad, while controversial, was not 
necessarily illegal. It was, however, legally invalid, since it derived from an illegal act, 
namely passportization. Moreover, while the Five Day War itself, by expanding far 
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beyond the borders of South Ossetia, violated the requirement of proportionality and 
eventually resulted in a clear violation of the principle of uti possidetis, Russia, 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
independent states and have begun the business of concluding legally binding treaties 
with the new government. Moreover, in addition to Transdnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which are de facto states seeking independence of their own, the Palestinian organization 
Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip, has also recognized Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.
344
 
We thus immediately begin to see the tension between effective and normative 
international law: the latter maintains that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are integral parts 
of the Republic of Georgia, whereas the former recognizes their factual existence. This 
state of affairs, then, presents a classic case of what Enrico Milano would call an 
“unlawful territorial situation" – "a territorial state of affairs, which is established and 
pursued in defiance of international norms and principles."
345
 Importantly, there is the 
potential for unlawful territorial situations to be legitimated ex post facto; Milano cites 
the cases of the decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo and the replacement of 
Saddam Hussein‟s regime with a Coalition-backed government, both of which 
subsequently received the blessing of the UN Security Council, as good examples of this 
process.  
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It would appear unlikely, at this point, that the Security Council will recognize the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, by providing Russia with a 
plausible legal justification for invading Georgia, passportization has raised a number of 
legal and territorial questions that international law, at this point, appears to be unable to 
address. Passportization would also seem to present challenges to international law 
similar to those posed by the so-called “Bush Doctrine,” which was formulated in the 
years after the attacks of September 11, 2001. As geographer Simon Dalby has written, 
one aspect of the Bush Doctrine is to  
work to deter aggression and counter coercion because 
“rapidly deployable forces” can resolve conflicts 
“decisively on favorable terms.” But should such 
dissuasion and deterrence fail then the strategy promises to 
defeat adversaries, in the terms of an especially chilling 
phrase, “at the time, place, and in the manner of our 
choosing.”346 
What Dalby is highlighting here is that the Bush Doctrine essentially grants the United 
States the “right” to preemptively intervene wherever in the world it deems necessary to 
remove potential threats. Unsurprisingly, this doctrine has proven to be controversial, and 
many legal scholars, while recognizing its potentially transformative effects on 
customary international law, remain wary of its implications and skeptical of its 
legality.
347
 
Similar criticisms can be levied against the ways that passportization has been 
carried out in the former Soviet Union. While nowhere near as “globe-spanning” as the 
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Bush Doctrine, passportization, combined with the clause in the Russian constitution 
guaranteeing “defense and patronage” to compatriots abroad, would certainly seem to 
grant Russia the self-declared “right” to intervene wherever it sees fit. There is little 
chance, after all, that Russia will soon be distributing passports to the citizens of Middle 
Eastern countries in the hopes of securing some kind of geopolitical advantage there. 
Within the not-insignificant geographic boundaries of the former Soviet Union, however, 
passportization may prove to be the key to Russian hegemony. The existence of millions 
of ethnic Russians living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, as well as the 
willingness to employ passportization to create citizens wherever it pleases, means that 
the Kremlin has effectively granted itself the right to intervene militarily anywhere in the 
post-Soviet space that it feels necessary. This is not to say that Russia is likely to use 
passportization as a widespread means of territorial expansion. Instead, “passport 
politics,” much like the Kremlin‟s “pipeline politics,” is likely to become another tool of 
soft power that Russian can use to apply pressure on its neighbors for the purposes of 
maintaining some degree of hegemony in Eurasia.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, war with Georgia was probably not the desired outcome of 
passportization. It is more likely that the intent of passportization was to dissuade 
Georgia from attempting to repeat the “Adjara scenario” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
the ultimate goal being the maintenance of Russian influence in Georgia. Despite being a 
rather late innovation, passportization was therefore consistent with the general trajectory 
of Russian foreign policy since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As discussed 
elsewhere, the Kremlin's priorities vis-à-vis the newly independent states have largely 
focused on the task of rebuilding Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Pursuant to 
this end, passportization can be seen as a last-ditch effort to prevent Moscow's influence 
in Georgia from being severely weakened in the event of the Saakashvili government 
managing to reestablish effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
Although some aspects of passportization have received a certain amount of 
scholarly attention, particularly from researchers concerned with the program‟s legal 
aspects, the topic has in some senses taken a back seat to analyses that focus on questions 
such as the war‟s implications for European security structures. Passportization has 
nevertheless raised a number of intriguing questions that are worthy of further study. 
How, for example will international law respond to the challenges posed to it by Russia‟s 
undermining of the principle of territorial sovereignty? On a similar note, one could ask 
whether the events that have transpired in South Ossetia and Abkhazia can be considered 
as having set a precedent. Finally, there is the question of whether Russia is likely to 
employ passportization in the future. There is, of course, no way to answer these 
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questions without speculating. Nevertheless, the fact that such questions are even on the 
table, particularly the first two, should serve as an indication that, far from being a simple 
ploy to manufacture a casus belli, passportization at least has the potential to challenge 
some of the fundamental assumptions that underpin the modern state system. 
Passportization, after all, has in some respects problematized the logic of the 
nation-state by undermining and exploiting the discursive linkage between population 
and territory. As has been shown elsewhere in this thesis, the idea that territory and 
population should be congruent has a long history, particularly in Europe. The population 
identified with a given state, so the story goes, belongs within the borders of that state. 
Passportization both exploits as well as disrupts this logic, which serves as the ideological 
basis of the nation-state by capturing a portion of the population that constitutes the target 
state without necessitating any change in borders. The passportizing state is then able to 
fall back on the population-territory discourse to assert its right to exercise power over its 
new citizens and the region in which they reside. In practice, passportization resulted in 
the creation of Russian exclaves where the Kremlin, by invoking the right to protect its 
nationals abroad, was able to plausibly justify using military force to “defend.”  
International law appears to be poorly equipped to address the problems posed by 
passportization, which has challenged long-held beliefs regarding the right of states to 
territorial sovereignty and which, moreover, has resulted in the creation of two new states 
that the law itself maintains do not exist. This is problematic, since the longer Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia go unrecognized, the more disconnected prescriptive law becomes 
from reality. On the other hand, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would 
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represent a fairly clear victory for the principle of effectiveness, which raises the spectre 
of the creation of law from faits accomplis. 
The problem of effectiveness and how it relates to the legal status of the de facto 
states raises a question as to whether some kind of precedent has been set by Russia. 
While Abkhazia and South Ossetia may eventually gain widespread recognition, the 
means by which they became independent from Georgia – passportization and the 
concept of the defense of nationals abroad – are likely to remain controversial. Previous 
instances in which the right to defend nationals abroad has been invoked have all met 
with considerable criticism. The Five Day War was no exception, which has led some 
scholars to dismiss the idea that Russia has “changed the game” with its actions in 
Georgia. As James Green has noted, 
[t]he seemingly disingenuous application of the protection 
of nationals abroad concept by Russia in 2008, and the 
possibility that it could employ this type of claim again in 
relation to other states will (rightly) strengthen the view of 
those who reject this manifestation of self-defense as one 
particularly open to abuse.
348
 
On the other hand, Green also points out that, in an age of transnational terrorism, 
the concept of the protection of nationals abroad may in fact grow in importance As 
states seek to justify military actions launched in retaliation against terrorists acts 
committed against their citizens living beyond their borders, the concept of the defense of 
nationals abroad may eventually come to enjoy more widespread legal acceptance.
349
 
Even if this concept were to gain more authoritative legal stature, however, Russia‟s 
invasion of Georgia was sufficiently controversial that it is likely to either remain in a 
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sort of limbo, neither illegal nor entirely accepted, or, like the recognition of Kosovo, be 
treated as a special case that would not set precedent elsewhere.
350
 
Even if no wider precedent is set, however, there is no reason to believe that 
Russia itself will abandon passportization as a strategy. Indeed, its ability to profoundly 
alter territorial discourses to Russia‟s benefit – something that more traditional hard 
power techniques or coercion through control of energy resources cannot achieve – 
means that passportization is likely to remain a component of any future Russian foreign 
policy. Given that the Five Day War clearly demonstrated the potential for Russian 
passport-holders to be used as foreign policy levers by Moscow, the presence of Russian 
nationals alone could in the future cause tensions between Russia and its neighbors.  
Indeed, the fact that none of Russia‟s partners in the CIS have joined Moscow in 
recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a sign that the newly independent states are 
wary of Russia‟s ambitions and have concerns about the future potential for 
passportization on their own territory. States such as Ukraine, Estonia, and Kazakhstan 
have large ethnic Russian populations that already hold Russian passports and, as 
discussed elsewhere, tensions between Moscow and Estonia over the status of ethnic 
Russians have already resulted in violence and cyber-attacks. Indeed, worries over 
Russian irredentism were behind the decision to move the capital city of Kazakhstan 
from Almaty in the south to Astana in the north, where most of the country's Russian 
population resides.
351
 Recent controversies in Ukraine, particularly in the Crimea, have 
also highlighted some of the deep divisions in Ukrainian society, where many people not 
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only hold strong feelings of connection with Russia, but hold Russian passports as well. 
Such connections could, in the future, leave Ukraine open to Russian “passport politics.” 
Despite the possibility of using passportization to pressure its neighbors into 
complying with Moscow‟s wishes, it seems unlikely that Russia will attempt to use 
passportization as an excuse to aggrandize itself territorially; indeed, since the collapse of 
the USSR, Russia has shown little inclination toward territorial expansion. Despite its 
deep involvement in the political, economic, and defense institutions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, for instance, Russia has not attempted to annex either one, even though 
three years have now passed since the Five Day War. This suggests that, should 
passportization be employed elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, it may follow the 
same pattern as it did in Georgia: Moscow will slowly tighten its grip over a passportized 
population and gradual shift the discourse to emphasize the priority of Russia‟s personal 
and territorial competence over the territory where that population resides. As in Georgia, 
the purpose of passportization would be to ensure compliance, rather than to deliberately 
precipitate a war. Whether such a strategy can succeed in the absence of the sorts of 
quasi-autonomous state structures that existed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an open 
question, though research by Svante Cornell would seem to suggest that autonomy is a 
fairly crucial factor in separatism in the former Soviet Union.
352
 
What will ultimately become of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is still an open 
question. As discussed in the previous chapter, Abkhazia in particular is beginning to 
chafe under what is increasingly seen as being an overbearing Russian presence, but aside 
from attempting to carve a small portion out of Abkhaz territory near Sochi, Russia has 
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shown no interest in incorporating the new states into its own territory. Legally, the new 
states remain in limbo: international law maintains that they are still part of Georgia, 
while the treaties turning defense of their borders over to the Russian military underscore 
the fact that it will likely be very difficult for Tbilisi to reestablish its jurisdiction in its 
erstwhile provinces.  
More than anything, then, the Five Day War was the latest major episode in a 
much longer contest between Georgia and Russia. While Russia has consistently sought 
to establish itself as a regional hegemon, Georgia, especially in the early 1990s and again 
since 2003, has attempted to escape the orbit of the former imperial center. At stake 
throughout the entire period following in the wake of the Soviet collapse was the 
territorial status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Georgia maintained were integral 
parts of its territory and which Moscow, following classic geopolitical logic, viewed as 
crucial for maintaining its grip on Tbilisi and thereby securing its southern flanks. The 
conflicts in Georgia were as much between Georgia and Russia as they were between 
Georgia and the de facto regimes. As such, passportization effectively decided their 
outcome in Russia‟s favor long before the shooting actually began in August of 2008. 
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APPENDIX 
MAPS 
 147 
Figure 1: Map of the Republic of Georgia 
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Figure 2: The Distribution of Ethnic Russians in the Former Soviet Union 
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Figure 3: Russian Military Bases in Georgia 
 150 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
A Dictionary of Law, 7
th
 ed., s.v. “annexation.” Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009. 
 
Alatout, Samer. "Towards a Bio-Territorial Conception of Power: Territory, Population, 
and Environmental Narratives in Palestine and Israel." Political Geography 25 
(2006): 601-621. 
 
Allen, Nick. “Soviet break-up was geopolitical disaster, says Putin.” The Telegraph, 
April 25, 2005, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1488723/Soviet-break-up-
was-geopolitical-disaster-says-Putin.html (accessed February 15, 2011). 
 
Amoore, Louise. "Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror." 
Political Geography 25 (2006): 338. 
 
Anchabadze, Jurij. “History: The Modern Period.” In The Abkhazians: A Handbook, 
edited by George Hewitt. 132-146. Richmond: Curzon, 1999. 
 
Antonenko, Oksana. "Frozen Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict Over Abkhazia." In 
Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution, edited by Bruno 
Coppieters and Robert Levgold. 205-270. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.  
 
Areshidze, Irakly. Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007. 
 
Asmus, Ronald. A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of 
the West. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010. 
 
Avraamova, A., L. Ovcharova. “The Financial Crisis of August 1998: Did Russia‟s 
Middle Class Withstand the Blow?” Problems of Economic Transition 44, no. 1 
(2001): 6. 
 
Baev, Pavel. “Russia‟s Departure from Empire: Self-Assertiveness and a New Retreat.” 
In Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory, Identity, edited by Ola 
Tunader, Pavel Baev, and Victoria Einagel. 174-195. London: Sage. 1997. 
 
Baev, Pavel. "The Trajectory of the Russian Military: Downsizing, Degeneration, and 
Defeat." In The Russian Military: Power and Policy, edited by Steven Miller and 
Dmitri Trenin. 43-72. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 
 
Bassin, Mark, Konstantin Aksenov. “Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in Post-Soviet 
Geopolitical Discourse.” Geopolitics, 11, no. 99 (2006): 99-118. 
 
 151 
Bauer, Otto. The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000. 
 
Bennett, Andrew. Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-
Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. 
 
Bgazhba, Oleg. “History: First-18th Centuries.” In The Abkhazians: A Handbook, edited 
by George Hewitt. 59-66. Richmond: Curzon, 1999. 
 
Billingsley, Dodge. "Military Aspects of the War: The Turning Point." In The 
Abkhazians: A Handbook, edited by George Hewitt. 147-156. Richmond: Curzon, 
1999. 
 
Broxup, Marie B. "Volga Tatars." In The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, 
edited by Graham Smith, 277-289. New York, Longman, 1990. 
 
Buszynski, Leszek. Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War. Westport: Praeger, 1996. 
 
Caldwell, Lawrence. "Russian Concepts of National Security." In Russian Foreign Policy 
in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past, edited by Robert Levgold. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
 
Church, George, Sally Donnelly, and Ann Simmons. “Next, a Cold Peace?” Time.com, 
December 19, 1994. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,982016,00.html (accessed 
November 14, 2010). 
 
Churkin, Vitaly. "Letter dated 11 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council." S/2008/545, 2008. 
 
Cohan, John. “The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense 
in Customary International Law.” Pace International Law Review 15, no. 2 (2003): 
283-357. 
 
Connor Walker. "Man is a R
N
ational Animal." In Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding. 195-209. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Conquest, Robert. The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-
Famine. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Conquest, Robert, ed. The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future. Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 
 
Cornell, Svante. Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in 
the Caucasus. Richmond: Curzon, 2001. 
 152 
 
Corso, Molly. "Georgia: Russian Border Guards in Abkhazia, South Ossetia Pose New 
Challenges for Tbilisi." Eurasianet.org, May 11, 2009. 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav051209c.shtml (accessed 
April 13, 2011). 
 
Corso, Molly. "Georgian IDPs Face Evictions at Start of New Year." Eurasianet.org, 
December 23, 2010. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62631 (accessed January 12, 
2011). 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. The Propiska System Applied to Migrants, 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Council of Europe Member States: Effects and 
Remedies. Doc. 9262. 2001. 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc01/edoc9262.htm (accessed 
March 12, 2011) 
 
Cutts, Noelle. "Enemies Through the Gates: Russian Violations of International Law in 
the Georgia/Abkhazia Conflict." Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
40, no. 281 (2008): 281-310. 
 
Dalby, Simon. “Regions, Strategies and Empire in the Global War on Terror.” 
Geopolitics 12 (2007): 590. 
 
Danilov, Dmitrii. “Russia‟s Role.” Conciliation Resources, September 1999. 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/russias-role.php (accessed May 
14, 2011). 
 
Derlugian, Georgi. Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System 
Biography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Devdariani, Jaba. “Georgia and Russia: The Troubled Road to Accommodation.” In 
Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution, edited by Bruno 
Coppieters and Robert Levgold.  153-204. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.  
 
Eck, Nathan. "Rescue of Jews with the Aid of Passports and Citizenship Papers of Latin 
American States." Yad Vashem Studies 1 (1957): 125-152. 
 
"European Diplomat on Russia-Georgia Conflict," Civil.ge March 23, 2011. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23270 (accessed April 18, 2011). 
 
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. New York: Vantage 
Books, 1990. 
 
Foucault, Michel. "Society Must be Defended": Lectures at the College de France 1975-
1976. New York: Picador, 2003. 
 
 153 
Gachechiladze, Revaz. The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics. College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 
 
Gammer, Moshe. The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of 
Russian Rule. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2006. 
 
Garcelon, Marc. "Colonizing the Subject: The Genealogy and Legacy of the Soviet 
Internal Passport." In Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State 
Practices in the Modern World, edited by Jane Caplan and John Torpey. 83-100. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. “Nationalism in the Vacuum.” In Thinking Theoretically About Soviet 
Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR, edited by Alexander 
Motyl, 243-254. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism, 2
nd
 Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006. 
 
Gfoeller, Tatiana, “Candid Discussion with Prince Andrew on the Kyrgyz Economy and 
the „Great Game,‟” Wikileaks.ch, 
http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08BISHKEK1095.html (accessed January 05, 
2011). 
 
Goble, Paul. “Only Palestine‟s Hamas Backs Kremlin‟s Recognition of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia.” Georgian Daily, August 27, 2008. 
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6756&Item
id=65 (accessed April 15, 2011). 
 
Goldman, Marshall. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Goltz, Thomas. “The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia‟s Descent into Chaos.” In 
The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, edited by Svante Cornell and S. 
Frederick Starr. 10-27. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe & Co., 2009.  
 
Goltz, Thomas. Georgia Diary Armonk: M.E. Sharpe & Co., 2006. 
 
Gorbachev, Mikhail. Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1987. 
 
Gorbachev, Mikhail. On My Country and the World. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000. 
 
Gordadze, Thornike. “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s.” In The Guns of August 
2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, edited by Svante Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, 28-
48. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe & Co., 2009. 
 154 
 
Green, James. "Passportisation, Peacekeepers and Proportionality: The Russian Claim of 
the Protection of Nationals Abroad in Self-Defense." In Conflict in the Caucasus: 
Implications for International Legal Order, edited by James Green and Christopher 
Waters. 54-79. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan 2010. 
 
Hahaylo, Bohdan, Victor Swoboda. Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities 
Problem in the USSR. New York: The Free Press, 1990. 
 
Hanauer, Lawrence. “The Irrelevance of International Law to Ethno-National Conflict: A 
New Look at the Western Sahara Case.” Emory International Law Review 9, no. 133 
(1995): 133-177. 
 
Helly, Damien, Giorgi Gogia. “Georgian Security and the Role of the West.” In 
Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution, edited by Bruno 
Coppieters and Robert Levgold. 271-306. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.  
 
Hosking, Geoffrey. Russia: People and Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001. 
 
Illarionov, Andrei. “The Russian Leadership‟s Preparation for War, 1999-2008.” In The 
Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, edited by Svante Cornell and S. 
Frederick Starr, 49-84. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe & Co., 2009. 
 
Imedashvili, Aleksandr, Igor Belov. “Renewed Fighting in Abkhazia – Russian 
Peacekeepers on the Sidelines for Now.” Current Digest of the Russian Press 50, no. 
20 (1998): 19. 
 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG). 
Report Vols. 1-3. 2009.  
 
International Court of Justice. Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) (Liechtenstein v 
Guatemala), Summary of the Judgment of 6 April, 1955. April 6, 1955. 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/addHit.php?summaryID=215&case=18&lang=en 
(accessed March 11, 2011). 
 
Kaiser, Robert. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Kandelaki, Ana. "South Ossetia: Ethnic Georgians Alarmed at New Passport." Institute 
for War  & Peace Reporting, June 11, 2010. http://iwpr.net/report-news/south-
ossetia-ethnic-georgians-alarmed-new-passport (accessed March 18, 2011). 
 
Kaplan, Marion. Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
 155 
Khashig, Inal. "Abkhaz Rush for Russian Passports." Institute for War & Peace 
Reporting, June 27, 2002, http://iwpr.net/report-news/abkhaz-rush-russian-passports 
(accessed March 21, 2011). 
 
King, Charles, Neil Melvin. “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and 
Security in Eurasia.” International Security, 24, no. 3 (1999): 108-138. 
 
King, Charles. The Ghost of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Kotkin, Stephen. Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
 
Krutikov, Yevgeny. "Russia Signs a Friendship Treaty with Georgia – Friendship with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia is Called in Question." In Countdown to War in 
Georgia: Russia's Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, 59-61. Minneapolis: Eastview Press, 2008. 
 
Kubicek, Paul. "Russian Foreign Policy and the West." Political Science Quarterly 114, 
no. 4 (1999): 561. 
 
Lak‟oba, Stanislav. "History: 18th Century – 1917." In The Abkhazians: A Handbook, 
edited by George Hewitt, 67-88. Richmond: Curzon, 1999. 
 
Laitin, David. Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near 
Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
 
Laitin, David, Roger Petersen, and John Slocum, "Language and the State: Russia and the 
Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective." In Thinking Theoretically About Soviet 
Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR, edited by Alexander 
Motyl, 129-168. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
 
Larsson, Robert. “The Enemy Within: Russia‟s Military Withdrawal from Georgia.” 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17, no. 3 (2004): 405-424. 
 
Littlefield, Scott. “Citizenship, Identity and Foreign Policy: The Contradictions and 
Consequences of Russia‟s Passport Distribution in the Separatist Regions of 
Georgia.” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 8 (2009): 1461-1482. 
 
Lo, Bobo. Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and 
Mythmaking. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002. 
 
Lucas, Edward. The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West. New 
York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008. 
 
Luxemburg, Rosa. The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, edited 
by Horace B. Davis. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. 
 156 
 
Lynch, Dov. Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, 
Georgia and Tajikistan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 
 
Lynch, Dov. Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2004. 
 
Mackinder, Halford. "The Geographical Pivot of History (1904)." The Geographical 
Journal 170, no. 4 (2004): 298-321. 
 
Mankoff, Jeffrey. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. 
 
Martin, Terry. The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
 
McCorquodale, Robert, Kristin Haulser. “Caucuses in the Caucasus: The Application of 
the Right of Self-Determination.” In Conflict in the Caucasus: Implications for 
International Legal Order, edited by James Green and Christopher Waters. 26-53. 
New York: Palgrave-Macmillan 2010. 
 
McDonald, David. "Domestic Conjunctures, the Russian State, and the World Outside, 
1700-2006." In Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow 
of the Past, edited by Robert Levgold. 145-204. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007.  
 
McElroy, Damien. "South Ossetian police tell Georgians to take a Russian passport, or 
leave their homes." The Telegraph, August 30, 2008. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2651836/South-
Ossetian-police-tell-Georgians-to-take-a-Russian-passport-or-leave-their-homes.html 
(accessed March 18, 2011). 
 
Miller, Steven. "Moscow's Military Power: Russia's Search for Security in an Age of 
Transition." In The Russian Military: Power and Policy, edited by Steven Miller and 
Dmitri Trenin. 1-42. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 
 
Minogue, Keith, Beryl Williams. “Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union: The Revenge of 
Particularism.” In Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and 
Comparison in the Study of the USSR, edited by Alexander Motyl. 225-242. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
 
Mirsky, Georgiy I., On Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former Soviet 
Union. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997. 
 
Mitchell, Lincoln. Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose 
Revolution. Philadelphia: PENN, 2009. 
 157 
 
Morozova, Natalia. “Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy under Putin.” 
Geopolitics 14 (2009): 667-686. 
 
"Moscow Says Deployed S-300 in Abkhazia in 2008." Civil.ge, August 15, 2010. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22599 (accessed April 12, 2011). 
 
Mühlfried, Florian. "Citizenship at War: Passports and Nationality in the 2008 Russian-
Georgian Conflict." Anthropology Today 26, no. 2 (2010): 8-13. 
 
Müller, Daniel. “Demography: Ethno-Demographic History, 1886-1989.” In The 
Abkhazians: A Handbook, edited by George Hewitt, 218-240. Richmond: Curzon, 
1999. 
 
Murphy, Alexander. “Territorial Ideology and Interstate Conflict: Comparative 
Considerations.” In The Geography of War and Peace: From Death Camps to 
Diplomats, edited by Colin Flint. 280-296. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Murphy, Alexander. “Identity and Territory.” Geopolitics 15 (2010): 769-772. 
 
Nasmyth, Peter. Georgia: A Rebel in the Caucasus. London: Cassell, 1992. 
 
Nodia, Ghia. "Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia." In Contested Borders in the Caucasus, edited by Bruno Coppieters, 
73-90. Brussels: VUBPRESS, 1996. 
 
Novikov, Vladimir, Gennady Sysoev. “Be Georgian or You Will Lose.” Kommersant, 
June 3, 2004. http://kommersant.ru/doc/480078 (accessed May 15, 2011). 
 
O‟Loughlin, John, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, and Vladimir Kolossov. “Russian Geopolitical 
Culture and Public Opinion: The Masks of Proteus Revisited.” Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 30 (2005): 322-335. 
 
Ostergren, Robert. “Defining Liechtenstein.” In Borderlines and Borderlands, edited by 
Alexander Diener and Joshua Hagen. 137-154. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. 
 
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "Russia's Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War 
over South Ossetia." Eurasian Geography and Economics, 49, no. 6 (2008): 670-705. 
 
Paasi, Anssi. Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of 
the Finnish-Russian Border. New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1996. 
 
Page, Stephen. “The Creation of a Sphere of Influence: Russia and Central Asia.” 
International Journal 49, no. 4 (1994): 788-813. 
 
 158 
Parsons, Robert. "Georgians." In The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, edited 
by Graham Smith, 180-198. New York: Longman, 1990. 
 
Paul, Joel. “The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary International Law?” 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 27 (2004): 457-479. 
 
Pikayev, Alexander A. “The Russian Domestic Debate on Policy Toward the „Near 
Abroad.‟” In Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, edited by Lena Jonson 
and Clive Archer. 51-66. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. 
 
Pipes, Richard. A Concise History of the Russian Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 
1996. 
 
Pipko, Simona, Albert Pucciarelli. "The Soviet Internal Passport System." The 
International Lawyer 915 (1985): 915-920. 
 
Popescu, Nicu. “„Outsourcing‟ de facto Statehood: Russia and the Secessionist Entities in 
Georgia and Moldova.” CEPS Policy Briefs 109, 2006. 
 
Prozorov, Sergei. “Russian Postcommunism and the End of History.” Studies in East 
European Thought 60 (2008): 207-230. 
 
Putin, Vladimir. “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 
(2004).” 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029type82912_71650
.shtml (accessed November 02, 2010). 
 
Putin, Vladimir. “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 
(2005).” 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086
.shtml (accessed November 02, 2010). 
 
Putin, Vladimir. “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium.” In Russian Foreign Policy in 
Transition: Concepts and Realities, edited by Andrei Melville and Tatiana Shakleina. 
222-234. New York: Central European University Press, 2005. 
 
Putin, Vladimir. "Speech at the 43
rd
 Munich Conference on Security Policy." Munich 
Security Conference. 2007. 
http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu
_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=179& (accessed November 03, 
2010). 
 
Quigley, John. "The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama." Yale Journal of 
International Law 15 no. 276 (1990): 276-315. 
 
Rabinow, Paul. "Biopower Today." Biosocieties 1 (2006): 195-217. 
 159 
 
Republic of Georgia. The Constitution of the Republic of Georgia. 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL(2004)041-e.pdf. (accessed May 04, 2011). 
 
Rorlich, Azade-Ayse. The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience. Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 
 
Rubins, Noah. "The Demise and Resurrection of the Propiska: Freedom of Movement in 
the Russian Federation." Harvard International Law Journal 39, no. 2 (1998): 545-
566. 
 
Russian Federation. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.” In Russian 
Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, edited by Andrei Melville and 
Tatiana Shakleina, 27-64. New York: Central European University Press, 2005.  
 
Sengupta, Anita. Heartlands of Eurasia: The Geopolitics of Political Space. Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2009. 
 
Shearer, David. Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet 
Union, 1924-1953. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 
 
Shelley, Louise. Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control. New York: 
Routledge, 1996. 
 
Sherr, James. “The Implications of the Russia-Georgia War for European Security.” In 
The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, edited by Svante Cornell and S. 
Frederick Starr, 196-224. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe & Co., 2009. 
 
Shirer, William. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. 
 
Slider, Darrel. "Democratization in Georgia." In Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, edited by Karen Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott, 
156-198. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Smith, David. "The Saakashvili Administration‟s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 
2008 War." In The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, edited by Svante 
Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, 122-142. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe & Co., 2009.  
 
Smith, Graham. “The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift, and the New 
Eurasianism.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24 (1999): 481-
494. 
 
Smith, Sebastian. Allah’s Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus. New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 1998. 
 
 160 
Sokov, Nikolai. “The Withdrawal of Russian Military Bases from Georgia: Not Solving 
Anything.” PONARS Policy Memo 363, 2005. 
 
Stalin, Josef. "Marxism and the National Question." In Marxism and the National 
Question: Selected Writings and Speeches. 7-68. New York: International Publishers, 
1942. 
 
Stalin Josef. "The National Question and the Soviet Constitution." In Marxism and the 
National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches. 217-222. New York: 
International Publishers, 1942. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2
nd
 edition. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994. 
 
Sysoev, Gennady, Novikov, Vladimir. “Georgia Moves Forward.” Kommersant, June 1, 
2004. http://kommersant.ru/doc/479204 (accessed May 12, 2011). 
 
Taylor, Peter. “The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System.” 
Progress in Human Geography 18, no.2 (1994): 151-162. 
 
"Tbilisi Condemns Deployment of Tochka-U in S. Ossetia." Civil.ge, January 24, 2011. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23078 (accessed April 11, 2011). 
 
Thomas, Timothy. “The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-
Day War in South Ossetia.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22 (2009): 31-67. 
 
 
Torpey, John. The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Townley, Barbara. "Foucault, Power/Knowledge, and its Relevance for Human Resource 
Management." The Academy of Management Review 18, no. 3 (1993): 518-545. 
 
Treisman, Daniel. The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev. New 
York: Free Press, 2010. 
 
Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia‟s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region.” In 
Contested Borders in the Caucasus, edited by Bruno Coppieters. 91-102 Brussels, 
VUBPRESS, 1996.  
 
Vigansky, Mikhail. “Next Stop – Sukhumi: Abkhazia Wants to Protect Itself From the 
Export of the Georgian Revolution.” Vremya novostei, May 20, 2004. 
http://www.vremya.ru/2004/85/5/98709.html (accessed March 04, 2011). 
 161 
 
Wheatley, Jonathan. Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed 
Transition in the Former Soviet Union. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005. 
 
Whitmore, Brian. "A Russian Land Grab in Abkhazia?" Radio Free Europe, March 30, 
2011. http://www.rferl.org/content/blog/3542144.html (accessed April 13, 2011). 
 
Wixman, Ronald. Language Aspects of Ethnic Patterns and Processes in the North 
Caucasus. Chicago: University of Chicago Dept. of Geography, 1980. 
 
Wixman, Ronald. "Applied Soviet Nationality Policy: A Suggested Rationale." In Turco-
Tatar Past Soviet Present: Studies Presented to Alexandre Bennigsen, edited by 
Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Gilles Veinstein, S. Enders Wimbush, 449-468. Paris: 
Editions de l Ecole des hautes  tudes en sciences sociales, 1986. 
 
Wixman, Ronald. "The Middle Volga: Ethnic Archipelago in a Russian Sea." In Nation 
and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, edited by Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras. 
421-447. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
Yahil, Leni. “Raoul Wallenberg – His Mission and Activities in Hungary.” Yad Vashem 
Studies 15 (1983): 7-54. 
 
Yemelyanova, Polina. “Stalin‟s Special Settlements.” Master‟s thesis, University of 
Oregon, 2009. 
 
Zharmukhamed, Zardykhan. “Russians in Kazakhstan and Demographic Change: 
Imperial Legacy and the Kazakh Way of Nation Building.” Asian Ethnicity 5, no. 1 
(2004): 61-79. 
 
Zevelev, Igor. “Russia‟s Policy Toward Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union.” Russia 
in Global Affairs 6, no.1 (2008): 49-62. 
 
Zürcher, Christoph. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in 
the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press, 2007. 
 
 
